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ABSTRACT 
This thesis considers several aspects of consumer search theory. 
The thesis begins by giving a history of developments in consumer 
search theory since its inception in 1961. Various failings of the 
literature are discussed and the implications of some of these 
deficiencies are established, In particular, it is shown that fixed 
demand restrictions can be incorporated into neo~classical search 
models only with difficulty, 
In Chapter 2 an examination of some earlier sequential search 
models is made, It is found that the restrictions placed on these 
models are logically inconsistent, except in circumstances which are 
particularly unusual, A sequential consumer search model, which is 
not limited by these restrictions, is constructed and compared to 
the earlier models criticised. 
Chapter 3 points out that the search literature has largely 
ignored the problem of a searcher's rational choice of a preferred 
set of sellers to sample. The effects of marginal financial search 
costs, transaction costs and information on sellers' behaviour on this 
choice are described. Some implications of the analysis for advert-
ising strategies are presented, In addition it is shown that, in the 
circumstances considered, rational choice of search path results 
in the optimal sequential search strategy being myopic, 
In Chapter 4 a variety of statistical results are offered. The 
ex ante probability mass function of sequential search lengths is 
derived and some comparative statics results established. The ex 
ante probability density function of minimum observed prices resulting 
from optimal myopic sequential search is then derived, and its 
ies are compared to properties which it has 
to possess, It is found that some these 
not valid, 
The type of consumer search model is substant y 
extended in Chapter 5 through the use of the indirect util function. 
It is shown that the optimal search strategy cannot exclude the 
consumer's allocation decision~ as previous analyses have done, and 
thereby relaxes Stiglerts fixed order quantity restriction. Optimal 
search paths Stigleresque searchers are described, Comparat 
statics results are determined which describe the dependence of the 
quantity of search undertaken on the consumer's \veal th, psychic 
costs and. the nature of the searched~for commodity, 
In Chapter 6 a generalised search theory is described. This 
search behaviour is sufficiently general to include both the 
sequential and Stigleresque search behaviours as special cases. 
Consequently~ the analysis of this chapter resolves the debate over 
the relative merits of sequential and Stigleresque search rules. 
Chapter 7 offers some concluding remarks. 
3. 
CHAPTER I 
AN INTRODUCTION TO SEARCH PROBLEMS 
SECTION 1-1: SEARCH AS AN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: THE SEMINAL CONCEPTS 
I Price i is a term used with great facility and frequency by 
economists of all kinds. Much effort is directed towards understanding 
the effects of price changes on economic variables but most of these 
arguments and theories make severe assumptions about prices; assumptions 
which inhibit insights into the establishment, movements and persistence 
of price structures easily observable in the real world. One charac-
teristic of real world price structures which is of sufficient importance 
to prompt all of us to window shop, take notice of advertisements and 
take trouble to amass some considerable knowledge of price structures 
affecting us, is price dispersion. Yet the existence of price dispersion 
is flatly denied by main-line economic theory. For gains in analytic 
simplicity we have, from before this century, created a variety of 
devices to ensure the complications of price dispersion did not trouble 
the analysis of economic theories. The most persistently invoked device 
is the Walrasian auctioneer, an awesome creature mysteriously endowed 
with the tatonnement power to elucidate a single market clearing vector 
of prices to which all traders must adhere. Similar in concept and 
effect is Edgeworth's device of allowing provisional contracts between 
buyers and sellers - provisional in that should one agent locate a more 
advantageous contract he may disregard the first. Only when no advantage 
can be gained by additional recontracting does trading take place. The 
assumptions surrounding prices are probably at their most extreme in the 
general equilibrium models formulated by Arrow and Debreu. In these 
models, agents are not only overseen by the Walrasian auctioneer but 
4. 
enjoy the advantages of perfect futures as well, enabling a 
Pareto optimal set of contracts to be decided upon now contingent upon 
all future possible events. Whatever the name the mechanism assumed, 
all these devices have a central feature. No trading takes place until 
a single market clearing vector of prices is established. Such a 
restriction greatly facilitates the analysis of the theorists' models 
and the understanding that results can easily be said to justify the 
costs of the restriction. Nobody argues that the tatonnement process 
exists in real markets. The severity of the necessary supporting 
assumptions of perfect knowledge, cost less information, instantaneous 
trades etc. is obviously too great for any real world credibility to 
be attached to the process. 
Analytic gains have been made, but as part of the price paid for 
them we have little insight into how dispersed price structures arise 
and persist. Only recently have any attempts been made to formulate 
plausible theories describing price dispersion. The first attempt at 
explaining why price dispersion is present in markets where commodities 
are homogeneous, at least with respect to their physical characteristics, 
came only in 1961 when G.J. Stigler published the seminal paper on 
search as an information-producing economic activity [SOl. The theories 
on search which have developed are a promising attempt to incorporate 
price dispersion into economic theory. They are motivated by the simple 
observation that, in the real world, information about uncertainties is 
desirable but costly. Stigler, presumably prompted by this observation 
and musings of the kind above, wrote [SOJ "Price dispersion is a mani-
festation - and, indeed, it is the measure - of ignorance in the market" 
and "One should hardly have to tell academicians that information is a 
valuable resource: knowledge is power. And yet it occupies a slum 
dwelling in the town of economics. Mostly it is the best 
technology is assumed to be known; re of commodities to 
consumer preferences is a datum. And one of the information-producing 
industries, advertising, is treated with a hostility that economists 
normally reserve for tariffs or monopolists." A second paper [51] in 
very similar vein to the first is the seminal paper on 'job search'. 
Separate, but complementary, literatures of increasing sophistication 
are accumulating behind each of these papers. A review of these 
literatures, biased towards consumer search, is contained in Section 1-2. 
In anticipation of this review, Stigler's seminal concepts on search as 
an information-producing activity are now presented, 
The search literature subsequent to Stigler has incompletely 
captured important aspects of the problem, as this thesis will show. 
The seminal paper is more conceptual than formally precise. Subsequent 
criticisms make it appear as though the main thrust of the paper was to 
describe individual search behaviour but in fact the main thrust was an 
attempt to explain the causal factors of price dispersion. Stigler's 
consumer search model [SOJ initially considers an individual consumer 
who wishes to purchase a particular quantity of a particular commodity. 
Prices in this commodity market are dispersed and Stigler introduces 
the search activity by saying "A buyer (or seller) who wishes to 
ascertain the most favourable price must canvass various sellers (or 
buyers) - a phenomenon I shall term 'search' ,II [50, p.213J The 
quantity demanded is determined prior to search and is not revised as 
search proceeds. How the consumer determines his demand is not explained. 
The commodity is assumed homogeneous throughout the market to avoid 
considerations of difference in quality. Relative likelihoods of 
different values of the price are described by a probability density 
function (p.d.f.), fep), the functional form 
are known exactly to the consumer. With a 
no 
since 
the 
can then be al 
costs, the consumer's most 
of 
of the commodity, 
to other commodities. never 
al 
6. 
which 
and 
lowest 
to 
I from search 
lici tly 
stated as the motive for search as an economic activity but it is 
difficult to see what else he could have had in mind. He states "For 
any buyer the expected savings from an additional unit search will be 
approximately the quantity (q) he wishes to purchase times the expected 
reduction in price as a result of the search" and that "The expected 
savings from given search will be greater, the greater 
prices. The saving will also obviously be 
expenditure on commodity" [50, p.215]. The 
dispersion of 
the 
consumer's 
search is costly and of diminishing marginal value. "Whatever the 
precise distribution of prices, it is certain that search will 
yield diminishing returns as measured by the expected reduction in the 
minimum asking price" [50, p.2lS] and "The cost of search, for a consumer, 
may be taken as approximately proportional to the number of (identified) 
sellers approached, for the chief cost is time. This cost not be 
equal for all consumers, of course: aside from in taste, 
time will be more valuable to a person with a income" [50, p, 
Correctly assumed. but not proven, by Stigler that non-zero costs 
and diminishing expected value of search are 
conditions to ensure the Stigleresque searcher will wish to 'canvass' 
only a number of sellers. Stigler gave the rule determining 
the amount of 
commodity as "If 
which minimises expected expenditure on the 
cost of search is equated to its expected marginal 
return 
A 
is 
purchases 
optimum ~fiount of search will be 
to 
only 
rule is liThe equation 
a unique purchase is 
used book, etc. If purchases are 
upon the search must be 
of search calculation is carried out 
and the amount of search so decided upon 
proceeds. 
not 
[50 p.216], 
search 
a , a 
, the volume 
[50, p.218J. 
commences 
as 
devoted the latter and larger part of his paper to 
sellers behaviour. It is perhaps surprising, therefore, that 
few of the subsequent writers explicitly consider the sel 's of 
ly 
the market. Stigler noted that sellers may also indulge in search "Of 
course, the sel can also engage in search and, in the case of unique 
items, will occasionally do so in the literal fashion that do. 
In this empirically unimportant - case, the optimwn amount of 
will be such that the marginal cost of search equals the 
increase in receipts, strictly parallel to the analysis for buyers" 
[50, p.216J. For the most part, however, the Stigleresque seller 
described as "Each dealer sets a selling price, p, and makes sales to 
all buyers whom the minimum asking price". "We should 
generally high-price sellers to be small volume sellers" 
[50, p.217J. The seller is thus restricted to 
the same 
As 
to each buyer who contacts him. 
, a desirable outcome from the 
search a theory explaining persistent price dispersion 
market at equi although a new definition of 'equilibrium' may 
have to be coined for this occasion. Stigler asserts persistent 
dispersion to be the consequence of a perpetual stock of ignorance on 
a 
8. 
the part of both buyers and sellers. He says, liThe mainten.ance of 
appreciable dispersion of prices arises chiefly out of the fact that 
knowledge becomes obsolete. The conditions of supply and demand, and 
therefore the distribution of asking prices, change over time. There 
is no method by which buyers and sellers can ascertain the new average 
price in the market appropriate to the new conditions except by search. 
Sellers cannot maintain perfect correlation of successive prices, even 
if they wish to do so, because of the costs of search. Buyers accordingly 
cannot make the amount of investment in search that perfect correlation of 
prices would justify. The greater the instability of supply and/or 
demand conditions, therefore, the greater the dispersion of prices will 
be" [50, p.220]. 
Theories of search thus rely neither upon a Walrasian auctioneer 
nor upon the restriction that all arbitrage occur at the same instant of 
time. Removing these simplifications, which are crucial to main-line 
economic theory, poses severe problems. The most immediate problem is 
to define an equilibrium in the resulting markets. The Arrow-Debreu 
equilibrium notion that net demand must equal total resources at 
equilibrium (see [8, p.76J) is no longer adequate. The real world 
phenomena of unsold stocks and unsatisfied demands may well be present 
in the new equilibrium (see [18, p.261J for one example of an equilibrium 
with this property). A description of an equilibrium is meaningful only 
if the equilibrium exists. The problems of proving existence and 
examining if such equilibria are attainable are set in the context of 
dynamic markets in which different agents may trade at different times 
and at different real prices. Consequently, these tasks will be con-
siderably more difficult than the comparable proofs evolved for the 
perfectly competitive model. 
but we 
of 
the 
St ler continued in his paper to 
1 now turn our attention to 
job search model is a 
consumer search model. The 
by a searching 
the 
on job 
now 
lowest 
commodity A closely similar search rule was - "A worker 
will search for wage offers (and an emplayer will wage 
demands) until the marginal return equals the marginal cost 
of search" [51, p.96J. Again the amount of search carried out is 
determined prior to search and is not revised as search proceeds. It 
would be repetitious to outline the job search model fully. Accordingly, 
the reader invited to infer the structure of the job model 
by analogy to the consumer search model described above. 
The seminal concepts have been described. In the following 
section an account given of how subsequent authors have developed 
and criticised 's ideas. In Section 1-3, the , s 
is drawn to inadequacies 11 remaining in search models and a 
description of how this thesis resolves some of them, Section 1-4 
describes some of the possible variations on the search problem theme, 
explains how the elucidates their differences. compares their 
conclusions, and them. 
Section 1-2: A HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SEARCH MODELS 
This section 
Stigler's seminal 
of the seminal 
search literature is 
literature, since 
the that have accumulated behind 
[50J and [51J, and criticisms and refinements 
Although and more varied, the job 
attention than the consumer search 
is primarily concerned with consumer search. 
either 
's optimal search rule. McCal 
(1965) to draw attention to the between a 
fixed-sample-size search rule and a 
rule [31J. In a later paper (1970) McCall [32J ly applied a 
sequential rule to a job search problem and Bayesian 
analysis is applicable to those search problems where the 
p,d, of wages (prices) is in some way not comp known to the 
searcher, McCall's survey paper [30] repeated and in 
addition called attention to the use of martingales in problems, 
These three initial modifications to Stigler's original analyses are 
commonly included in subsequent research and are elaborated upon 
Sections 2-3, 2-5, 2-6, 2-7, 3-7 and Chapter 6, McCall's job search 
comments gave impetus to similar work on consumer 
Nelson [ J and Te1ser [52J and then Gastwirth [llJ 
[43J criticised Stigler's consumer search rule, 
Rothschild [411, 
was 
that sequential search rules are always optimal and that "fixed-sample-
size rules ... are not the best search procedures and are in some 
circumstances simply silly" [43, p. 691]. The Telser, Gastwirth, Rothschild 
consumer search models are similar to the model, but differ in 
that marginal search costs are solely the sa~le for each 
observation, the p,d,f. of selling f(p) is not always completely 
known. and, as mentioned, the search rules are Both the 
Telser and Gastwirth papers [52J, [11J are Monte Carlo studies directed 
at determining the sensitivity of rules to the parameters con-
ditioning them. Teiser's results, derived a of p.d.f.'s 
f(p), first completely known and secondly unknown. indicate 
"the gain from search is modest unless (finanaial)* marginal cost 
* My ics 
1 " 
of search is a very small percentage of minimum or the 
range (of prices) * is very large" [52, p,4SJ. Gastwirth's study [l1J 
supports Stigler's assertion that positive bet\'Jeen price 
observations reduces the optimal search length and shows mis~ 
specifying the optimal search rule through incorrect knowledge of the 
p,d.f. of selling prices fep) can result in expensive errors in the 
number of observations taken. However, Gastwirth's const~er is not 
allowed to utilise his price observations to check if such a mis-
specification has occurred. It would be interesting to see if some 
such information feedback system significantly reduced the expense of 
such errors. Rothschild [43J adopts a more formal and rigorous approach 
to consumer search with his model. His consumer is provided with 
incomplete prior information about a discrete probability mass function 
(p.m.f.) of selling prices f(p) and utilises Bayes rule to refine this 
information with price observations taken during search. Rothschild 
examines the optimal search rule for his consumer and concludes that 
"the qualitative behaviour of persons searching optimally from unknown 
distributions is the same as that of persons searching optimally from 
known distributions" [43, p.708J. 
A much more general approach to sequential search problems is 
taken by Kohn and Shavell [20J. Their analysis is conducted specifically 
in utility terms, breaking with the use of consumer expenditure mini~ 
misation or job income stream maximisation as a proxy for utility 
maximisation. It will be shown in Section 2-6 that using consumer 
expendi ture minimisation as a proxy for utility maximisation is valid 
only when the consumer's utility function belongs to a particularly heavily 
restricted class of utility functions. These necessary restrictions 
have been ignored entirely by previous authors. Kohn and Shavell 
* My italics 
a who may take observations a 
X over which some probability 
lity distribution may be c0mpletely or ly to 
Upon making the jth observation x. the searcher oys an 
J 
immediate utility payoff of k. ex.)" [20, p.9SJ. In case of consu.mer 
J J 
is interpreted as the marginal search cost of j 
observation. Kohn and Shavell show that "in very general circumstances 
the optimal decision rule of an expected utility maximiser the 
form of a switchpoint level of utility s. If the of the best 
Xt available so far is higher than s, the search will end; otherwise 
will continue" [20, p. 93J . A variety of comparative results 
about the switchpoint s are presented, describing behaviour w.r.t. 
changes in time preference, search costs, risk the 
probability distribution over the population X. Proof 
optimal sequential stopping rules exist either when bounded 
above or when there is Bayesian learning about probability 
distribution over X and independence between observations 
Authors such as Danforth [6J, [7J. Pissarides [37J, Whipple [55J, 
Lippman and McCall [23J, to name a few, have substantially refined 
models of individuals' job search behaviour from McCall's original 
sequential search model [32J. Whipple's model J, examp 
incorporates non-linear utility functions, endogenously 11 
levels and preferences for different jobs, and search 
ion variables from merely the rates 
and search as well. Pissarides [37J also non-linear 
. 
functions in the development of a job 's optimal 
sequential search rule. Comparative statics and dynamic properties of 
the rule are examined for changes in the p.d.f. , search costs 
and it is shown that under some conditions it will be optimal for 
search to be temporarily halted and later resumed. In Section 6-1 
similar consumer behaviour is described as part of a 'generalised 
consumer search' model. The generality of this model is sufficiently 
great for it to be able to describe both fixed-sample-size search 
rules of the Stigler type and sequential search rules of the Rothschild, 
Gastwirth etc. type. Lippman and McCall [23J have produced a dynamic 
model in which they establish the optimal job search rule when the 
labour market's wage distribution varies from period to period according 
to a known Markov process. Lippman and McCall are also the authors of 
the currently most comprehensive survey [24J, [25J of the job search 
literature. 
Models attempting to explain how price dispersion may persist in 
a market at equilibrium must consider not only consumers' search 
behaviour but also consider sellers' responses to consumers' behaviour. 
The models described so far are one-sided in that they preserve Stigler's 
original assumption of passivity on the part of sellers. Models adopting 
the opposite stance have been developed by a number of authors. In 
these models, consumer behaviour is either passive or else unspecified. 
Typically a non-passive seller is considered not to indulge in search 
activity in the manner of a consumer because he finds it excessively 
costly. Instead, the seller is considered to wait until contacted by a 
searching consurner to whom the seller offers a price which the consumer 
may either accept or reject. The non-passivity is taken to mean that 
the seller may offer different prices to different buyers or may alter 
his price so as to alter the rate at which buyers contact him. A 
description of the first type of non-passive seller behaviour is 
provided by Manning [28J. Manning's seller ignores the actions of other 
I Ll '0 
sellers and offers the kth searcher who contacts him the kth 
a sequence of selling prices. The values of the prices in the sequence 
depend upon the seller's reservation price, the number of buyers who 
contact him and the p.dof. of reservation prices the seller assumes 
buyers possess. The sequence is not revised as buyers contact the 
seller. If all buyers are identical the sequence of prices offered is 
strictly decreasing. Fisher [10J provides a model in which competing 
sellers may offer different prices to buyers. The buyers' search 
behaviour is directed by sellers' relative prices to the extent that 
a seller offering a particular price must receive at least as many 
enquiries from searching buyers as a seller offering a higher price. 
Apart from this, buyers' search behaviour is left unspecified. The 
model is, however, relatively uninteresting in that sellers have 
identical cost curves, consumers have identical demand functions and 
search is costless. Not surprisingly, the model shows that any initial 
price dispersion eventually collapses to the perfectly competitive 
price. A more sophisticated version of Fisher's model has been put 
forward by Hey [15J. Hey's searchers use a Stigleresque fixed-s~lple-
size search rule and buy an endogenously determined quantity from the 
seller offering the smallest observed price. Sellers use buyers' 
reactions to their price offers to refine their knowledge of the buyers' 
identical demand functions and attempt to maximise profits. In contrast 
to Fisher'S model, Hey concludes that . any initial price dispersion 
collapses to the monopolistic price rather than the perfectly competitive 
price. However, Heyls results are invalid if his buyers are permitted 
to search sequentially. A comment by Hey [15, p.486, footnote 8J that 
sequential search is not applicable to his model is incorrect and 
invalidly referenced. Rothschild has presented a model [42J in which 
sel to maximise expected 
price dispersion, rOle sellers 
opportunities and the srune costs but 
iences customer acceptances and refusals of offered 
s, 
same 
lead sellers to eventually offer different prices all time. As 
Rothschild con~ents, his sellers are not truly competitive 
model assumed that the flow of customers was independent of stores' 
actions1l [42, p,200J. Further comment on some of these models is 
contained a survey article by Rothschild [41J. 
A more aggressive seller is envisaged by Butters [3J who 
considers advertising strategies adopted by sellers competing for the 
favours of potential buyers. The advertisements are mailed at random 
to potential buyers and contain a price offer. The model is a of 
Stigleresque sellers model in that the sellers must decide upon 
number of advertisements to mail at the beginning of a period .and 
cannot revise the decision. A potential buyer must either accept 
lowest price offer received within the period or else leave the 
An effort by Butters to incorporate search by buyers into the model 
very rudimentary and, for the most part, buyers are taken to be 
The p.d. of transaction prices for the model is and 
properties examined. 
An effort to examine the properties of the probabil 
distributions search lengths and transaction prices has been 
Axell [1]. His Monte Carlo study is based upon a sequential 
by 
model which sellers are totally passive and buyers revise the knowledge 
of a unknown p.d.f. of selling prices as their searches 
Various empirical comparative statics results which Axell infers from 
his numerical are compared to the theoretical results derived 
6, 
in Sections 4-3 and 4-4. 
To model price dispersion realistically. it is necessary to 
combine optimal search by buyers with optimal seller response to such 
search. Such a combined analysis must be dynamic in some sense because 
search is necessarily a time consuming activity. Efforts to construct 
such models have been made by Mortensen [33J, Lucas and Prescott [27J, 
Ioannides [18J and Telser [53J. Mortensen's analysis was the first to 
appear (1970) and is an explicitly dynamic analysis of a labour market 
in which both workers and employers display competitive behaviour. 
Workers may sequentially search out employment opportunities in 
decentralised labour markets. Employers are competitive in their demand 
for labour in that the flow of searching workers to an employer is partly 
determined by the wage offered by the employer. Given an exogenously 
fixed turnover rate in the employed labour force, the model endogenously 
determines the unemployment rate and the rate of wage inflation. Many 
comparative statics results are also provided but few of these concern 
changes in the p.d.f. of wages. Nevertheless, Mortensen's model remains 
significant as the first effort to place the economics of information 
from search in a dynamic context. With this in mind it is interesting 
to compare it to Lucas and Prescott's model of wage dispersion in 
equilibrium labour markets. Theirs is a model of perfectly clearing 
sub-markets isolated from each other in some way. Workers may move 
between sub-markets but only at the cost of one period's unemployment. 
Product demands in the sub-markets are subject to random shocks which 
gi ve rise to wage differen'tials between sub-markets which, in turn, 
provide the incentive for workers to move between sub-markets. Wage 
dispersion and positive unemployment are shown to persist and some 
loosely argued welfare results are presented. However, as Butters 1.3J 
comments, model contributes little 
information. Lucas and Prescott's 
complete knowledge of his sub-market's product demand, 
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p.d.f.'s of all present and future states of all sub-markets. 
Such a plethora of information gives the worker little opportunity to 
the uncertainty he faces by searching. To date, the most 
model of nont&tonnement adjustment of price dispersion is Ioannides' 
model [18J. Buyers and sellers in a market may contact each other 
randomly. Should a contact occur, the seller will offer the buyer a 
price which reflects the seller's assessment of buyers' reservation 
prices. The buyer either accepts or rejects the offered price, without 
revealing his reservation price. A single unit of the commodity is 
should buyer and seller agree on a price. Given both buyers 
and sellers are expected utility maximisers, both the demand and supply 
of the market are solved simultaneously for an equilibrium 
as stationarity in the number of market participants and the p.d.f.'s 
of asking and reservation prices. Within such an equilibrium, prices 
are dispersed and some market participants' supplies and demands are 
not satisfied. Such equilibria are shown to exist provided market 
participants enter the market in a particular manner and remain in the 
market only a length of time. Ioannides does not show how 
such an equilibrium attained. 
This completes the presentation of what might be called ilmain 
stream" search that it follows directly from Stigler! s 
seminal are also a number of papers impinging on to 
the main stream some of are now presented. Stigler's original 
assumption of a homogeneous commodity market is retained in all of the 
models so , preventing any of them shedding any light on 
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the allied problem of demand for information about product qualities. 
Kihlstrom [19] has constructed a Bayesian model of consumer demand for 
such information in which he adopts the Lancaster notion (see [22, 
p.113-118J) that consumers purchase commodities not for the substance 
of the commodities. but for the utility provided by "attributes" 
possessed by the commodities. A commodity's quality is measured by 
the amounts of these attributes it possesses. In Kihlstrom's model 
consumers may purchase observations on variables related to commodity 
qualities prior to purchasing quantities of the commodities. The 
consumers' demands for the commodities are thus dependent on the consumer's 
observations on commodity qualities. 
Also common to all the search models presented is the underlying 
assumption that buyers' preferences are fixed. This is an assumption 
standard in neo-classical theory and one that is trivially valid for 
any static analysis. Search, however, is a dynamic activity so the 
question of how a searcher may revise his preferences is a meaningful 
problem. Revision of preferences was recognised as a problem in dynamic 
problems as long ago as 1898 by T. Veblen [54J and a large literature 
on the problem now exists. Recent general treatments of the problem 
have been presented by Gorman [12J and Krelle [21]. The problem has 
been extended by Cyert and De Groot [5J and by Long and Manning [26J 
to include a consumer's learning about his preferences. Such a consumer 
selects a present consumption pattern to maximise the utility derived 
from present and future consumption when this depends upon what he 
learns about his preferences from the consumption pattern chosen 
presently. 
Many papers have been presented which examine problems involving 
learning under conditions of uncertainty, Only those directly concerned 
with or closely related to the problems raised by Stigler are 
here. 
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That the search literature contains significant deficiencies 
is not surprising considering the youth of this branch of economic 
theory. The purpose of the next section is to point out the principal 
deficiencies. 
SECTION 1-3: DEFICIENCIES IN PRESENT SEARCH MODELS 
This section presents aspects of the search activity in which 
present consumer search models are usually deficient. Some of these 
deficiencies are at least partly remedied in later sections of this 
thesis. 
In standard neo-classical analysis, an economic agent is 
restricted in his actions by market conditions which are the result of 
other agents' actions. That a considerable number of additional 
restrictions are placed upon agents' actions in search models indicates 
the presence and nature of significant deficiencies in these models. 
Most of the restrictions can be placed into one of two categories -
restrictions on the consumer's utility fun<i:tion and restrictions on 
the degree of uncertainty in the market. Given there are many 
restrictions in use , it is immediate that there is no such ~;j ngle thing 
as the 'search problem'. A large variety of search problems is 
generated by any consistent combination of these restrictions. It 
seems that, by and large, writers on search problems have not clearly 
realised that this variety exists for few clearly interpret the 
problems they analyse. That one writer's results have provoked argument 
with another's is sometimes a consequence of different models being 
analysed and not a consequence of incorrect analysis by either party. 
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This is the heart of the conflict over which the Stig 
fixed-sample-size search rule and the sequential search rule of McCall, 
Rothschild etc. is optimal. The conflict is resolved in Chapter 6 
where a theoretical justification is given for the cold fact that both 
Stigleresque and sequential search behaviour are often used in the 
real world. 
Some of the variations possible on the search problem theme are 
discussed in the next section. The restrictions giving rise to these 
variations are now listed, 
Restrictions on the Consumer's Utility Function: 
(i) Frequently (eg. [lJ, [3J, [llJ, [43J, [50J, [52J, [53J) 
the consumer's utility function is restricted to those functions for 
which the consumer will always demand one unit of the searched for 
commodity, whatever the price-income situation facing the consumer. 
That demand is one unit in particular is merely a matter of choice of 
units. That demand for this commodity is independent of consumer 
wealth and the price of the commodity is shown in Section 1-4 to be 
severely restrictive in a neo-classical world. It is intuitive that 
the consumer's budget allocation decision must be an integral part of 
his adaptive search strategy. Observed prices influence his expectations 
on the utility maximising allocation possible from extending his search 
further and so play an important part in determining the extent of his 
search and the gains received from it. It is therefore surprising that, 
despite the considerable attention paid to search rules, no writers 
(with one possible exception) have allowed that prices observed during 
search and changes in consumer wealth due to financial costs of search 
will usually cause changes in the consumer's demands. This is one of 
two 
Kohn and 
single deficiencies in the consumer 
11 [20J can possibly be 
they approach sequential search problems in a 
manner to allow an interpretation of their work as a consumer 
an adaptive allocation and search rule, However, not 
possibi 
(ii) Frequently it is assumed that a conswner's 
is will always choose to accompany his 
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function 
the 
market with purchase of a non-zero quantity of the searched 
commodity. The consumer's market-exit decisions are thus excluded 
from discussion (see [lJ, [3J, [11J. [43J, [50J, [52J). If restriction 
(i) is present in a search model then it is necessary that restriction 
(ii) be also. Non-entry to the market or exit from market 
without purchasing any of commodity 1 is equivalent to demanding zero 
units of the searched for commodity and this would violate 
(i) . 
(iii) Almost invariably allied to restrictions (i) and (ii) 
the restriction that all consumers choose to search. There no con-
sideration of a consumer decision on market entry (see [lJ, [3], [11], 
[15J, [18], [32], [ • [43J, [50], [52J). 
(iv) Many analyses are carried out in monetary terms rather 
than utility terms. The underlying restriction in these analyses 
the consumer's ut 
on the searched 
function is such that minimisation of expenditure 
commodity is equivalent to utility maximisation 
(see [1], [3], [l1J, [43], [50J, [52]). 
(v) Search costs are frequently assumed to be solely 
ie. to have no psychic component. They are therefore disincentives for 
search only that they reduce the utility attainable by reducing the 
consumer's initial wealth (see [1J, [3J, [11J, [43J, [52J). 
(vi) All search theorists (Kahn and Shavell [20] may 
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ibly be excepted) assume their searchers' functions are 
they will not choose to change from potential buyer to 
potential seller (or vice versa) during their searches. In real 
however. a potential buyer of additional units of the for 
commodity could observe prices high enough to persuade him to sell some 
of his endowment of the commodity and allocate the proceeds to purchases 
of other commodities. For instance, a person seeking to hire a plumber 
may find the prices high enough to induce him to give up some of his 
leisure time to perform plumbing services for others. The restriction 
also avoids having to consider speculative activities, always a possi-
bility in real world markets with dispersed prices and incomplete 
individual knowledge of these prices. A commodity speculator must both 
buy and sell the commodity. Assuming no individual can indulge in both 
buying and selling therefore has the effect of assuming speculation does 
not exist. 
Restrictions on the Level of Uncertainty in the Market: 
(vii) Searchers are assumed to have either an exact knowledge of 
their wealth at all times or to have some way of determining their 
utility maxinlising allocation of wealth without an exact knowledge 
what wealth actually is. This assumption is never 
but implicit in every search model known to this 
(viii) are assumed to have an exact knowledge of all 
search costs possible at any time before or during search. The assumption 
avoids the complications involved in a consideration of the searcher's 
bel about search costs a consideration which would not contribute 
to the understandings gained from s 
(ix) The searched for commodity assumed to 
market. Yet this assumption denies one of the sources 
ion, the phenomenon which search models seek to 
The assumption is made to avoid what is essentially an aggregation prob 
It is obvious that a rational consumer will choose to buy a 
vacuum cleaner for $50 from a seller who offers a three year warrantee 
than for $50 from a seller who offers no warrantee at all. The 
question ,therefore, should these two vacuum cleaners be 
identical commodities? To what degree of coarseness should any aggregation 
be carried? A possible escape from this problem to adopt 
Lancastrian notion that a consumer purchases a commodity for the 
'attributes' possessed by the commodity (see [22, p.lI3-118]), 
concept sidesteps the need to consider differences .in 
physical characteristics, warranties, etc. Olsen [36] adopts an 
attitude towards a housing market where it is assumed that an 
called "housing service" is bought and sold. However, commodity 
geneity and the Lancastrian analogue of restriction (i), that 
consumer's demand for the searched for attribute always one unit, 
together imply that different quantities of commodities with this attribute 
will be purchased. Variable quantities demanded are a degree of freedom 
earlier authors have found analytically and consequently they 
have chosen to assume homogeneity. Search models with discretely and 
continuously variable demands are analysed in 
tively. 
2 and 5 respec-
(x) Transaction costs are assumed not to The consequences 
of including transaction costs in search models are set out in Chapters 
2. 3 and 6. 
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(xi) If a searcher is to contact a certain set of sellers, 
then he will usually have a most preferred sequence in which to do 
this. Yet search models assume such sequences (called 'search paths' 
from now on) are indistinguishable in terms of costs and benefits. 
Search paths are examined in Chapter 3. 
(xii) The p.d.f. of selling prices is assumed static throughout 
the whole of an individual's search. This restriction is very common 
because of the great gains it offers in statistical simplicity. It 
implies both some kind of passivity on the part of sellers and some 
restrictions on their supply functions. There is no doubt that changes 
in the p.d.f. of selling prices do occur. Moreover, individuals are 
likely to perceive these changes only slowly so these changes must be 
a contributing factor to maintaining ignorance about prices and price 
dispersion in the market. The analytic difficulties encountered without 
this restriction are the principal reason why no researcher has yet 
succeeded in constructing a model showing a path by which a dis-equilibrium 
market with dispersed prices may attain an equilibrium with dispersed 
prices. 
(xiii) Sellers are assumed to offer a selling price to every 
buyer who contacts them and to be able to honour this offer should a 
buyer later return to take up an offer. This implie,s a serious 
restriction on both the sellers' supply functions and the amount of 
information about the market which must be possessed by individual 
sellers, each of whom must be able to satisfy any total demand made 
upon him by buyers who have previously contacted him, 
The usual motivation for introducing 
consurner search models seems to be a desire for 
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restrictions 
simplicity. 
Some of the restrictions can be introduced without greatly altering 
the nature of the model. For example, introducing restriction (viii) 
merely removes the need for using expected instead of actual costs. 
Most of these restrictions, however. have a substantial effect on the 
nature of the model if introduced. Some of these effects are not 
obvious. For example. in the next section it is shown that restrictions 
(i) and (v) can be combined consistently if and only if the consumer's 
preferences are not smooth. To the extent that all the restrictions 
damp factors giving rise to price dispersion, they all inhibit Stigler's 
original aim in formulating the search problem - seeking the causes of 
persistent price dispersion. 
The exclusion of the consumer allocation decision from the search 
rule was labelled earlier as one of the two greatest deficiencies in 
the consumer search literature. The second of these deficiencies is 
the incomplete fashion in which the literature specifies the way in 
which time constrains search. Search is necessarily a dynamic activity 
and time is therefore an important consideration for all searchers. 
For example, trading is commonly permitted only in certain periods -
retailers are commonly closed from evening until the next morning. 
Search is therefore confined to the daytime. The essential point is 
that the search method which is optimal for a searcher depends upon the 
constraints placed upon the searcher by time and other factors. 
the following three examples. 
Consider 
Example 1: A person wishes to build a house. 
with the advent of winter in two months time. 
House building ceases 
It will be far more 
costly to build the house next spring. One month is the time required 
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to build a house and builders need one month to prepare quotations 
for the job, Consequently, the person must solid t quotations now 
and may make more than one observation on prices by asking more than 
one builder for a quotation. Search thus lasts one period (one month) 
and the searcher takes at least one observation, possibly more, within 
the period. Time constraints make Stigleresque search the optimal 
method. 
Example 2: A person wishes to buy an object for which price quotations 
can be obtained only by visiting the seller in person. The searcher's 
transport difficulties prevent him from visiting more than one seller 
on anyone day (a period). The person's search may be carried out over 
many days but on anyone day only a single price observation is made. 
The constraints restricting the searcher make sequential search optimal. 
Example 3: A person wishing to buy an object is able to read adver-
tisements from sellers every morning in his daily paper. These 
advertisements carry selling price offers and thus constitute price 
observations. The number of advertisements in the paper may vary from 
day to day. If none of the offered prices on one morning are satisfactory, 
the searcher may wait until the next day to see what is offered then. 
Search may therefore persist over many periods and the number of 
observations taken in different periods may differ. Such search 
behaviour will be called "generalised search". Generalised search is 
an approach to search which is more capable than previous efforts of 
describing the search phenomena observed in the real world. It 
explicitly considers the consumer's market entry decision, his learning 
about the market he faces, the adaptive manner in which he decides upon 
the number of periods over which to persist in his search and the number 
of observations to take in successive periods. The approach specifically 
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includes consumer I S allocation problem allowing s to be 
variable as proceeds and allowing a of how 
he selects a seller (if any) from whom he quantity 
demanded. 
Some adaptive search is always optimal. above 
I 
examples demonstrate that in some circumstances the of the 
optimal rule may result in behaviour identical to that 
prescribed by the Stigleresque search rule or by the sequential search 
rule. Indeed, both behaviours are frequently observed in the real world, 
Sequential search behaviour is examined in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, 
Stigleresque search is examined in Chapter 5 and generalised 
Chapter 6. 
An examination of the search literature from its conception 
in 1961 to the soon shows that the research effort 
towards search and the economics of information is steadily 
Increasing with the need for a rigorous framework which 
research efforts can be compared formally and clearly. One such 
framework, wherein models are characterised in terms of the restrictions 
listed above, set out in the next section. 
SECTION 1-4: NOTATION AND VARIATIONS OF THE 'SEARCH PROBLEM' 
The formal analysis presented in this thesis begins in this 
chapter. It is h",·,...,,';'''''''·''' necessary to present some of the notation 
and assumptions used in the thesis. Not all of the assumptions are 
invoked in all A note of where assumptions are 
invoked is given alongside the statements of the assumptions. Additional 
notation is introduced as required in subsequent chapters to avoid 
burdening the reader with notation not inooediately in use. All 
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is collected in Appendix 1 for the IS 
on used follows symbols in standard use in the economics 
1 as much as possible to facilitate comparison of 
to works. 
The thesis views the search problem against the background 
neo-classical exchange model. In the standard leal model 
the consumer faces known and fixed prices for all commodities. 
these prices his problem is to achieve his highest attainab 
utility subject to his wealth constraint. 
w = (wl,w2""'w~) - the vector of the consumer's initial endowments 
of commodities 1 to ~. 
P = (Pl'P2'···.P~) - the vector of market prices for commodities 1 to ~. 
The following assumption is made to assist comparison of the 
carried out in this thesis to the standard neo-classical 
Assumption: The markets for commodities 2 to ~ are perfectly 
competitive. 1-4-1 
This assumption relegates the consumer to the role of price taker in 
these markets and requires that the prices of commodities 2 to ~ are 
not dispersed and are known to the consumer. 
Assumption (1-4-1) is retained throughout the thesis. 
U(xl,x2""'x~) - the consumer's direct utility function. U summarises 
the consumer's preferences over his set of 
x '" {(x1 ,x2 , ..• ,xQ,)L 
the consumer's wealth prior to In 
Ie consumptions 
e neo-classical 
model of a private ownership economy M is a function of prices p 
and initial allocations w. 
1-4-2 
For a complete specification of profits a ownership economy 
may consult Debreu [8, p.78J. The 
consumer problem therefore to 
subj to 
max U(xl""'x~) 
xl" .• ,x$(, 
M 
neo-class 
1-4-3 
the consumer's demand for commodity i, 
i = I, ...• $(,. xi, ... ,x£ are the solutions to (1-4-3) and in 
general are correspondences of all prices and wealth. For the 
of this thesis, however, the x~ will be assumed to be functions. 
1 
properties of the demand functions x~ depend upon the properties 
1 
utility function U. Restrictions placed upon demand functions 
imply ons placed upon utility functions. This 
in this section. For now, note that the x~ are continuous functions 
1 
U is continuous and strictly quasi-concave w.r.t, xp' • .,xl: 
Assumption: ;:::: O. 1-4-4 
(1-4-4) is a restriction of xi. and therefore of U, that 
invoked throughout the whole of the thesis. If xi < 0, commodity 1 
would be some type of consumer output, such as labour. (1-4-4) thus 
restricts the attention of the thesis to consumer search and prevents 
any consideration of job search. (1-4-4) is equivalent to applying 
restriction (vi) of Section 1-3 and so precludes discussion of the 
phenomena mentioned therein, 
The dispersion considered search problems makes a 
search theorist's consumer a far less advantaged creature than a standard 
neo- consumer. A glance at (1-4-2) quickly shows that any 
uncertainty in any 
also uncertain. 
much more 
Pl' ... ,p$(, means that the consumer's wealth M is 
makes the solution to the consumer problem (1-4-3) 
Assumption (1-4-1) restricts price dispersion to 
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only the market for commodity 1 but this is sufficient to make M 
uncertain if the consumer has a non-zero initial endowment of conwodity 1 
(WI f 0). In search problems the value of P1 is uncertain both before 
and during search. To avoid the difficulties associated with M being 
uncertain it is assumed throughout the thesis that the consumer has a 
zero initial allocation of commodity 1. 
Assumption: WI = O. 1-4-5 
However, (1-4-5) by itself is not sufficient to ensure that M 
is known with certainty. Even if WI = 0, M will be uncertain if the 
consumer speculates by both buying and selling commodity 1 as he searches. 
Consequently it is always assumed that the consumer does not speculate 
in commodi ty 1. 
Assumption: There is no speculation in commodity 1. 1-4-6 
I(P1, ... ,p~,M) - the consumer1s indirect utility function. The 
indirect utility function is the objective function of the dual 
problem to the budget constrained direct utility maximisation problem. 
I is derived from the direct utility function U by replacing the 
arguments x. of the direct utility function by the demand functions 
1 
Xi (P1,···,p~,M), ie. 
I(Pl"··,Pl,M)= 
U(x1 (PI" .. ,p~,M) ,x2 (PI" .. ,p~,M), ... ,x~ (PI" .. ,p~,M)) 1-4-7 
More complete explanations of the derivation and properties of the 
indirect utility function are contained in [13, p.197-208J, [16J, [17J 
and [49J. The consumer search problems are concerned with changes in 
consumer welfare resulting from changes in prices and wealth. These 
variables are arguments of the indirect utility function while only 
appearing in the constraint of the direct utility maximisation problem. 
Consequently, the indirect utility function is more immediately applicable 
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to analysis of search problems than is the 
Kohn and Shave11 [20J recognise the indirect utility function as 
appropriate form of the utility function when observations are taken on 
Manning and Morgan [29J have specifically applied the indirect 
utility function to a search problem. 
L PI - a lower bound on selling prices for commodity 1, 
U PI an upper bound on selling prices for commodity 1. 
The range of the dispersion of prices for commodity 1 is bounded 
there is no price dispersion and no search 
problem. Hence In addition the usual neo-classical assumption 
of non-negative prices will be made and retained throughout the thesis. 
In particular, it is assumed that none of the dispersed prices for 
commodity 1 are negative. 
Assumption: pi ~ o. 1-4-8 
a sequence of time periods. A searcher may make 
any number of observations on PI within any of these time periods. At 
the start of a period the searcher must decide the number of observations 
(perhaps zero) to make within the period. In particular, at the start 
of period Tl the searcher must make his market entry decision. If the 
choi~~ was to enter the market, then at the start of period T2 the 
will utilise the prices observed (if any) in period T1 to decide 
the number of observations to be taken in period T2. This decision 
sequence 1 continue until the searcher chooses to exit from the market. 
In any adaptive decision process the manner in which the flow of 
information from observations affects the searcher influences hi~/ optimal 
Obviously the searcher can be affected in many ways. Throughout 
the the following choice is made. 
Assumption: The information from and costs of observations on PI 
taken in any period reach the consumer only at 
end of that period. 
a - the discount rate per period. 
ik PI - the consumer's kth observation on PI (offered sell 
pri ce) in period T.. For s imp Ii ci ty it is always as sumed 1. 
that observations on PI are statistically independent. 
1-4-9 
Assumption: All observations on PI are independently distributed. 1-4-10 
Each seller quotes only a single price to each searcher who 
contacts him. However. different sellers t quotes are usually different 
so, from the searcher's point of view> it appears as if each seller 
quotes randomly from his own p,d.f. of selling prices, (1,·-4",10) 
is an assumption that the searcher believes these p.d.f.'s to be 
statistically independent, 
cik - the (marginal) financial cost to the consumer of taking 
b . ik o servat1.on PI 
Kik - the (marginal) psychic cost to the consumer of taking 
b . ik o servatl.on PI In Chapters 5 and 6 it is assumed that the 
net utility expected from search by a consumer can be expressed as the 
difference between the utility he expects to enjoy at the e~d of his 
search and the psychic costs he incurs during his search. 
Assumption: The consumer's expected indirect utility function 1-4-11 
is additively separable w.r.t. expected psychic search 
costs i.e. E[I' (PI •... ,p~.M-C.K)J = E[I(Pl, ... ,p~,M-c)J - E[KJ 
where I' is the consumer's indirect utility function inclusive of 
psychic search costs and I is the consumer's indirect utility function 
exclusive of psychic search costs. 
tik - the transaction cost incurred by the consumer when purchasing 
the quantity of commodity 1 demanded from the kth seller 
contacted in the ith period. 
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Assumption: is independent of the quantity of commodity 1 1-4-12 
purchased. 
In thesis a transaction cost is regarded as a fixed cost 
incurred only a purchase of commodity 1 is made. schemes 
are possible. A fixed transaction cost could be incurred even if the 
searcher chooses to buy zero units of commodity 1. For instance, a 
searcher may have travelled across town during his search and, at the 
end of his search, could be faced with the cost involved in returning 
home. A second alternative is for the transaction cost to be dependent 
on the quantity of commodity 1 demanded. Sales taxes and stamp duties 
are common examples of transaction costs of this form. 
v = (VI 'V2 ' ••• ,V j , ... ) - an observation number rule. 
observed prices, 
a function 
x ~ •• . 1-4-13 
"'here 1+' th t f .. t .. IS e se 0 non-negatIve In egers. At the end of period 
T., i '" O,l, .•. ,j, ... the consumer will use V to decide upon a vector 
1 
(n. l,n. 2"") where nk ~ 0 is the (integer) number of observations 1+ 1+ 
on PI he intends, at the end of period Ti' to take in period Tk, 
k = i+l,i+2, ... The values of n. l,n. 2"" will depend upon the values 1+ 1+ 
f th h ' . b . 11 In1 i I lni o e searc er s preVIOUS 0 servat10ns PI "",PI ,··.,P1 , ... ,Pl • 
At the end of period T. 1 the searcher will use these observations and 1+ 
any additional observations pi+1,1, ••• ,pi+1 taken in period Ti +1 to 
y. 
J 
upon a vector (n. 2,n. 3 •... ) and so on. 1+ 1+ 
- the vector of observations taken on 
11 In j 1 jn. Yj = (PI •... ,PI 1, ... ,PI •... ,PI J) 
over periods T1, ...• Tj 
1-4-14 
min PIj the smallest of the observations made on PI in the first 
j periods of the consumer's search, 
min . { 11 In j1 jn.} 
PI j '" mm PI"'" P 1 1, ... , P 1 " .. , PI J 1-4-15 
34, 
c(j) - the total financial cost incurred by the consumer in making 
his observations on PI in the first j periods of his search, 
j n. 
~ ~1 
w w cik i=1 k=1 
c(j) = 
Assumption: c(O) = o. 
It is always assumed that there is no financial penalty 
associated with not searching. 
M. - the searcher's wealth net of financial search costs after 
J 
searching through periods T1, ... ,Tj , 
M. = M - c(j) 
J 
1-4-16 
1-4-17 
1-4-18 
A. = {aO,a1l , ... ,al , ... ,a.l, ... ,a. } - the terminal action set for a J . n l J Jnj 
search over j periods. Terminal action aik is to purchase xi 
units of commodity 1 from the kth seller contacted in the ith period. 
Terminal action aO is to purchase zero units of commodity 1. The 
consumer may choose not to enter the market and search. In this case 
the terminal action set is AO = {aD} and the only terminal action possible 
for the consumer is to allocate all of his initial wealth M to purchases 
of only commodities 2 to~. Commodity 1 cannot be purchased without 
search. 
o - a terminal decision procedure. If the searcher decides to 
stop searching at the end of period T., he uses his terminal 
J 
decision procedure 0 to choose a terminal action from his terminal action 
set A .. The terminal action chosen will depend upon the values of the 
J 
b d 11 ' . 11 In1 jl jn. ~. h f o serve se Ing prIces PI , ... ,Pl , ... ,Pl "",Pl J. u IS t ere ore 
a function of observed prices, 
x ••• x 1-4-19 
o is the procedure used by the searcher to determine the seller (if any) 
from whom commodity 1 is demanded and to determine the quantity demanded. 
0 1,···,t: j ,···) - a stopping rule. The uses 
stopping rule t;; at the end of a period to choose 
his at this point or carrying his search on through 
the next period. This choice is dependent on observed prices. 
At the end of the ith period T., i = 0,1, ... ,j •... 
1 
is used to 
determine a value S. 
1 
where S.:::: 
1 
o or 1. Hence, 
35, 
L U [PI ,PI J r L UJ x LPI ,PI x .•. + {O,I} x {O,l} x ... 1-4-20 
S. takes values of 0 or 1 with the following meanings. 
1 
(i) search has persisted over periods T1, ... ,Ti and 8i :::: 0 then 
the searcher's decision at the end of period T, is to carry his search 
1 
on throughout period T. l' 1+ 
(ii) 
the 
now, 
Ciii) 
If search has persisted over periods T1, ... ,Ti and 8i :::: I then 
's decision at the end of period T. is to stop his search 
1. 
at the end of period T, . 
1 
If search ceases before period Ti is reached (at least one Sk :::: 1, 
k < i) the value of S. is of no importance. 
1. 
It must be emphasised that, in general, a searcher does not know with 
certainty over how many periods his search will persist until the 
instant he makes his decision to stop searching, 
(iv) If :::: I at the end of period T. (for any i :::: 0,1, ...• j , ... ) 
1 
then search cannot continue past the end of period T.. Consequently 
1 
no observations on PI can be taken in periods T. 1,T. 2"" Hence 1+ 1+ 
Si = 1 implies nk :::: 0 for all k ~ i+l. Conversely, if S. = 0 then 1. 
search 
presence 
continued throughout period T. l' This is rational in the 1+ 
marginal search costs only if at least one 
observation is made in a period subsequent to period T .. Hence S. = 0 
1 1 
impl that at one nk > 0 where k ~ 1. 
a vector with components ~. where ~. is a 
J J 
function of observed prices y. with the property that 
J 
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~.(y.) = ~. = ° or 1 only. ~. = 1 if and only if search is halted at 
J J J J 
the end of period T .. ,', - ° otherwise. J 't'j- Therefore, ~. :::: 1 is equivalent J 
to the situation of So :::: Sl :::: :::: S. 1 J- :::: 0, S. :::: 1. ~. may therefore J J 
be expressed as the following function of sO"",Sj 
~. :::: (1-S0)(I-S 1) ... (1-S. l)S' for all j :::: 0,1, ... J J - J 1-4-21 
p :::: (~,v,o) - a search rule. The triple notation is a convenient way 
of expressing the fact that a search rule has three components -
a stopping rule ~, an observation number rule v and a terminal decision 
procedure o. The objective of any searcher is assumed to be the maxi-
misation of his ex ante expectation of the maximum utility attainable 
after search. The search rule which defines the search strategy 
achieving this aim is called 'optimal'. 
Definition: The optimal search rule p* :::: (~*,v*,o*) is the search 1-4-22 
rule maximising the searcher's ex ante expectation of the 
maximum utility attainable from search. 
The optimal search rule is generally an adaptive rule although 
its behaviour in certain problems coincides with the behaviour of other 
search rules ego the Stigleresque and sequential search rules. For a 
detailed and well referenced discussion on sequential search rules see 
De Groot [9, p.272J and Yahav [56J. The adaptive search rule is an 
application of Bellman's principle of optimality which can be loosely 
stated as "the optimal policy from the present state is independent of 
how the present state was arrived at". At each decision point the 
searcher must decide if he should continue searching for at least one 
more period. If he decides to continue searching, then as part of that 
decision he must have decided upon the number of observations on PI to 
take in the next period. If he decides to stop searching he must choose 
37. 
a terminal action. The adaptive search rule has form that 
searcher should continue his search if he expects to gain by doing so, 
of how fruitful or fruitless his search up to point 
has been. Stigleresque search rules are thus optimal only in 
problems for which p* gives 
So = 0, Si = 1, ni ~ I 1-4-23 
and sequential search rules are optimal only in search problems for 
which p* gives 
So = 0, and nt = I for all i ~ 1 such that Si = ... ::: Si = 0 1-4-24 
VO(~,V,o) - the present value of the searcher's ex ante expected net 
utility from using a search rule p ::: (C v, 0). (1-4-22) defines 
the optimal search rule p* = (~*,v*.o*) as the search rule which 
maximises the present valued ex ante expected net utility from search. 
Hence p* must have the property that 
Vo(~*.V*,o*) ~ VO(~,V,o) 
for any search rule p = (;,v,o). 
V.(;,v,8) 
J 
the present value, at the end of period T., of the 
J 
expected net utility from search conducted according to the 
search rule p = (;,v,8). It is shown in Chapters 2 and 6 that 
Vj(~'V,O) is the greater of the utility attainable at the end of 
period T. and the searcher's present valued expectation of the net 
J 
1-4-25 
utility attainable from continuing search past the end of period T. 
J 
according to the search rule p = (;,V,o). 
f(Pllw) - the probability density function (p.d.f.) of selling prices 
for commodity 1. f describes the relative frequencies with 
L U 
values of PI € [P1,PIJ are quoted by sellers. These 
are dependent upon w, a vector of parameters conditioning f. 
Assumption: All sellers of commodity 1 are passive. 1-4-26 
(1- 26) is invoked throughout the thes means 
any seller offers the same selling to all 
who contact him. This makes it impossible a to 
any gain by a seller for more than one quotation. The 
therefore as taking observations without replacement 
from a large population of prices PI where f(PIlw) the 
probabi of observing the various selling prices for commodity I 
offered in the market place. In all sections of the thesis, except 
Section 3-5, it assumed that the searcher is ignorant of any 
differences in sellers' relative pricing behaviour. Consequently the 
searcher has no choice but to regard all sellers as being identical in 
their pricing behaviour. In Section 3-5 the searcher assumed to 
possess some imperfect information about which sel are more 
to offer lower than others. This information is utilised in 
determining the order in which the searcher contacts sellers. 
F(P1Iw) - the cumulative density function (c.d.f.) of selling 
for commodity 1, 
ly 
f
PL
l 
f(xlw)dx 1-4-27 
PI 
g(w) - the p.d.f. describing the consumer's ex ante beliefs 
about the relative likelihoods of different values of w. 
The consumer has complete knowledge of the functional form of f(PIlw) 
but, throughout all of , except Section 4-5, it is assumed 
that the searcher actual value of wand, therefore, 
uncertain of the actual p.d. of selling prices f(P1Iw). However, 
as observations are taken on PI the searcher can refine his prior p.d.f. 
g(w) by using Bayesian pre-posterior analysis and so reduce his uncertainty 
39. 
wand f(Pllw). A short description of Bayesian 
s given in Appendix 2. In Section 4-5 
knows the true value of wand actual 
p.d.L selling prices f(Pllw). This assumption 
assuming g(w) degenerate at the correct value of w. 
g(wly·) J p,d.f. describing the consmner's bel 
relative likelihoods of different values of w 
to 
about the 
th h . d T T d k' b . 11 jn. Th' roug perlo 5 1"'" j an ma 1ng 0 servat10ns PI , •.. ,Pl J. 15 
is the consumer's posterior p.d.f. on wand is related to his ex ante 
prior p.d. g(w) in a manner described in Appendix 2. 
f ( j+1,l j+l,n. 11) h d f d 'b' h ' g PI ,.··,P1 J+ Yj - t e p ..• eserl Ing t e consumer s 
beliefs about the relative likelihoods of the values of the 
observations to be taken in the next period, given observations 
11 jn. PI ,···,Pl J have already been taken. This p.d.f. is described more 
fully in Appendix 2. 
11 jn. fg(Pl , ... ,Pl J) - the p.d.f, describing the consumer's ex ante 
beliefs about the values of the observations to be taken in 
periods Tl, ... ,Tj , This p.d.f. is described more fully in Appendix 2. 
a search path. Search paths are discussed at length 
Chapter 3 which expands on the observation that rational 
not a random walk type of process. Instead it is directed by 
des of maximising the gains from search by, for example, 
sellers more ly to provide acceptable offers before contacting 
sellers likely to do so. It is assumed that all sellers have 
unique If i k ::: n then the meaning is that a 
who lows the search path il,.,.,ik",.,i j makes his kth 
contact with the seller whose index is n. Search paths can be revised 
as search proceeds. This is pursued further in Chapter 3. For the 
40, 
present it is sufficient to recognise the sequence i1, ... ,i j as an 
ordered sequence of seller indexes, 
c. - the (marginal) financial cost of making an observation 
lk 
on the kth seller on the search path i1, ... ,i j , k = l, ... ,j. 
t. - the transaction cost incurred by the consumer when purchasing 
lk 
the quantity of commodity 1 demanded from the kth seller on 
the search path i1, ... ,i j , k = l, ... ,j. 
w. - the value of w ascribed by the searcher to the kth seller 
lk 
on the search path i 1 •... ,i j , k = 1 •...• j. The searcher's 
beliefs about the relative likelihoods of the value of the selling price 
offered by the seller with index i k are described by the p.d.f. 
f(P1Iwik)' Recall from the above discussion of f(P1Iw) that in all 
but Section 3-5 it is assumed that a searcher cannot distinguish 
differences between sellers' pricing behaviour. This is equivalent 
to assuming that the searcher ascribes the same value of w to all 
sellers. 
Assumption: w. = w for all i k . 1-4-28 lk 
In Section 3-5 assumption (1-4-28) is replaced by the assumption 
that the searcher has information which allows him to ascribe different 
values of w to different sellers and, in this way, to differentiate those 
sellers more likely to offer relatively high prices from those more 
likely to offer relatively low prices. 
The above notation is now used to formally express some of the 
restrictions used in previous search models (listed in Section 1-3) as 
options which can be built into a search model. Alternatives to these 
restrictions are listed alongside as alternative options. 
Option 1Ca): The demand for commodity 1, xi, is fixed before search 
experience is available and before the length of search is known. 
41. 
The value of xi is not revised as search proceeds. 
Option leb): xi may revised as search 
Option 2(a): There are financial costs of search ie. c > 0, 
Option 2(b): There are no financial costs of search ie. c - 0, 
Option 3(a): There are psychic costs of search ie. K> 0, 
Option 3(b): There are no psychic costs of search ie, K::: 0, 
Option 4(a): The consumer's indirect utility function is linear in 
the price of commodity 1 so that 
1-4-29 
Option 4(b): The consumer's indirect utility function need not be 
linear in PI' 
Option Sea): Search lasts for one period and at least one observation 
on PI is taken; So = 0, Si = 1, ni ~ 1 (Stigleresque search), 
Option S(b): Search lasts for at least one period and exactly one 
observation on PI is taken in each of these periods; So = 0, and 
n:: = 1 for every i ~ 1 such that S*1 = = s:: = ° (sequential search), 
1 1 
Option S(c): Search may last for any number (including zero) of 
periods and any number (including zero) of observations on PI may be 
taken in any period (generalised search). It should be noted that 
this option includes both the Stigleresque and sequential search options 
Sea) and S(b) as special cases. 
The options can now be used to categorise the search models 
presented in earlier work and in this thesis, 
Stigler's original consumer search model [50J relies on options 
of fixed demand, ICa), utility linear in PI' 4(a), search behaviour 
option Sea) and, although his discussion makes it clear that psychic 
search costs are important, his analysis includes only financial search 
costs - options 2(a) and 3(b), 
The 
[ 
Axel [lJ can be as 
I linear in Pl~ 4(a), 
only financial costs of 
approach to search allows 
[ ] 
3(b). 
natural of both of the above types of models. In 
3 
may 
that 
For 
must 
made 
2 respectively the basic Stigleresque and sequential 
outlined above are generalised by replacing options lea), 
and 4(a) by l(b), 3(a) and 4(b) ie. the fixed demand 
is aced by the option allowing variable demand, psychic 
costs are specifically included with financial search costs and 
consumer's utility function is no longer restricted to being linear 
Manning and Morgan [29J forms the basis of the analysis of 
5, 
6 an analysis of the most general possible 
options 1 to 5 ie. l(b), 2(a), 3(a). 4(b) and S(c), 
~u,~v~,~ly, both psychic and financial search costs 
may have any cardinal utility function 
additively w.r.t. psychic costs and the searcher is 
a 
It is course 
which includes both Stigleresque 
Ie to add more options to the above list, 
assumptions used in the thesis was listed 
is nothing to prevent these assumptions 
as options also, The theorist 
are two principal reasons for the choice of options 
same as 
, the options fixed as assmnptions are the 
authors. One of the contributions of this 
43, 
thesis is the use of the models developed in s thesis a crit 
examination of these authors' models, A comparison such as this is 
valid only if the models in this thesis contain the same axiomatic base 
as the earlier models, Second, previous authors chose this base 
principally because it offers relative statistical simplicity and makes 
the economics of information contained in consumer search models easier 
to extract. Nevertheless, the additional restrictions imposed by 
earlier authors severely limits the amount of economic analysis possible 
in their models. The generalisations made in this thesis substantially 
increase this yield. 
Each possible combination of the above options represents a 
different variation on the search problem theme. It is convenient to 
collect the variations into four groups. 
Type 1 Variations: No Search Costs: 
Price information is both financially and psychically free in 
search models containing both option 2(b) and option 3(b). The consumer 
will continue to search until he finds a seller offering the lowest 
price because, without search costs, his expected net gain from search 
is always positive until the lowest price is attained. Any initial 
price dispersion must collapse to the lowest price in these variations 
which are therefore both unrealistic and uninteresting. 
Proposition 1-4-1: 
If c :: K :: 0, then no consumer's search terminates until the 
'I b d' min. h 1 k' consumer s owest 0 serve pr1ce PI IS t e owest mar at prlce. 
Type 2 Variations: Psychic Search Costs, No Financial Search Costs, 
and Fixed Demand for Commodity 1: 
These variations contain options l(a), 2(b) and 3(a). The absence 
of financial search costs assures the searcher that his wealth at any 
44, 
stage of his search unchanged from his initial wealth M. For the 
moment assume marginal psychic costs are sufficient to prevent 
search continuing for ever,t 
The placed upon the class of utility functions 
admissible to search problems with a fixed demand constraint xi = Xl' 
where xl > 0 is a constant, is illustrated in Figure 4-1. The range 
Figure 1-4-1 
I 
I 
x2 I I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I slope AS =-p /p 
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I 
I 
I slope 
I 
of AC U =-PI/P2 
I D 
B 
min L U 
of possible values of PI ' [PI,PIJ, defines a set of possible budget 
constraints with bounds AB and AC. Since ~1 the quantity of 
commodity 1 demanded by the consumer whatever value of p~in is the 
min 
outcome from search, the consumer's price expansion path as PI varies 
must be ED. 
The class of utility functions for which xi = ~1 for any value 
min L U 
of PI E [PI,PIJ clearly very special. Solving for these functions 
t This sufficiency is proved in Chapters 5 and 6 
requires of a simultaneous system 
derived from the 
conditions. This task difficult. Recall 
= 
commodity 1 is parameterised by 
" .• ,Pt,M). 
min (PI 'P2'····Pl'M) 
The fixed demand 
45, 
) 
consumer's demand 
,M 
is that 
1-4-30 
The utility functions for which (1-4-30) is true are therefore par~leter­
ised by particular values of P2, ... ,Pl,M for a given value of Xl' It 
follows that, the consumer's utility function is smooth, altering 
the value of anyone of P2",.,Pl,M will alter quantity of COIDrrlodity 1 
demanded from Xl' This means that comparative statics analysis is 
impossible under the fixed demand hypothesis if the consumer's utility 
function is smooth, 
Under the fixed demand hypothesis there is no smooth utility 
function which comparative statics analysis is possible, 
The proposition rules out comparative statics analys these search 
problems only if the utility functions are smooth. Comparative statics 
analysis may still be possible if the utility functions are not smooth, 
but only for changes in PZ, .. ',Pl,M within limits which upon the 
degree of non-smoothness of the utility functions. an example, see 
Figure 1-4-2 which demonstrates the two commodity case (~=2) the 
consumer's are not smooth at Xl = ~1' 
A 
C 
E 
1-4-2 
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F 
1 2 A decrease in the price of commodity 2 from P2 to P2 alters the 
budget constraint from AB to CD but does not violate the condition 
1 3 A decrease from P2 to P2 alters the budget constraint from 
AB to EF. alters the consUDler's demand for commodity I from ~l to xl 
and, in doing so, violates the condition xi = ~l' Comparative statics 
analysis may therefore be possible for parameter changes within some 
interval. The width of this interval is determined by the degree of 
non-smoothness possessed by the utility function at Xl ~ ~1' Let 
lim!~ C3U/3xl)/caU/3x2) 
x1->-x1 
= a, lim!~ (3U/3xl )/(3U/3x2) = S 1-4-31 
x1+x1 
where a > S. The degree of non-smoothness of the utility function at 
Xl = ~l can be measured by the difference (a-8) , Comparative statics 
analysis can be carried out for changes in P2 only from Pz to P2 where 
both Pz and P2 E (p~in/a. p~in/S). Similar constraints exist on com-
M. 
An is 1-4-3 where M 
to resul ts in the budget constraint to 
or the consumer's demand for 1 
3 
E 
C 
F 
A 
D 
A 
M value of M such that 
1-4-32 
can be carried out for changes in M 
only [o,iiJ. 
Search Costs and Fixed Demand for 
Conunodity 1: 
simultaneously contain options lCa) and 2(a). 
In 1 3 it was' noted restrictions of these two types are 
common in the search 1 ego [lJ. [3J. [11], [43J. [SOJ ] 
[53J. Now note the of financial search costs is to alter 
searcher's wealth from M to M < M. It is an immediate implication 
of Proposition 1-4-2 that the consumer's utility function cannot be 
smooth in these search problems. 
Proposition 1-4-3: 
If search is financially costly and xi ::::: Xl for all 
then the consumer's utility function is not smooth at xl = 
Proof: 
The consumer's demand for commodity 1 is xi = Xl for any price-
income situation. Let j 1 and j 2 be two different search lengths. The 
wealth of the consumer after search is M. ::::: M - c(j. ) for search length J. 1 1 
min j . , i ::::: 1.2. Denote the minimum observed price PI for a search length 1 
min 
of j. by Pl' for i = 1,2. 
1. Ji 
Let xl ,x2, .... xi be the optimal allocation of 
net wealth M. for a consumer when search of length jl < j2 reveals a 
Jl 
min 
minimum price of Pl' . 
J l 
A sufficient but not necessary condition for 
. min 
search of length j2 to be undertaken is that there is a prlce Pl' such 
)2 
that the allocation xl .x2 •.... xi can be attained with the smaller net 
weal th M .. 
J2 
Suppose such a price p~~n exists. The ~-l) dimensional 
J2 
hyperplanes defined by the two budget constraints are 
min 
P1j.xl + P2x2 + 
1. 
These two hyperplanes must 
+ P.Q.x.Q.= Mj . for 
1 
intersect along 
i ::::: 1,2 
the (.Q.-2) dimensional 
hyperplane defined by setting xl ::::: xl in (1-4-33), 
1-4-33 
P2X2 + ... + P.Q.x.Q.= Mj . 
:1 
For search of length jl or j2 
- P~~~Xl for i :: 1,2 1-4-34 
1 
the optimal consumptions must lie in the 
hyperplane (1-4-34), For search of length jl the preferred consumption 
is x1,xi",.,xi, For search of length j2 the consumer must again choose 
from the consumptions in the hyperplane (1-4-34), The axiom of revealed 
49, 
preference (see Richter [40J) requires that the consumer chooses 
consumption xl'xZ""'x~, This implies two distinct hyperplanes 
(1-4-33) support the strictly convex set defined by the indifference 
This is possible if and only if the 
A 
indifference hypersurface is not smooth at x1,xZ,.",xQ:. Q.E.D, 
Figure 1-4-4 
A 
A' 
Figure 1-4-4 illustrates this result for ~ = 3 (the result is 
geometrically obvious for ~ = 2), ABC is the budget constraint after 
search of length jl and AlBIC' is the budget constraint after search 
of length j2' Both intersect on the two-dimensional hyperplane with 
xl = xl' Since the consumption (x1,xZ'x3) was chosen from all others 
in this hyperplane for search of length jl' (x1,xi,x3) must again be 
chosen from all others in this hyperplane for search of length j2' 
Consequently, the indifference hypersurface cannot be smooth at Xl = Xl 
in the direction of any x1xj - plane. j = 2,3. 
50, 
in discussion of Type 2 variations was 
statics analysis was possible only if the consumer1s 
uti was not smooth for xl = xl' In Type 3 
nm.., , the utility functions cannot be smooth 
so lar arguments apply to the use of comparative 
results can only be obtained for changes anyone 
of P2'" .,p~,N that are between limits set by the degree of 
of the hypersurface. This is particularly important 
changes in the consumer's net wealth M since the fixed 
condition may be violated if financial search costs accumulate to 
point where M passes outside the limits set by the indifference hyper-
Such considerations have not been expressed by any previous 
, the only implicit consideration being that no searcher will 
allow net wealth to 1 below the amount required to purchase Xl 
of commodity 1. 
The Type 3 variations containing the sequential search rule 
option 5(b) are analysed in detail in Chapter 2. They are also used in 
Chapter 3 for describing the choice of an optimal search path and in 
Chapter 4 for deriving transaction prices and search length probability 
distributions. The Type 3 variations containing the Stigleresque search 
rule option Sea) or the generalised search rule option S(c) form special 
cases of the models developed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Type 4 and Variable Demand for Commodity 1: 
contain options l(b) and either one or both of 
options 2(a) or 3(a), Search is thus by financial and/or 
psychic costs the demand for commodity 1 may vary as the 
min -PI and/or the consumer's net wealth M vary. 
Smooth are admissible for these search problems despite 
51. 
the presence of financial search costs. Figure 1-4-5 demonstrates this 
for ~ = 2 and Stigleresque search behaviour. xi(O) is the demand for 
commodity I decided upon before search on the basis of the expected 
minimum price for commodity 1 for j observations E[p~inljJ and a post-
- min 
search net wealth of M .. The actual least observed price Pl' causes 
J J 
the consumer to revise his demand for commodity 1 from xi(O) to xi(j) 
if his utility function is smooth. 
Figure 1-4-5 
A 
C 
The variations containing the generalised search option Sec) 
are left until Chapter 6. The variations containing the Stigleresque 
search option are analysed in Chapter 5. The (Type 4) variations 
containing the sequential search option 5(b) are not specifically 
considered for two reasons which would make their inclusion largely 
52, 
it 
analysis 
rule 
it \vould mean a repetition of the bulk of the 
out Chapter 5, Second, the 
the sequential search rule (and the search 
rule) as an extreme case, Type 4 variations containing 
search option are therefore specified in Chapter 6 as a 
Spot and Futures Markets; 
case. 
The real world is a mixture of imperfect spot and futures 
markets, Yet the consumer search problem is always thought of only in 
the context of imperfect spot markets, Futures markets are not admitted 
to consumer search problems because doing so greatly complicates the 
analys of these problems. If the existence of futures markets is 
recognised) then it must also be recognised that a searcher's actions 
in present spot markets are partly determined by his beliefs on the 
likelihoods of various outcomes possible for future events, Consequently, 
analysis of consumer search problems would have to be extended to provide 
descriptions of the manner in which a consumer allocates wealth to 
futures commodities for both present and future futures markets, 
descriptions of the consumer's expenditure patterns in the imperfect 
spot markets of the future, descriptions of the consumer's assessment 
of the likelihoods of the outcomes of various future events and how 
these different outcomes will influence markets at times when the 
consumer.s various futures contracts fall 
purpose of this section has been to formally distinguish 
between some of the search problems considered in the literature. 
Deficiencies in some of their analyses have been pointed out together 
with some of the more subtle consequences ions commonly 
imposed on consumer search models, Chapters 2 to 6 extend the models 
53, 
labelled as Types 3 and 4. Type 3 models are examined in Chapters 2~ 
3 and 4, Type 4 models are examined in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 presents 
the generalised search model and demonstrates how it encompasses both 
Stigleresque and sequential search models, 
54. 
CHAPTER II 
SEQUENTIAL STOPPING RULES APPLIED TO SEARCH PROBLEMS WITH FIXED 
ORDER QUANTITY RESTRICTIONS 
SECTION 2-1: ASSUMPTIONS ON SEARCHERS' KNOWLEDGE AND SEARCH VARIABLES 
IN THE ROTHSCHILD, TELSER, GASTWIRTH AND AXELL SEARCH MODELS 
In Chapter 1 the search models analysed by Rothschild [43], 
Telser [52], Gastwirth [11] and Axell [1] were categorised as all 
containing only financial search costs and a fixed demand for con~odity 1. 
Additional restrictions contained in these models are: 
(i) minimisation of expenditure on commodity 1 is equivalent to 
maximisation of consumer utility, 
(ii) there are no transaction costs, 
(iii) the conditions of search are such that sequential search rules 
are optimal ie. it is optimal to make exactly one observation on 
PI in each period over which search persists, 
(iv) the marginal financial cost of search is the same for each 
observation on PI' 
(v) search always ends in the purchase of a unit of commodity 1, 
(vi) the market entry decision of the consumer must always be to 
enter the market and begin searching. 
The claims made by these authors are that their models are comparable 
to Stigler's consumer search model [50J and that their use of 'optimal' 
sequential search rules remedies a substantial deficiency in Stigler's 
model. However, the discussion in Chapter 1 makes two points clear: 
(i) the absence of psychic costs in the above models means they are 
not directly comparable to Stigler's model. In particular, minimisation 
of expenditure on commodity 1 is not necessarily equivalent to utility 
55, 
maximisation in the presence of psychic costs. The conditions under 
which minimisation of expenditure on commodity 1 is equivalent to 
utility maximisation are discussed in Section 2-6. 
(ii) Sequential search rules are optimal only when the nature of the 
problem permits it. Neither Stigler nor the above authors considered 
what conditions might be necessary and/or sufficient in search problems 
for their two respective search rules to be the optimal search rule. 
In Chapter 6 these two sets of conditions are shown to be limiting on a 
more general set of conditions on search problems. 
The sequential search rules used by Rothschild, Telser, Gastwirth 
and Axell all have the following simple form. A searcher must make 
j ~ 1 observations on PI' the least of which is p~tn. The searcher 
chooses to make his (j+l)th observation on PI if and only if 
min [min I min] > Pl' - E PI . I Pl' c J ,J + J 2-1-1 
where c is the constant marginal financial cost of search. The rule 
expresses the idea that the next observation is taken if and only if 
the searcher expects to lower his expenditure on commodity 1 (inclusive 
of financial search costs) by doing so. If (2-1-1) is not satisfied, 
search is stopped and a single unit of commodity 1 is purchased free of 
transaction costs from the seller who offered the lowest price. 
The stopping rule (2-1-1) has a particular simplifying structure 
called a 'supermartingale' which makes the rule 'myopic' in that the 
searcher need consider only his expectations about the next observation 
(decision point) and need not consider expectations about observations 
beyond the next. Supermartingales are discussed in Sections 2-6 and 
3-7 and in Appendix 3. The reader is referred to De Groot [9, p.353J 
and McCall [30, p.423] for detailed descriptions of martingales. 
Assumptions on search costs and searchers' knowledge of prices 
56, 
implicit in the use of a search rule as simple as (2 1-1) are set 
out below. The of these assumptions ly on the 
manner 1n which a searcher carries out his search, 
Assumption: The s has no knowledge of sellers' relative 1-
behaviour. 
Assumption: The marginal financial search cost of any obser- 2-1 3 
on PI is a constant c and is 
any other observation on Pl' 
Assumption: There are no transaction costs. 
of any 
Consider assumption 1-4) The searcher incurs a transaction 
cost only he purchases a unit of commodity 1. Furthermore, a 
transaction cost is incurred only at the completion of search when a 
purchase is If transaction costs are present, the seller 
offering the lowest observed selling price need not be the seller 
1 4 
whom a unit of commodity 1 can be obtained with least expenditure. For 
example, if seller A has offered a selling price of $5 and seller B a 
price of $6, and .their respective associated transaction costs are 
$3 and $1, then seller B is preferred to seller A. The presence of 
different transaction costs associated with different sellers 
means that the ture minimising terminal action need not be to buy 
from the seller who offered the lowest price. 
1- simplifies the statistical tools to 
analyse these search models by allowing the use of the same p,d.L of 
selling f Iw) determining successive expectations on minimum 
observed sel ces E 1 . Ilpml~nJ in the stopping rule (2-1-1). 
,J+ J 
In real life a searcher may observe signals from sellers which cause 
him to be eve are differences in sellers' relative pricing 
behaviour, and so the searcher's sequence of expected minimum 
57. 
prices. For example, a hotel with a uniformed doorman may be expected 
to charge a higher tarrif for its rooms than one without a doorman. 
Similarly, experience has taught people that a jar of coffee usually 
costs more if it is bought from a small corner store instead of a 
large discount supermarket. Assumption (2-1-2) is relaxed in Section 
3-5 where searchers' knowledge of sellers' relative pricing behaviour 
is discussed as a factor in determining a searcher's optimal search 
path. 
Assumption (2-1-3) is more sensitive to the physical manner in 
which search is conducted than are assumptions (2-1-2) and (2-1-4). It 
is useful to think of c. as the marginal cost incurred by the searcher's 
J 
communicating with the jth seller on his search path. c. > 0 so 
J 
communication is never free. The word 'communication' is used in a wide 
sense to include a variety of physical search methods. A searcher may 
communicate with sellers by travelling from one seller to another to 
communicate on a face to face basis, or he may communicate by telephoning 
sellers, or he may conmlunicate by simply reading sellers' advertisements. 
The method employed has a large bearing on the nlagnitude of the search 
costs - an enquiry over the telephone usually costs less than a journey 
to enquire in person. If the method of search chosen is to travel from 
one seller to another, the cost of the next observation on PI is clearly 
dependent on where the last observation on PI was taken.. The distance 
separating the next seller from the present seller's position depends 
upon the present seller's position. In such cases the marginal cost of 
the next observation is strongly dependent on at least one characteristic 
(location) of another observation, and it is unlikely that the marginal 
financial costs of different observations will be the smne. If the 
method of search chosen is telephone enquiries, sellers' locations will 
be less important characteristics than the stic of whether 
or not particular sellers have telephones. This characteristic is 
unlikely to affect the marginal financial cost of any other observation 
on PI and the financial cost per telephone call is likely to be a constant. 
Assumption (2-1-2) is therefore less severe for telephone searches than 
for face to face searches. 
The most serious aspect of the simplistic rule (2-1-1), however, 
is that its use could contradict the hypothesis of fixed demand for 
commodity 1, xi ::: 1, upon which the rule relies. The possibility is 
demonstrated by the following simple numerical example. Suppose all 
sellers offer one of only two selling prices for con~odity 1, $10 and $1, 
and that 
0.1, PI::: $10 
0.9, p = $1 1 
A searcher begins with an initial wealth of $20. The constant marginal 
financial search cost is $6. Suppose the compulsory first observation 
1 PI chances to be $10. The searcher's net wealth is now $14. The 
expected reduction in selling price from a second observation is 
$10 - ($10xO.1 + $lxO.9) $8.10 > $6 2-1-5 
so rule (2-1-1) decrees a second observation on PI must be taken. 
Suppose the second observation chances to be $10. The lowest observed 
price is p~~n ::: $10 but the searcher's net wealth is now only $8 and the 
fixed demand condition xi = I cannot be met. 
The models used by Rothschild, Telser, Gastwirth and Axell will 
be compared with the search model developed in Sections 2-2, 2-3, 2-4 
and 2-5 which uses a sequential search rule and contains only financial 
search costs. The utility functions admissible for this model are 
59, 
therefore characterised by a non-smoothness similar to that described 
in Section 1-4 for Type 3 search models, on (2~1-2) and the 
assumption of independence of marginal costs are retained for simplicity, 
but the above models are extended in the follmving ways: 
(i) the consumer is allowed to choose whether or not to search, 
(ii) the consumer's demand for commodity 1 may be either one unit or 
zero units ie. the consumer may choose not to search or to exit from 
the market without purchasing any of commodity I, 
(iii) the marginal financial cost c j of the jth observation on PI 
is not restricted to be the same for all j = 1,2, ... 
(iv) consumer utility maximisation need not be coincident with 
minimisation of consumer expenditure on commodity 1, 
(v) transaction costs are not excluded. 
In Section 2-6 this model is shown to reduce to the Rothschild 
etc. search models if the consumer's utility function belongs to a 
particularly heavily restricted class of utility functions. 
It is not of particular consequence that CU) restricts the only 
non-zero quantity of commodity 1 that can be demanded to one unit. The 
analysis can easily be extended to allow any positive integer quantity 
demanded for commodity 1. 
SECTION 2-2: NOTATION AND AN OUTLINE OF A SEQUENTIAL SEARCH MODEL WITH 
ONLY FINANCIAL SEARCH COSTS AND ZERO-ONE DEMAND FOR COMMODITY ONE 
For clarity, the assumptions made in the analysis of this model 
are stated at the outset. Additional notation is presented to allow 
easier comparison of this model to the models discussed in Section 2-1. 
Assumption: The conditions imposed on the searcher by the 
search problem he faces are such that a sequential search 
2-2-1 
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rule is optimal. 
Assumption: The consumer chooses the search rule which 2-2-2 
maximises his ex ante expected util 
(2-2-1) requires that only a sequential search rule JIIay be optimal. 
In this model, therefore, only one observation on PI will be made in 
each period over which search persists. This peTIlits the following 
notational simplifications. 
(i) For a sequential search rule, the observation number rule \) has 
the simple form of v = (VO"",v j , ... ) where 
v. (y.) == (1 ~ n. 2' n. 3"') for all j s, t. Sl -, ., ::: S. ::::: 0 J J J+ J+ . J 2-2-3 
Because \) is fixed in this way it is convenient to drop it from the 
search rule notation and write a sequential search rule as 
p ::: (s,o) 
s 
2-2-4 
The sequential search rule which maximises ex ante utility is therefore 
2-2-5 
the optimal terminal decision procedure component of p; is presented 
in Section 2-4. s*, the optimal stopping rule component of p* is 
s 
0* , 
presented in Section 2-3. The optimality of P~ is proved in Section 2-5 
and the conditions under which p* simplifies to the simple rule (2-1-1) 
s 
are presented in Section 2-v. 
eii) Under a sequential search rule only one observation on PI is made 
in each period oveT which search persists. In the notation presented in 
Section 1-4, the index i refers to the number and the index k 
refers to the number of the observation taken within a period. Hence, 
under a sequential search rule k::: 1 only for each period over which 
search persists and consequently it is convenient to drop it from the 
notation while only sequential search rules are being considered. The 
ith sequential observation on PI is pil, the marginal financial cost of 
61, 
taking it is cn and the associated transaction cost is til' These 
i 
are rewritten as PI' c i and This not form is akin to the 
notation used in earlier sequential search models. The notational 
modifications are 
C, 
1 
t. -
1 
y. 
'" J 
min 
P1j 
c(j) 
A. :: 
J 
Assumption: 
Assumption: 
:: 
= 
1 . 
(PI' . , . ,pi) 
. { 1 j} 
mln PI"" ,PI 
j 
L: c. 
i=1 1 
{aO' a1 ' ... , a j } where a. :: a'l for i :: 1, ... ,j. 1 1 
There are no psychic costs of search ie. K - 0 
There are financial costs of search and c. > 0 
J 
and finite for all j ~ 1. 
Assumption: Commodity 1 is indivisible. 
Assumption: The consumer's demand for commodity 1, xi :: 0 
or 1 only. 
If the consumer's demand for commodity 1 is zero units he incurs no 
transaction cost. If the consumer's demand for commodity 1 is one 
2-2-6 
2-2-7 
2-2-8 
2-2-9 
2-2-10 
2-2-11 
2-2-12 
2-2-13 
2-2-14 
2-2-15 
2-2-16 
unit and it is purchased from the ith seller contacted, the payment 
made to the ith seller by the consumer is (pi + t i ). If j sellers are 
contacted, the minimum payment that can be made in purchasing a unit of 
commodi ty 1 from any of these sellers is 
( + t)~in PI J 2-2-17 
Assumption: The consumer fixes upon a particular search path 2-2-18 
prior to beginning his search and does not revise it as 
62. 
In ion> all of the ions made 4 
assumption (1 4-1 through this (1-4- 1) 
is not necessary assUIi1ption (2~2- is search 
costs do not exist. Some additional notational modifications are now 
presented. 
VoCl;,o) - since a sequential search rule is written as Ps ,6), 
consumer's ex ante expected maximum 
Ps can now be written as VOCI;,o). 
V.(i;,o)-the 
J 
is expectation, after he has 
on PI' of the utility attainable from us 
search (1;,0). 
sequential search rule 
s 
property no other sequential search rule <:an 
with a ex ante expected utility ie. 
Vo(;*,o*) ~ VOCI;,o) 
for any sequential search rule p ::: (1;,0). 
S 
Ii using 
j observations 
the sequential 
,8 ) has the 
the consumer 
2-2-19 
TE. the searcher's total expenditure on corrunodi ty 1 throughout 
J 
his search should he stop searching 
on PI ie, 
i 
::: (PI + 
::= cU)' 
t.) + c(j), if the 
1 
if the chosen 
Wo ,0) - the searcher's ex ante 
s rule p 
s 
on corrunodi ty 1 at 
(Co) 0 
action is 
e 
j observations 
action is a. 2-2-20 
1 
2-2-21 
minimum total 
a sequential 
w.ct:,o) 
J 
searcherls expectation, after he taken j observations 
on PI' of the minimum total on ity 1 attainable 
from using a sequential search rule p '" (~> 0) . 
s 
The sequential search rule p 
s 
(€,&) is defined as having 
the property that no other sequential search rule can provide the 
consumer with a lower ex ante expected total on the purchase 
of a unit of commodity 1 ie. 
Wo (t 8) ::; W 0 (/;, 0) 2-2-22 
for any sequential search rule Ps '" (/;,8) 0 
SECTION 2-3: THE OPTIMAL STOPPING RULE FOR THE SEQUENTIAL SEARCH MODEL 
Kahn and Shavell [20] are the authors of the presently definitive 
paper on optimal sequential stopping rules. In their analysis they 
recognise the indirect utility function as the utility function appropriate 
to search problems in which the observations are prices. Their statement 
of the form of the general optimal sequential stopping rule (see 
Section 1-2) is a paraphrase of Bellman's optimality principle since, 
as already mentioned, this principle underlies any type of adaptive 
decision procedure. The sequential stopping rule derived here is 
particular to the model considered and may be considered as a special 
case of Kohn and Shavellis more general rule. However, the rule derived 
here explicitly recognises the consumer's allocation problem as an 
integral part of the optimal stopping rule E? and therefore of the 
optimal search rule p*. Kohn and Shavell i s 
s 
is is sufficiently 
general for this recognition but they did not make it expEci t, the 
thrust of their paper being towards other properties of sequential 
stopping rules. 
The optimal sequential stopping rule ~i' for the search model 
under consideration is derived as a 'truncated backward induction' 
stopping rule under the temporary assumption that there is a finite 
number of sellers. This number is a finite 
nwnber ions that will be taken us 
search rule. In Section 2-5 this finite 
always exist when financial search costs are 
as a number of sellers unnecessary 
J is a finite upper bound on the nWl1ber 
on PI that will be taken by a 
optimal sequential search rule. 
Derivation of the Truncated Backward Induction 
on the 
ima! 
is 
obser-
using an 
bJ bJ bJ bJ bJ I; ,by (1-4-20), is I; = (SO ,1;1 " .. ,I;J ) where 
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1 
to 
2-3-1 
0, if the (j+1)th observation on is to be taken 
2-3-2 bJ 1;. (y.) 
J J 
1, if only j observations on PI are to be taken 
and where 
2-3-3 
since, by assumption (2 3-1), no more than J observat can be made 
on PI' 
Recall from Section 2- 2 that V. (t;, 6) is defined as being the 
J 
maximum utility the consumer 
according to a search rule p ; (s,o) to be 
s 
the upper bound J on the number of 
consumer will make, this utH will be 
Suppose a consumer using a rule 
obs His attainable level uti! 
ion procedure 8, is U(8(YJ))' Hence 
j observations on PI 
Ie. To denote the 
that a 
J J 
as V. Ct; ,6). 
J 
(t;bJ,8) has taken J 
, given a terminal 
V~(sbJ;8) = U(8(YJ)) 2-3-4 
Now suppose a consumer has observations on PI' If 
6S ~ 
he chooses to halt search at this hi attainable utility 
is U(6(YJ __ l)). I to take an 
the utility so doing is ECUCa 
expectation 
reasons. First, uti expected 
the utility made attainable by 
Second, the is made with to 
3 
ervation, PI> 
]. This 
for two 1 
J PI depends on 
3-1 
o •• ,PI 
which is the IS assessment of the relative 
p,d.f. f g(piIY3_1), 
ihoods of 
J different values of PI being quoted. This assessment is made after he 
h '1' db' 1 J-1 as utI Ise 0 servatlons P1"",Pl to knowledge of w, 
the vector of parameters conditioning his assessment of the p.d.f. of 
selling prices in the market for commodity I. 
The (J,·1)th component l;bJ of the J-1 
rule !;bJ is as choosing the taking 
induction stopping 
observation pi if and only 
if the consumer expects to attain a higher level 
ie, , 
By definition, 
max{U(a(YJ_l)), ECU(o(yJ )) II} 
max{U(O(yJ _1)), E[V~(!;bJ,o)1 I]} 
by (2-3-4) so (2-3-5) may be rewritten as 
Io' U (0 (y 3 -1)) ~ 1 ,,0) bJ 
t;J-l(YJ-l) 1 '" I J 
1. 1, U(o(YJ_l)) '" VJ 1 ,0) 
Continuing on in fashion for j _. J-2,J-3, ... 
component backward 
utility by so doing, 
2-3-5 
2 3-6 
2-3-7 
2-3-8 
shows that the jth 
!;bJ , rule IS 
0, U(O(Yj)) 
bJ S~J [,. (y.) ::: 
.J J .J 
1, U(6(Yj)) 
for all j = 0, ... ,J-l. The meaning 
values of his previous observations 
66, 
# V~(~bJ 
J 
8) 
"' V~(~bJ,c'i) 
J 
of (2-3-9) 
1 
PI' ... , 
is that, given the 
if the consumer 
expects the greatest utility attainable at this or any subsequent 
2-3-9 
stage of his search, 
stop his search (S~J 
J 
J bJ V. (~ ,8), to be attainable now, then he should 
J 
::: 1). If the consumer expects the greatest utility 
attainable at any stage of his search to be attainable at some later 
stage of his search, then he should continue his search (S~J= 0). 
J 
The recursion contained in (2-3-9) is a formal expression of Bellman's 
optimality principle. 
N h h f ' cboJ of cbJ l'S the k ote t at t e 1rst component s s mar et entry 
decision component of the consumer's search rule, ie. 
= SbJ '" 
o 
1 U ( ~ ( ) ) vJo (c bJ, ~) , IJ Yo ::: s U 
ie. U(o(YO)) < E[V~(~bJ,O)J 
2-3-10 
ie. U(o(yO)) 2 E[~(~bJ,6)J 
Thus the consumer chooses to not enter the market for commodity 1 only if 
U(6(yO))' the utility attainable from purchases of only commodities 2 
J bJ to ~, exceeds E[ V1(~ ,0)J, the utility the conSillner expects ex ante 
to be attainable at any stage of a search. Recall from Section 2-1 
that the first component of the sequential stopping rules used by Nelson 
[34J, Rothschild [43J, Telser [52J, Gastwirth [llJ, McCall [32J and 
Axell [lJ is restricted to always committing the consumer to entering 
the market for commodity 1, ie. 
~~J(yo) ::: s~J = 0 2-3-11 
bJ The stopping rule ~ used in this thesis makes no such market entry 
. N h cbJ , ,. 1 restrict1on. ote also t at s 1S not a myop1c stopp1ng ru e. In 
j deciding whether or not to take observation PI' for any j 2 1, the 
consumer the utility he expects to attain at all 
j +1 > ' •• ,J of his search. A myopic 
the uti! the consumer expects to attain at 
The last section of this chapter 
which the stopping rule ~bJ becomes myopic. 
rule 
very next 
the 
SECTION 2-4: THE OPTIMAL TERMINAL DECISION PROCEDURE FOR THE 
SEQUENTIAL SEARCH MODEL 
of his 
Bellman I s optimality principle implies that, when the searcher 
halts his search, he should choose the terminal action which gives the 
maximum attainable utility for the situation he finds himself to be in. 
First of all, suppose the searcher chooses not to search. His 
action set is AO = {aO} so that his only possible terminal 
action is aO' This is a formal way of saying that commodity 1 can only 
be purchased if at least one seller is contacted ie. some search must 
be undertaken commodity 1 is to be purchased, The maximum level of 
lity attainable from allocating wealth M to only commodities 2 to ~ 
Uo(O) where 
UO(O) 2-4-1 
Now suppose the consumer chooses to enter the market and chooses 
to making j ~ 1 observations on PI' The financial 
cost of search incurred is c(j), reducing the searcher's net wealth to 
His 
A. 
J 
set 
M c (j) 
action set is 
•. , . ,a. } 
J 
costs associated with A. is 
J 
{0,t1,t2,·, '. } 
If terminal action aO is chosen, the searcher exits from the market 
2-4-2 
2-4-3 
2-4-4 
68. 
without purchasing any of commodity 1 (xi::: 0) and incurs no 
transaction cost. If action a. is chosen, for any i '" 1, ... ,j, the 
1 
searcher exits from the market by purchasing a unit of conunodity 1 
from the ith seller contacted (xi::: 1) and incurs a transaction cost of 
t i . The total payment to the ith seller is (Pi + t i ) leaving wealth 
i (Mj - (PI + t i )) to be allocated to commodities 2 to 9,. The conswner's 
optimal terminal action is the action which maximises the utility 
attainable. To choose this action the conSUTIler must compare the levels 
of utility attainable with each of the (j+l) possible terminal actions. 
The greatest utility attainable with action aO E A. is U~(O) where J J 
Uj(O) ::: max{UIU ::: U(0,x2,··.,x9,)' P2x2+' "+P9,x9,~ Mj } 2-4-5 
The greatest utility attainable with action a. E A. for any i=I, ... ,j is 
1 J 
Uij(l) ::: max{ulu::: U(1,x2 ,···,xQ), P2X2+···+P9,X.Q,~ Mj -(pi+t i)}2-4-6 
The most preferred of actions a1, ... ,aj is the action which provides 
the highest U~.(l). This maximwn will be denoted by U~(I) ie. 
IJ J 
U~(l) = max{max{UIU:U(I,x2, .. ·,x ),P2x2+' "+P.Q,x.Q,~M.-(pi+t.)}}2-4-7 J l~i~j . 9, J 1 
Combining (2-4-5) and (2-4-7) shows the highest utility attainable 
after j ::: 1,2, ... observations on PI have been taken is 
Uj (x) = max{max{U I U=U (x,x2 , ... ,x9,),P2x2+' .. +P9,X.Q,~Mj - (pi+ti ) x} }2-4-8 
where x ::: 0, 1. 
If U~(O) > U~(l), then the highest possible level of utility is attained 
J J 
by exiting from the market without purchasing any of commodity 1. Hence, 
O*(y.) ::: aO if U~(x) ::: U~(O) > U~(l) J J J J 2-4-9 
If U~(l) > U~(O), then the highest possible level of utility is attained 
J J 
by purchasing a unit of commodity 1. Hence, 
if U~(O) < U~(l) ::: U~(x) 
J J J 
2-4-10 
With demand for commodity 1 fixed at either zero or one units it is 
intuitive that the objective of the conswner is to minimise his expendi-
69 
ture on commodity 1 through prices, transaction costs and search 
costs so as to have as much wealth as possible al 
to commodities 2 to~. Intuitively, therefore. the seller a 
level of U~(1) to the searcher is the seller whose sel 
J 
and transaction cost combined is least. 
Given that a sequential search halts after j observations on PI 
any j 
O*(y.) E A. ) ) 
0,1,2, ... ), the optimal terminal decision procedure 
ao. if U~(O) > U~(l) or if j = 0 J ) 
8* (y.) :::: 
J 
Given search has halted after j ~ 1 observations on PI' 0* 
chooses the terminal action which provides the highest attainable level 
of utility U~(x). (2-4-9) establishes that 
J 
o*(y.) = aO if U~(x) = U~(O) > U~(l) J J)  
(2-4-10) shes that 
0* (y .) E { aI' . . .• a . } 
J . ) U~(x) :::: U~(1) > U~(O). J J J 
The uti attainable from taking action a i E {a1, ... ,a j } is, from 
(2-4-6) , 
U~ . (1) 
1) 
maximum U~. (1) attainable, U~(l), will be provided by the terminal 
1) ) 
action which the largest feasible set of solutions 
(M. 
J 
by the wealth constraint 
2-4-11 
set of solutions x2 ' ... ,x~ defined 
(pi + )) increases ie. as (pi + 
by (2-4-11) becomes larger as 
t.) decreases. Hence 
1 
if ~ (1) 
J (pi + ):= 
70~ 
(PI + t)~in 
Q.E.D. 
ion of transaction costs into a search model with 
2 4-12 
zero-one demand for commodity 1 is intuitive and not In 
Section 6-5 transaction costs are included in a general model 
with continuously variable demand for all cOmTIlodities 1 to~. The 
optimal terminal decision procedure provides an anation 
of why transaction costs prevent small amounts of commodity 1 being 
purchased. 
If the transaction costs associated with different sellers are 
all equal, the seller who represents the least expenditure on commodity I 
to the 
ceo 
any j 
will again be the seller who offers the lowest observed 
Given sequential search halts after j observations on PI (for 
0,1,2, ... ), and given t. = t, a constant, for all i = 1 •... ,j, 
1 
the optimal terminal decision procedure 6*(y.) E A. is 
J J 
aO' if U~(O) > U~(l) or if j := 0 
J J 
0* (y.) ::: 
J 
t. '" t for all i 
'" 
1, ... ,j, then 
1 
k 
+ t k ) min 
i if and only min 2-4-13 (PI = . (PI + t i ) p 
•... ,J 
result follows immediately from Proposition 2 l. Q.E.D. 
Note that even if all transaction costs are zero, the optimal 
decision procedure does not to terminal decision 
procedure used by Stigler, Rothschild, etc. where a of commodity 1 
71. 
must always be purchased from the seller who offered the lowest price. 
8*still allows the option of buying zero units of commodity 1. This 
terminal action will be taken more frequently as transaction costs 
increase, resulting in a decline in the market demand for commodity 1. 
The option of buying zero units of commodity 1 also avoids the contra-
diction inherent in the s~mple rule (2-1-1) between a fixed demand 
hypothesis and an objective of minimisation of expenditure on commodity I 
(see Section 2-1). 
Although expenditure minimisation is a term used throughout this 
section it should be remembered that 8* does not minimise expenditure 
on commodity 1. The minimum possible expenditure on commodity 1 is zero 
ie. xi = 0 for j = O. 0* minimises expenditure on commodity 1 only to 
the extent that, when xi = 1, 0* selects the seller from whom a unit of 
commodity 1 can be purchased with least expenditure. 
The next section shows that p~J = (;bJ,o*) is an optimal 
sequential search rule, subject to conditions sufficient to ensure that 
no more than a finite number J of observations will be taken on PI' 
SECTION 2-5: THE OPTIMALITY OF THE SEQUENTIAL SEARCH RULE 
In this section the sequential search rule pbJ = (;bJ,o*) is 
. s 
shown to maximise ex ante expected utility from search and, therefore, 
to be optimal. The proof is initially subject to assumption (2-3-1) 
that only a finite number of observations on PI will ever be taken. 
It is then proved that searchers using the optimal search rule (;bJ,o*) 
will always take only a finite number of observations on PI if financial 
search costs exist. This shows assumption (2-3-1) to be unnecessary, so 
that the optimality proof stands without the assumption. 
By definition (2-2-19) and by ~ssumption (2-3-1), p~J = (;bJ,8*) 
is optimal if and only if 
V~(~bJ,o*) ~ V~(~J,6) 
J for any other sequential search rule (~ ,6). 
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2- 5-1 
searcher's ex ante expected maximum attainable utility from using the 
bJ 
search rule (~ ,6*). This expectation must include the searcher's 
assessment of the relative likelihoods and magnitudes of different 
attainable levels of utility. For instance, a utility level of 
max{Uk(O),Uk(l)} can be enjoyed if and only if search halts after k 
observations on Pl' Both the likelihood of search halting after k 
observations and the value of Uk(l) depend upon pi, ... ,p~, the values 
\IJbJ, of the k observations on Pl' The vector r defined by (1-4-21), is a 
particularly convenient form of notation to use to emphasise that the 
enjoyment of a utility level of max{Uk(O),Uk(I)} is conditional upon 
search halting after exactly k observations on Pl' The kth component 
of 'l'bJ is, from (1-4-21), 
0, otherwise 
= 2-5-3 
1, if search halts after 
exactly k observations on PI 
cb. J l's a funct1' on of 1 i l' bJ sl PI'" ·,PI' for all = 1, ... ,k, so'l'k is also a 
1 k function of Pl, ... ,Pl' A utility level of max{Uk(O),Uk(I)} is enjoyed 
W . W W if and only if ~k = 1. From (2-5-3), 1f ~k = 1, ~i = 0 for all 
i = 0, ... ,J, ilk. Hence, if search halts after k observations on PI' 
the utility level enjoyed is 
J 
max{Uk*(O),Uk*(l)} = ~bOJ.uo*(O) + ~ ~~J.max{U~(O),U~(l)} 2-5-4 j=l J J J. 
The searcher's ex ante expected attainable utility V~(~bJ,o*) is his 
expectation w.r. t. selling prices on the magnitude and relative likeli-
hoods of the (J+l) possible outcomes from search UO(O), 
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max{uiCo),UiC1)}, ... ,max{Uj(O),Uj(l~}. Intuitively, 
V~(~bJ,6*) ECW6J,Uo(O) + E w~J.max{U~(O),U~(l)}J 2 5-5 
j=l J J J 
This is formalised in Lemma 2-5-1 which is then combined 
bJ 
with Lemma 2-5-2 to prove the optimality of the search rule (l; ,6*) 
in Proposition 2-5-3. 
From (2-3-10), 
V~(sbJ.6*) = max{Uo(0),E[V~(sbJ,6*)J} 
s6J .uo(0) + (1-s6J)·E[V~(sbJ,o*)J 
V~ (sbJ ,6*) :: max{Ui (O),Ui (l).E[V; (sbJ ,6*) 1Y1]} 
From (2-5-7), (2-5-8) and (2-3-9), 
2-5-6 
2-5-7 
5-8 
V~(sbJ,o*) s6J.uo(O)+(1-s6J).E[S~J.max{Ui(0),Ui(1)}+(1-S~J).E[V~(sbJ,6*) Iy 
2-5-9 
and so on up to 
V~(sbJ,6*) :;: s6J'UO(O)+(1-s6J).E[S~J.max{Ui(0),Ui(1)}+(1-S~J).E[ ... 
... +(1-S~~1).E[S~J.max{Uj(0),Uj(1)}IYJ_1] ... IYl]] 2-5-10 
Recall that s~J a ion of P~, ... ,P~ for all i = I, ... ,J. 
2-5-12 
J 
+ E 
j:::l 
J 
E 
j 1 
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Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2-5·-2 proves a general result commonly used in the 
of sequential decision making. The result characterises a 
function p* which maximises the integral of a linear. combination of 
two continuous functions a and b. It will be shown in Proposition 
2-5-3 that of the components s~J of the backward induction stopping 
J 
rule have the same form as p* and consequently maximise an integral 
which is a linear combination of expected utilities. This property is 
used to prove sbJ is an optimal sequential stopping rule. 
Given two continuous functions a(x) and b(x), the function p(x), 
o ~ p(x) 5 1, which maximises the integral 
is p*(x) 
1, a(x) ::: max{a(x),b(x)} 
The above statement of p*(x) is equivalent to 
0, a(x) < bex) 
p*(x) 2-5-14 
1, a(x) ;;:: b(x) 
Hence I (p*(x).a(x) + (l-p*(x)).b(x))dx 
oXI max{a(x),b(x)}dx 
X 
Since max{a(x),b(x)} ~ p(x)a(x) + (l-p(x))b(x) 
for any 0 $ p(x) $ 1 and for all x E X, 
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2-5-15 
2- 5-16 
I (p*(x)a(x) + (l-p*(x))b(x))dx > I (p(x)a(x) + (1-p(x))b(x))dx 
X X 2- 5-17 
for any p(x), 0 $ p(x) $ 1. Q.E.D. 
It will assist the reader's understanding of the proof of the 
optimality of the sequential search rule (~bJ,o*) if he compares the 
form of p*(x) to the form of ~~J in (2-3-9). Recall that 
J 
V~(~bJ,o*) = max{U~(0),U~(1),E[V~ 1(~bJ,0*)ly.]} 
J J J J+ J 
2-5-18 
= max{max{U~(O),U~(l)},E[V~ 1(~bJ,0*)ly.]} 
J J J + J 
2-5-19 
From (2-3-9) and (2-5-19), ~~J can be written as 
J 
0, max {U~(O),U~(l)} ~ max{max{U~(O),U~(l)}, 
J J J J 
E[V~ l(~bJ,o*)ly.]} 
J+ J 
1, max{U~ (0), U~ (I)} = max{max{U~ (0) ,U~ (1)}, 
J J J J 
E[V~ 1(~bJ,0*) Iy.]} 
J+ J 
2-5-20 
Comparison of (2-5-20) to the statement of Lemma 2-5-2 will show the 
bJ 
similarity of the forms of p* and ~. . p* takes a value of zero if the 
J 
maximum of the functions a and b for some x is the latter function b. 
~~J takes a value of zero if the maximum of the functions max{U~(O),U~(l)} 
J J J 
and E[V~ 1 (~bJ ,0*'1 I y.] for some P1 is the latter function E[V~ 1 (~bJ > 0*) I y.: 
J+ 'J J+ J 
p* takes a value of unity if the maximum of the functions a and b for 
some x is the former function a. ~~J takes a value of unity if the 
J 
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maximum of the functions max{U~(O),U~(I)} and UV~ 1(~bJ,o*)IY.l for 
J J J + J 
some PI is the former function max{U~(O),U~(1)}. The similarity 
J J 
of the forms of p* and ~~J allows Lemma 2-5-2 to be used in Proposition 
J 
2-5-3 which proves the backward induction stopping rule ~bJ is an 
optimal sequential stopping rule. 
Proposition 2-5-3: 
bJ . . 1 . 1 hI· d d h p 1S an opt1ma sequent1a searc ru e prov1 e no more t an 
J observations will be taken on Pl' 
Proof: 
pbJ is an optimal sequential search rule if and only if (2-5-1) 
is satisfied. The first step in the proof is to show that 
V~(~bJ,O) ~ V~(~J,O) for any sequential stopping rule ~J and any 
terminal decision procedure o. The second step is to show that 
V~(~bJ,o*) ~ V~(~bJ,O) for any terminal decision procedure O. 
J J Consider any sequential search rule p = (~,8). By repeating 
s 
the logic of Lemma 2-5-1, V~(~J,O), the ex ante expected utility from 
the use of search rule pJ, can be written in a form analogous to 
s 
(2-5-10) as 
V~(~J,O) = S~U(o(Yo))+(1-S~)ECSiU(O(Y1))+(1-Si)E[S~U(o(Y2)) + 
J J J I I ECSJ _1U(o(YJ_1))+(1-SJ _1)ECSJ U(O(YJ)) YJ-1] YJ_2 J 
IY2JIY1JJ 2-5-21 
Note that, since AO = {aO}' 
2-5-22 
for any terminal decision procedure 0 and that 
~~(YJ) = S~ = 1 = s~J = ~~J(YJ) 2-5-23 
for any sequential stopping rule ~J. Hence (2-5-21) can be written as 
2-5-24 
The jth individual integral, j ::: O, ... ,J-I, of the nest of integrals 
(2-5-24) is 
I 
U 
PI 
[S~U(8(y.)) 
L J J 
PI J 
U 
J P l · j+ 1 j + 1 j j 
+ (I-S.) [ ... Jf (PI ly.)dP I Jf (PIly. I)dP I 2-5-25 J L g J g J-
PI 
which is an integral of the type considered in Lemma 2-5-2. Applying 
Lemma 2-5-2 shows the function ~~(y.) which maximises (2-5-25) is 
J J 
J* ~. (y.) where 
J J 
J* ~. (y.) 
J J 
J* 
::: S. :: 
J 
1, U(8(y.)) ::: max{U(8(y.)), 
J J 
f 
U 
P 1 . 1 . 1 J + J + C ... Jf (PI I y. )dP I } L g J 
PI 
J 
U 2-5-26 
P 1 . 1 . 1 J + J + C ... Jf (PI ly·)dPl } 
L g J 
PI 
0, U(8(y.)) ~ max{U(8(y.)), 
J J 
which, by the definition of V~(~J,8), is equivalent to 
J 
0, U (8 (y.)) ~ V~ (~J* ,8) 
J* J* J J ~. (y.) ::: S. ::: 
J J J 
::: V~(~J*,8) 1, U (8 (y . )) 
J J 
J* Comparison of (2-5-27) and (2-3-9) shows~. -
J 
J* bJ 
all j ::: O, ... ,J. Hence ~ = ~ and therefore 
2-5-27 
~~J and this is true for 
J 
J bJ J J J VO(~ ,8) ~ VO(~ ,8) for any sequential search rule ~ and any terminal 
decision procedure 8. 2-5-28 
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It remains to show that V~(~bJ,8*) ~ V~(~bJ;O)o Recall from Section 2-4 
that 
6*(y.) max{U!(O).U~(I)}~ max{U~(O);U!.(I)} 
J J J J 1J 
for any terminal action a. EA., Hence, 
1 J 
2-5-29 
U(o*(y,)) ~ U(o(y,)) for any terminal decision procedure O. 2-5-30 
J J 
Note. by comparison of (2-5-25) to (2-5-15), that 
fp~ bJ bJ fp~ j+l j+l j j [So U(o(y.)) + (I-S.) C ... Jf (PI ly.)dPI Jf (p 1Iy. l)dP I L J J J L g J g J-
PI PI 
f
p ~ fp ~ . I . I' . 
= max[U(o(y.)), [ ... Jf (p{+ ly.)dPi+ ]f (piIY'_I)dpl 2-5-31 
L J L g J g J 
PI PI 
From (2_5_24),V~(~bJ,8) may therefore be written as 
2-5-32 
2-5-33 
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2 211 
... Jfg(PlIYl)dPlJfg(Pl)dPl]] 2-5-34 
:::: V~(sbJ,o*) 2-5-35 
Combining (2-5-35) and (2-5-28) shows 
J W -~ J . VO(s ,0*) ~ VOCs ,0) for any sequentul J search rule p J ::: (s ,0). 
Q.E.D. 
The reader may wish to note that applying results such as 
Lemma 2-5-2 in the manner used in Proposition 2-5-3 is a quite general 
technique applicable to many problems in this area of research. 
Proposition 2-5-3 is still subject to assumption (2-3-1) that 
there exists a finite upper bound J on the number of observations on PI 
taken by any searcher using the optimal search rule (sbJ,6*). However, 
this assumption very weak for two reasons. , the real world 
contains only a finite number of sellers. Second, the existence of 
search costs means that the searcher will always choose to contact only 
a finite number of sellers. This means that reality this assumption 
is redundant. The searcher's initial wealth M finite. If there is a 
finite cost associated with each observation on PI' only a finite number 
of observations can be taken before search costs the searcher's 
net wealth to zero and so reduce the attainable utility to the minimum. 
The searcher 11 always prefer to halt search before this occurs so a 
finite bound J will always exist. 
In presence of financial search costs a searcher using the 
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optimal search rule (~bJ,o*) will always make only a finite number of 
observations on Pl' 
Proof: 
The total financial cost of taking j observations on PI is c(j). 
Let JI be the smallest integer such that 
c(J') ~ M 2-5-36 
ie. the searcher can afford to take at most Ji observations on Pl' Ji 
is therefore an upper bound on the number of observations a searcher 
will take on Pl' All marginal financial search costs are assumed to be 
positive and finite by (2-2-14) and M is finite. Therefore JI is finite. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2-5-4 depends crucially on assumption (2-2-14) that any 
observation exacts a financial cost from the searcher. This assumption 
is not always realistic since, in some searches, the searcher may incur 
no financial costs in making observations on Pl' For example, sellers 
do not charge potential buyers for reading their advertisements. In 
this search model, however, zero financial search costs imply the finite 
bound J does not exist (a Type 1 problem, see Section 1-4). This is 
because psychic costs of search are ignored (assumption (2-2-14)) when, 
as Stigler [50J pointed out, they are a major deterrent to search. In 
Chapter 5 this deficiency is removed by presenting the formalised 
Stigler search model containing both financial and psychic costs of 
search. 
Assumption (2-2-14) is also unnecessarily strong in that it 
requires a positive marginal financial cost on each observation on Pl' 
However, there are searches in which a small payment is made to a 
searcher for at least some of his observations on Pl' For example, 
free food and drink is sometimes offered to potential buyers to entice 
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them to a sales promotion. All that is required for Lemma 2-5-4 to 
be val id is that accumulated financial search costs eventually exceed 
the searcher's initial wealth, even if some of the earlier marginal 
costs are negative (payments) ie. there must be some finite J such 
that 
c(J') ~ M for all JI ~ J 2-5-37 
Th d · . f h . 1 . 1 ~bJ. S . 2 3 e er1vat1on 0 t e sequent1a stopp1ng ru e s 1n ect10n -
relies upon an assumption of a finite value for J. In Proposition 2-5-5 
it is proved that the optimality of the search rule (E;bJ,o*) does not 
depend upon the assumption. 
Proposition 2-5-5: 
The sequential search rule pbJ = (E;bJ,o*) is always optimal for 
s 
consumer search problems characterised by (2-2-1), (2-2-2), (2-2-13), 
(2-2-14), (2-2-15), (2-2-16) and (2-2-18). 
Proof: 
bJ bJ The search rule p = (E; ,8*) was proved optimal for consumer 
s 
search problems characterised by (2-2-1), (2-2-2), (2-2-13), (2-2-15), 
(2-2-16) and (2-2-18) in which at most J observations on PI will be made. 
Lemma 2-5-4 proved (2-2-14) was sufficient to guarantee that no more 
than J observations on PI will ever be made in consumer search problems 
with the above characteristics. Hence p~J = (E;bJ,o*) will always be 
optimal for these problems. 
Q.E.D. 
From this point on the optimal sequential search rule will be 
denoted by 
p* = (E;*,o*) = (E;b,o*) 
s 
2-5-38 
Both components of p*, E;* and 0*, are considerably more general and 
s 
flexible than the stopping rule and terminal decision procedure implied 
82. 
simple Rothschild, Telser, Gastwirth, Axell search rule given 
(2-1-1), Note that with the change in notation in (2-5-38), (2-5-3) 
becomes 
1jI~ (y.) 
J J ~~ = (1-S0*)···(1-S~ l)S~ J J - J 
and the statement of Lemma 2-5-1 becomes 
The upper bound of J is replaced by 00 in 
guarantees ~~ 
J 
o for all j > J. 
2-·5-39 
The next section examines the sequential search rule which 
provides the lowest ex ante expected total expenditure on the purchase 
of a unit of commodity 1. 
SECTION 2 6: THE SEQUENTIAL SEARCH RULE WHICH MINIMISES EX ANTE 
EXPECTED TOTAL EXPENDITURE ON THE PURCHASE OF A UNIT OF COMMODITY 1 
/\ A A 
Ps (~,o) is defined by (2-2-22) as being a sequential search 
rule for which the consumer's ex ante expectation of his total expenditure 
on commodity 1, WO(~'o), is a minimum with to his choice of 
sequential search rule p ::: (~,o). p is subject to the condition that 
s s 
the consumer's demand for commodity 1 x* 1 1. A condition necessary 
for xi ;:: 1 is that the consumer's market entry decision must always be to 
enter the market for commodity 1. component ~o 
A 
of the sequential stopping rule component ; Ps is restricted to being 
such that 
2-6-1 
The restriction xi ;:: 1 is essential to the obj of minimising total 
expenditure on commodity 1 because it removes terminal action aO from the 
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consumer's terminal action space. If xi = 0 (ie. terminal action ao) 
is Ie with this objective then minimising total expenditure 
on commodity 1 requires that the terminal decision procedure 8 chooses 
action aO always, ie. xi ::: 0 always. This is because, by 
choosing aO' the consumer is inflicted only with his expenditure on 
search costs and avoids expenditure on purchase and transaction costs. 
Permitting xi = 0 with an objective of minimising total expenditure on 
commodity 1 therefore causes the consumer search problem to vanish. 
The techniques used in the analysis of Sections 2-3, 2-4 and 2-5 
can be used to show that ~s has the following form. 
A A A A A A 
(1;,0) where (i) ~ :::: (~O'~l"" .Sj " .. ) where 
~O(yo) :::: So = 0 and where 
0, TE. f. W.(t~) 
~. (y.) A J J :::: S. :::: for all j ?:: 1 2-6-2 
J J . J A A 
1, TE. = W. (1;,0) 
J J 
The interpretation of (2-6-2) is as follows. By definition, W.(t,8) 
J 
the minimum total expenditure that the consumer expects, after taking 
j ~ I observations on PI according to search rule Ps' to be required 
the purchase of a unit of commodity 1 at this or any subsequent 
of his search. If the consumer expects TE., the total expenditure 
J 
A A 
required now, j observations on PI' to be the minimum Wj(S,o), 
A 
then he should choose to stop his search (S. ::: 1). If the consumer 
J 
expects a minimum total expenditure W. c€, 6), lower than TE., to be 
J J 
attainable at some subsequent stage of his search then he should choose 
to continue his search (S. = 0). 
J 
(ii) Total expenditure on the purchase of a unit of commodity 1, 
after j observations on PI' is, if terminal action ak E Aj is taken, 
= P~ + tk + c(j) 2-6-3 
84, 
1 j 
c(j) is the financial cost of taking observations Pl"",P1 and is 
therefore independent of the terminal action Hence, the 
terminal decision procedure minimising total on commodity 1 
" subject to xi = 1 is 0 where 
~(y.) := 
J 
d 1 . f i (t)m. in an on y 1 PI + ti = PI + J 2-6-4 
The minimum total expenditure achieved, after j observations on PI' by 
using ;S will be 
TE. (8) ::: 
J 
denoted by TE.(8), 
J 
min (PI + t)j + c(j) 
ie. 
2-6-5 
The reasoning of the proof of Proposition 2-5-3 can be adapted 
from an objective of maximising expected utility to an objective of 
minimising the expected total expenditure needed for the purchase of a 
unit of commodity 1. This allows the ex ante expectation of this 
A " 
expenditure, WOCE;,o), to be expressed in a form analogous to (2-5-34) 
as 
(6), ... , 
2-6-6 
The next section examines conditions under which one rule 
simultaneously satisfies 6) and (2-5-34) ie. simultaneously 
minimises the consumer's ex ante expectation of the total 
required to purchase a unit commodity 1 and maximises the consumer's 
ex ante expected utility. 
SECTION 2-7: ~1YOPIC SEARCH RULES AND THE USE OF EXPENDITURE 
MINIMISATION AS A PROXY FOR UTILITY MAXIMISATION 
In Section 1 3 it is stated that consumer theorists 
85, 
commonly restrict the utility functions admissible to their problems 
to those functions which utility maximisation coincident with 
minimisation of expenditure on commodity 1. It also stated that 
this restriction is usually accompanied by the restriction that 
utility functions must be such that demand for commodity 1 is fixed 
for every price-income situation possible from search. In Section 1-4 
the severity of these restrictions is demonstrated for what are called 
Types 2 and 3 search problems. It is shown there that only utility 
functions with a certain degree and type of non-smoothness are admissible 
for these problems. In Section 2-1 a simple example is given demonstrating 
that an unqualified objective of minimising expenditure on commodity 1 
can contradict the demand hypothesis. Typically the users of the 
expenditure minimisation proxy have utilised its statistical simplicity 
but have had insufficient regard, if any, to the limits within which the 
proxy can be used. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the 
severity of conditions which are necessary and sufficient to restrict 
the model developed in paper to the myopic minimising 
models presented by Rothschild [43J, Axe11 [lJ, Telser rS2J, and Gastwirth 
[11J. First to be examined are the conditions under which minimisation 
of the consumer's ex ante expected total expenditure on commodity 1 is 
equivalent to maximisation of the consumer's ex ante utility. 
Second to be explored are the conditions under which the consumer's 
optimal search rule is myopic. 
Maximisation: 
The expenditure minimisation objective is expressed in terms of 
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ces and wealth. To ease comparison of this with the utility 
ion objective VoCs*,o*) will also be in terms 
and wealth. This is done by expressing C2-5-34) in terms 
the consumerfs indirect utility function I. 
If, after j ~ 0 observations on PI' o*CY j ) = aO then the 
consumer's demand for commodity 1 is zero units and his demands for 
commodities I to ~ are 
::; 0 
x": ::: 
1 
2-7-1 
2-7-2 
The indirect utility derived from taking action aO after j ~ 0 observa-
tions have been taken on PI is therefore 
Uj(O) :: UCO,x2(P2, ... ,p~,Mj), ... ,x~(P2 •... ,p~,M)) 2-7-3 
::: 10 (P2 •... ,PQ"M) 7-4 
If, after j ~ 1 observations on PI' o*(Yj) ::: ai # aO then the 
consumer's demand for commodity I is one unit and his demands for 
commodit 1 to ~ are 
x* I - I 2-7-5 
x* == xi (PZ" •• 'PQ"Mj - (PI + t)~in) for all i ::: 2, ... ,~ 2-7-6 i J 
The indirect utility derived from taking action a. after j 2: 1 
1 
observations have been taken on PI is therefore 
min -
Uj(l) ::: U(I,x2(P2,. .. 'P~,Mj - (PI + t)j ), ... ,xQ,(P2, .. ·,p~,Mj 
( t) m.in) PI + J 2~7-8 
, ... ,p~ are fixed by assumption (1-4-1) so, for notational convenience, 
let 
U~ (0) 
J 
U~ (1) 
J 
I O(P2,·.· ,p~,Mj) '" !OCMj) 2-7-9 
- min ~ 
= I1(P2,···,p~,Mj - (PI+t)j ) = I 1 (Mj 
(2-7-9) and (2-7-10) into (2-5-34) shows VOC~*,o*) can be 
87. 
wri tten as 
2-7-11 
The search rule minimising the consumer's ex ante expected total expendi-
ture on the purchase of a unit of commodity 1, p = C~,~), is equivalent 
s 
to p* = (~*,o*), the search rule maximising the consumer's ex ante 
s 
expected utility, if and only if C2-6-6) is equivalent to C2-7-11). 
Proposition 2-7-1 shows that necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
valid use of expenditure minimisation as a proxy for utility maximisation 
are (i) VOC~*,o*) > IOCM) which, since VOC~*,O*) = max{IoCM),E[Vl(~*,o*)J}, 
is equivalent to E[V1(~*~o*)J > iOCM). 2-7-12 
IOCM), the utility attainable by not entering the market for commodity 1, 
must be less than E[V1C~*,o*)J~ the utility the consumer expects to be 
attainable by entering the market for commodity 1. This condition ensures 
that the consumer's market entry decision is always to enter the market 
for commodity 1. 
(ii) xi = 1, ie. for any j ~ 1, 
- - min lOCMj) < 11 (Mj - (P1+t )j ) 2-7-13 
At any stage of search the utility available to the consumer by demanding 
zero units of commodity 1 must be exceeded by the utility available to the 
88, 
consumer by demanding one unit of commodity 1. It has already been 
noted in Section 2-1 that, in the previous search models [43J, [lJ, 
[52J,[11J, there is no guarantee that xi = 1 will always be feasible. 
The source of the contradiction between the fixed demand condition 
xi = 1 and the myopic sequential stopping rule (2-1-1) is the next 
condition. 
(iii) min II is linear with respect to CMj - CPl+t)j ) for all j ;::: 1 
ie. utility is linear with respect to the net wealth the consumer is 
able to retain for allocation to purchases of commodities 2 to ~. 
This condition implies that the consumer is risk neutral with respect 
to expenditure on commodity 1 and it is this risk neutrality which 
permits the consumer to take a gamble which has the non-feasibility of 
xi = 1 as a possible outcome. If a measure of risk neutrality is 
imposed on the consumer's utility function sufficient to prevent this 
gamble being taken, then II is no longer linear with respect to 
(Mj - CPl+t)7in) and expenditure minimisation is no longer a valid proxy 
for utility maximisation. Consequently some influence other than the 
consumer's preferences must be assumed present to ensure the fourth 
condition. 
Civ) xi = 1 is always feasible for any j ;::: 1. 
Definition: 
&1:: {Ulu(xp''''x,e) is such that IOCM) < E[V1CC,8*)] and 
- min IOCMj) < 11 CMj - CP1+t)j ) for all j ;::: I} 2-7-14 
Proposition 2-7-1: 
Minimisation of ex ante expected total expenditure on purchase of 
a unit of commodity 1 is a valid proxy for maximisation of ex ante 
expected utility if and only if 
(i) U E &1 
89. 
(ii) 1 is always feasible 
~ 
(iii) I 1 
(a) 
v (~*, 0*) :::: o 
1 with respect to (Mj 
U E n Therefore (2-7-11) can be as 
2 7-15 
Mj M c(j) by definition (1-4-18) so 
M. 2 7-16 
J 
by Proposition 2-4-1 and conditions (i) and (ii) above. By condition 
(iii) above 
~ - min I 1(Mj - (Pl+ t )j ) a + b(M. J 
min (PI +t) j ) where b > O. 
for a1l j ;:: 1 
:::: a + b (M - TE. (8*)) for all j ;?: 1 by 
J 
(2-7-16) 
2-7-17 
2-7-18 
substituting (2-7-18) into (2-7-15) gives 
f 
U 
PI . 1 . 1 
* J+ J + TE.(8*)}, max[a + beM - TE. 1(0 )), ... Jf (P1 ly.)dP1 J 
J L J+ g J 
PI 
2-7-19 
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(8*) , 
== a + bM - bWO ,0*) by (2-6-6) 2-7-21 
(a + bM) is a constant and Proposition 2-5-5 proved VOCs*,8*) to be a 
maximum with to the choice of sequential search rule p = (s,8). 
s 
Hence, by 7-21), WO(~*.8*) is a minimum with respect to the choice of 
sequential search rule p == (s.8), ie. 
s 
WOCs*,8*) ~ WOCs,8) for any sequential search rule Ps = (~,o). 2-7-22 
However, by definition (2-2-22), 
2-7-23 
Therefore, from 7-22) and (2-7-23), 
2-7-24 
Conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are therefore sufficient for the validity 
of the expenditure minimisation proxy. 
(b) Necessity: P* == (~*,8*) possesses the property that 
s 
2-7-25 
for any sequential search rule p 
s 
For (2-7-25) to be true 
The existence of WoCs*.o*) is conditional upon 
a unit of commodity 1 always being purchased. Conditions necessary for 
(2-7-25) are the consumer always enters the market for 
conunodity 1, that demands one unit of commodity 1 and that 
this demand always ie. 
(i) U € ~ 2-7-26 
(ii) x* = 1 - 1 always 2-7-27 
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The expected total expenditure minimising consumer is risk neutral 
with respect to wealth net of total expenditure on commodity 1. This 
requires 
(iii) linear with respect to (M - TE.(6*)) = M. 
J J 
2-7-28 
for all j 2 1. Q.E.D. 
The conditions required by Proposition 2-7-1 are clearly very 
stringent and unusual. Consequently minimisation of ex ante expected 
total expenditure on the purchase of a unit of commodity 1 will usually 
not be a valid proxy for maximisation of ex ante expected utility. One 
must disagree with Rothschild [43, p.690] who, as a justification for 
ignoring psychic costs of search, says "Other rather trivial, from the 
formal point of view, generalisations are possible. Price and cost can 
be measured in utility rather than money. However, the utility function 
must be linear, so this is a small generalisation". This paper demon-
strates that measuring price and cost in utility terms is not a "small 
generalisation" [43, p.690]. Instead it is a generalisation necessary to 
avoid the contradictions inherent in the stopping rule (2-1-1) except 
under the stringent conditions of Proposition 2-7-1. Nevertheless, 
minimisation of expenditure on commodity 1 is the consumer objective 
invoked in Chapters 3 and 4 because using a more general utility 
maximising objective would greatly complicate the analyses contained in 
these chapters. 
Note that transaction costs are included in the expenditure 
A 
minimising search rule P
s 
described in Section 2 ... 6 and that this rule need 
not be myopic. For p. to be equivalent to the Rothschild, Telser, Axe 11 , 
s 
Gastwirth search rules the already restrictive conditions of Proposition 
2-7-1 must be augmented by a condition of zero transaction costs and 
conditions sufficient for P to be myopic. 
s 
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One apparent contradiction must be resolved. It is asserted 
that the consumer's 
min (Mj - (p 1 +t) j ) 
p* to coincide 
s 
utility function I must be linear w,r.t, 
all j ~ I for the optimal search rule 
sequential search rule minimising expected 
total expenditure on commodity 1. The consumer risk 
neutral w.r.t. total expenditure on commodity 1. Yet, the stopping 
rule s* seenlS to imply some degree of risk averseness in that 
s~(y.) :;: S~ =: 1 
J J J TE j (0*) '" E(v.]j+l (~~c, 0*) I Y j J. Therefore, if 
TE. (6*) ::: 
J k (o*) Iy·] = E[W. 1(s*,8*) Iy·] for some k 2 1 + J J + J 
the searcher will always decline the fair gamble of continuing his 
search past his present position in favour of stopping his search now. 
The "contradiction" does not in fact exist. because, as Proposition 
2-7-2 proves, the consumer will be indifferent between stopping and 
continuing his search only with probability zero. Only two-way ties 
of the type (2-7-29) are considered in the proof of Proposition 2-7-2 
because the probability of any higher order t bounded above by 
2-7-29 
the probability of a two-way tie. Proving the probability of a two-way 
tie is zero therefore automatically proves that the probability of any 
higher order is also zero. Proposition 2-7-2's result is proved 
under conditions which ensure that expenditure minimisation is a valid 
proxy for utH maximisation. The result will not be generally true 
with a more objective of maximising ex ante expected utility 
since the frequency with which indifference occurs through the use of 
the optimal sequential search rule will depend upon the form of the 
consumer's lity function. 
If the conditions of Proposition 2- 1 are satisfied, the 
searcher will be indifferent between stopping or continuing his search 
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at any only with probability zero. 
the consumer has taken j observations on 
he is between stopping and taking an 
on PI because a tie such as (2-7-29) has occurred, ie. 
E[W. 1(~*j8*) Iy·] TE.(8*):= E[TE. k(6*) !y.] 
J+ J J J+ J 
2-7-30 
for some k ~ 1. The probability of this tie occurring will be shown 
to be zero. From (2-7-30), 
2-7-31 
2-7-32 
2-7-33 
j+i The PI ' i=l, ... ,k, are independently distributed (assumption (1-4-10)) 
so 
Now, 
min pr((pl+t )j+k ~ P1 IYj) 
( ( min - I PI' P1+t )j+k::::: PI Yj ) 
k 
; IT (1 - F (PI - t. i)) 
i=1 g J + 
::::: d/dPl(pr((pl+t)~!~ ~ PIIYj) 
so from (2-7-36) and (2-7-35), 
k k 
E IT (1 
1 R,= 1 
Mi 
- F (Pl- t. n))' f 
.g J+x, g 
Substituting (2-7-37) into (2-7-32) gives 
k 
IT (1 
9,=1 
9,fi 
F (Pl-t. n))·f (Pl- t .+,)dP1 ::::: g J+x, g J 1 
2- 35 
2-7-36 
t. .) )+1 
j+k 
L 
+1 
2-7-37 
2-7-38 
Rearranging (2-7-38) gives 
IC 
t) min Pl+ . J . ((pl+t)~ln 
L. J 
PI 
k 
- p). E 
i=l 
k 
IT (1 
£=1 
.Q,~i 
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- F (Pl-t. n))·f (Pl-t .. )dPI g J+x, g J+1 
2-7-39 
min The L.H.S. of (2-7-39) is a monotonic increasing function in (Pl+t)j 
so there is only one solution, (PI+t)jin = p*. to (2-7-39). However, 
the p.d.f. of (Pl+t)jin is continuous so the probability that (Pl+t)jin = p* 
exactly is zero. Hence the probability of the tie (2-7-30) is zero. 
Q.E.D. 
In Section 2-1 it was mentioned that the search rule (2-1-1) 
possesses a 'supermartingale' structure which makes the search rule 
'myopic' in that the stopping rule component only considers the expected 
expenditure on commodity 1 after one extra observation on Pl' In the 
more general structure of p* developed in Sections 2-3 to 2-5, ~ considers 
s 
the expected utilities after one, two, ... , etc. extra observations on PI' 
assesses which of these expectations is the greatest and continues or 
halts search if this maximum does or does not exceed the utility presently 
attainable. A supermartingale structure is therefore one in which, after 
a certain number of observations on PI' the utility expected after one 
additional observation on PI exceeds the utility expected after two or 
more observations on Pl' The reader is referred to De Groot [9, p.353] 
or McCall [30, p.423] for formal discussions on the properties of 
martingales. 
Definition: 
only if 
The optimal sequential search rule p* = (~*,o*) is myopic if and 
s 
E[V. 1(~*,8*) Iy·] ::: E[max{u~ l(O),U~ 1(1) }Iy·] J+ J . J+ J+ J 
for all j 2 j* where j* 2 0, 
Whether or not p* possesses the myopic structure (2-7-40) 
s 
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largely depends on the nature of the costs facing the searcher, a 
dependency examined in the discussion on search paths in Chapter 3, 
Under the supermartingale structure (2-7-40), the jth component 
of the optimal sequential stopping rule greatly simplifies from (2-3-9) 
to 
0, max{U>; (0) ,U>; (I)} 
J J < E[max{U~ l(O),U>; l(I)}ly·] J+ J+ J 
~>; (y.) ::: S~ ::: 2-7-41 
J J J 
2 E[max{U~ I (0) ,U~ I (I)} Iy.] 1, max{U~(O),U>;(l)} 
J J J+ J+ J 
Since Uj+1(0) < Uj(O)for all j ~ 0, (2-7-41) simplifies further to 
! 0, max{U>; (0) ,U>; (1) } < BCU>; 1 (1) I y . ] J J J+ J ~~ (y.) ::: S~ ::: 2-7-42 J J J 2 BCU>; 1 (1) Iy. ] 1, max{U~ (0) ,U>; (1) } J J J+ J 
The myopia contained in the stopping rule is apparent from (2-7-42) 
since the decision of whether or not to take an extra observation on PI 
is made by comparing the presently attainable utility with the utility 
expected to be attainable after only one extra observation on PI' If 
the conditions of Proposition 2-7-1 are satisfied as well as (2-7-40), 
E [W. 1 ( ~* , 0*) I y .] ::: E [TE. 1 ( 8*) I y . ] 
J+ J J+ J 
2-7-43 
and the optimal stopping rule ~* has the particularly simple structure of 
~*::: (~o'~i""'~j'''') where ~O(yO) ::: SO:: ° and 
1
0, TE. (8*) > UTE. 1(0*) Iy· ] 
J J + J 
for all 
1, TE. (8*) :::; E [TE. 1 ( 0*) I y . ] 
. J J + J 
~~(y.) ::: S~ ::: 
J J J 
j :: 1 2-7-44 
If marginal financial search costs are a constant c and all transaction 
costs are zero, (2-7-44) is precisely the simple rule (2-1-1), 
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Myopia will be optimal if and only if the search 
are such that (2-7-40) true. The conditions e 
search rule (2 1-1) to coincide with the optimal rule 
p* are one set of conditions sufficient for myopic search to be 
5 
However, more general sufficient conditions than these In 
Section 3-7 it shown that the rational consumer chooses to contact 
sellers in a sequence (a search path) for which (2-7-40) is satisfied. 
Myopic search behaviour thus coincides with optimal search behaviour 
more frequently than it might at first appear. 
The search model developed in Sections 2-2 to 2-5 contains 
assumption (2-2-18), that a search path is decided upon prior to search 
and not revised as search proceeds. There are situations 
where a consumer is constrained to exactly this course action. 
However, if he expects to attain greater utility by changing his search 
path, and the freedom exists for him to do so, then he will change his 
search path. Chapter 3 examines how a search path is chosen, some of 
the influencing this choice and how changes in these factors can 
change the chosen path. A description given of how a sequential 
searcher's choice of search path may be revised as search proceeds. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE DIRECTION OF SEARCH AND OPTIMAL SEARCH PATHS 
SECTION 3-1: WHY SEARCH PATHS MATTER 
In real life, searchers do not mill aimlessly about among sellers. 
Rational search is always directed in some way. The actual direction 
will depend upon the searcher's knowledge of different sellers' 
existences and characteristics, the relative costs and benefits from 
contacting different sellers, the constraints imposed on the searcher 
by the search problem he faces and the manner in which he learns about 
all of these. It may well be that these constraints are such that only 
particular sellers can be contacted in one particular sequence but 
casual observation of reality suggests that the constraints upon a 
searcher's search path are rarely this severe. Usually, therefore, 
a searcher, will have some freedom to choose the sellers he contacts and 
to choose the order in which he contacts them. To ignore the variations 
in the expected net gain from search due to variations in these sequences 
makes as little sense as ignoring the variations in a firm's expected 
profit due to varying the mix of factor inputs. Just as the compet-
itive firm optimises by choosing a mix of factor inputs which maximise 
profits subject to the constraints on the firm, the rational searcher 
will choose a search path which maximises the expected gain from search, 
,subject to the constraints placed upon him by his search problem. Yet, 
with two exceptions, the search literature is devoid of any consider-
ation of search paths. The exceptions are papers by Burdet [2] and 
Salop [46]. This writer has been unable to obtain a copy of Burdet's 
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paper and so cannot describe his results. Salop considers a job searcher 
who must accept a job within a finite time horizon in a labour market 
with dispersed wages. The searcher has subjective uncertain prior 
knowledge of the likelihood of being offered a job by any particular 
firm and of the wage rate accompanying such an offer. Salop assumes 
that this stock of information is not altered over the course of the 
search. One firm is sampled per period. If the sequential searcher 
refuses a firm's offer, an opportunity cost is incurred of the wage 
offered by the firm for one period. Salop shows the job searcher, who 
has an objective of maximising his present valued expected wealth, finds 
it optimal to sample firms in a specific order, The order of sampling 
is identical to the ranking of firms in a decreasing sequence of the 
wealth the searcher expects to receive from the individual firms. The 
searcher's acceptance wage is shown to decline as search proceeds. 
The implicit assumption typically present in the search literature 
is that, for some reason never specified, the searcher is indifferent 
between all possible search paths or, alternatively, that only one 
search path is possible. While the simplicity achieved in the analysis 
of search models by assuming indifference between possible search 
paths is useful, it is achieved only at the expense of being unable to 
glean any insights into how a search path is chosen. The purpose of this 
chapter is to determine some of the factors influencing this choice. 
Only sequential search paths are considered in this chapter. 
Stigleresque search paths are considered in Section 5-4. 
The following sections examine the influences of financial 
search costs, transaction costs, searcher's knowledge of sellers' 
relative pricing behaviour and advertising on the choice of search 
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path. The first three factoJ;':;l C\J;'e ~hown to give rise to supermartingale 
sequences of net expected gains from search, so that myopic search is 
optilnal (see Section 2-7), when marginal financial search costs are 
independent. 
SECTION 3-2: NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Throughout the whole of the chapter it is assumed that the 
conditions of Proposition 2-7-1 are satisfied so that minimisation of 
expenditure on commodity 1 is a v~lid proxy for consumer utility 
maximisation. It is recognised that these conditions are restrictive, 
but the simplification gained by the use of the proxy is considerable 
and allows at least an intuitive understanding of what may motivate 
the searcher in his choice of search path when he has a more general 
objective, such as maximising expected utility, 
Assumption: Minimisation of ex ante expected total expenditure 
on commodity 1 is a valid proxy for maximisation 
of ex ante expected utility. 3-2-1 
The analysis in this chapter is therefore carried out in money terms. 
A unique index is atta.ched to each seller so that one seller 
may be identified from any other. It is supposed that each index is 
a positive integel'. No two sellers may have the same index. The index 
does not imply a ranking of any sort over the sellers ~ it is simply 
a means of identifying pal'ticular sellers.· For instance, the clothing 
stOl'e two blocks away may have an index of 14076 while the clothing 
store four kilometres due south may have an index of 32. The indices 
.are used to indicate which sellers the searcher is considering 
contacting, 
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- a search path over j sellers, j ~ 1, is by a 
sequence of j indices, 1., ... ,i., where i k = n means l J the 3-2 2 
kth seller a searcher would contact by following path 
the seller attached to an index of n. For example. a search path over 
j 2 sellers may be 14076, 32, meaning the clothing store two blocks 
away would be contacted and the store four kilometres due south 
contacted second. A potential point of misunderstanding must be 
emphas here. Choosing a search path i l •••. ,l j does not, in 
, commit a searcher to contacting all of the sellers associated 
with these j indices in the order 11, •. "i j , Assumption (3-2-1) 
guarantees that a consumer always searches. With a search path of 
I •• "i. the first seller he contacts is the seller attached to the 
J 
index If the searcher decides to take a second observation on PI 
, in general, no guarantee that the second seller contacted 
the seller attached to the index i 2 , The selling price quoted by the 
seller, p~, may alter the consumer 1 s choice of search path to 
iZ" .. ,ij, where j' need not equal j and i k need not equal i k for 
any of k = 2"."j. The choice of a particular search path at a 
particular decision point thus fixes definitely only the identity of the 
very next seller to be contacted should search be extended by an additional 
ob on PI' The actual search path followed is known with 
to the searcher only at the moment he stops searching. However. 
3-3 shows that if marginal costs of observations are independent~ 
the may choose to vary the length of his search 
path, he 1 never choose to vary the order in which sellers on this 
are contacted. The searcher\g preferences over all sellers 
on order of contacting sellers will not change as search proceeds. 
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Thus if second, third and subsequent observations are taken on PI' the 
sellers from whom these observations are taken are still the sellers with 
indexes of i 2, i3 etc. on the original search path. 
In Section 2-2, assumption (2-2-18) prevented consideration of 
alternative search paths. Lifting the assumption in this chapter 
raises a difficult problem which may be avoided by the following 
assumption, 
Assumption; The marginal financial cost of any observation on PI is 
independent of any characteristic of any other observation 
3-2-3 
(3-2-3) will be recognised as part of assumption (2-1-3), implicit in 
the search models discussed in Section 2-1. The difficult problem 
being avoided may be inferred from the following example. Suppose a 
rural housewife wishes to buy a dress. There is a local drapery three 
miles down the road while ten miles in the other direction is a city with 
many draperies. As far as the housewife knows there is no difference 
in the relative pricing behaviour or transaction costs of any of these 
sellers. If she decides it is likely she will wish to accept the first 
selling price offered to her, it is intuitively reasonable for her to 
visit the local draper first, since the cost of this observation is 
less than the cost of obtaining a first observation from a city draper. 
However, if she feels it is likely that she will obtain more than one 
quotation, it may be more profitable to avoid the local draper and go 
straight to the city drapers, While the marginal cost of the first 
observation at a city draper is greater than for the local draper. the 
marginal costs of subsequent observations are lower since city drapers 
102. 
are clustered closely together. The difficulty is that the marginal cost 
of an observation is dependent upon the location of at least the imm-
ediately preceding observation. Computation of the optimal searcher 
strategy for such problems requires the solution of a very large, very 
complex dynamic programming problem. The complexity of this problem 
is substantially reduced and great analytical simplification obtained, 
for only a little loss in understanding of characteristics of optimal 
searcher strategies 1 if assumption C3-2~3) is invoked. 
Recall from Section 1-4 that c. is the marginal financial search 
Ij 
cost of obtaining a selling price quotation from the jth seller on the 
searcher1s chosen search path and that t. is the transaction cost of 
Ij 
purchasing a unit of commodity 1 from the jth seller on the searcher's 
chosen search path. 
The expected total expenditure on commodity 1 associated with a 
particular search path i 1 ••.. ,i j depends upon the relative likelihoods 
of search being halted after any of 1 to j observations on PI have been 
taken. 
Pr(1J!k*=llw. ,,,.,w. ,to , ... ,t. ,c. , ... ,c.) -the ex ante probability 3-2-4 
11 1. 11 1. 11 1-J. J J 
of the searcher wishing to halt search after k, 1 ~ k ~ j, observations 
on PI given a chosen search path i1",.,i j , To ensure the probabilities 
Pr(1J!l*=llw. , ... ,c. ) to Pr(1J!~=llw. , ... ,c. ) form a complete p.m.f. 
11 1j J 11 Ij 
of search lengths for the chosen search path, Pr(1J!~=llw. , ... ,c. ) 
J 11 1j 
is defined as 
Pr(1J!~::llw. , ... ,c. ) ;:: 1 
J 11 1j 
j -1 
L: pr(1J!k*=llw. , ...• c.) 
k=1 11 1j 
3-2-5 
ie. the searcher assesses the ex ante expected total expenditure on 
commodity 1 for the search path i1,.,.,i j on the basis that the 
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searcher may not past seller i., 
J 
he has not stopped 
his search this seller, 
depend upon the values observations 
on PI and are revised as search proceeds and observations on 
PI accumulate, Revision of these probabilities may well result in the 
searcher changing his choice of search path as proceeds. 
ETE(iI, .•. ,i j ) - the ex ante expected total on commodity 1 
for the path i 1",.,i j , 
j min k 
E[ E {(P1+t)k + E c. Lwk*lw. ,. •. ,w. ] 
k=l m:::::1 ~m 11 lj 
ETE(i1,·,·, ) 
The searcher evaluates ETE(i1, ..• i j ) for all possible search 
paths i1, ..• ,i j and, since minimisation of expenditure on commodity 1 
is equivalent to ut maximisation, chooses the search path for 
which ETE a minimum. 
ii" .• ,ij* - the searcher 1s optimal search path 
ETE(ii,,,·,ij*) S ETE(il, ... ,i j ) 
for any search path i1, •.. ,i j , 
The reader reminded that the ex ante optimal search path 
3-2-6 
3-2-7 
3-2-8 
ii, ... ,ij* neither commits the searcher to a search of j* observations 
on PI nor commits him to contacting any of the sellers with the 
. * . * S· 12, • , . ,lj *. lnce at one observation on PI is always taken, 
choosing the search path i* does commit the searcher to contact-,.,., j* 
ing the seller attached to the index ii, but this is the only 
commitment implied by this choice of search path. 
The results ions 3-3, 3-4 and 3-5 
rankings over all the values of the c. • 
1. 
J 
t. 
1. 
J 
and w .• 
1-
J 
The 
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following four definitions are given in preparation for these results, 
C(j) - the jth smallest member of the set of all marginal financial 
search costs ci . ie. c(l) S c(2) $ '" $ c(j) S ,., 
J 
for all c. . 3-2-9 
l. 
J 
t(j) - the jth smallest member of the set of all transation costs 
W(j) 
t i . ie. t(l) ~ t(2) ~ ... ~ t(j) $ •. , for all ti.' 
J J 
- the jth smallest member of the set of all values of W. 
l. 
J 
w ascribed to sellers ie, w(l) S w(2) S '" S w(j) $ ". 
for all w. 
l. 
J 
- the jth largest member of the set of all values of w. 
1-
J 
of w ascribed to sellers ie. W(l) ~ w(2) ~ .. , ~ w(j) ~ 
of 
3-2-10 
3-2-11 
for all w. . 3-2-12 
l. 
J 
In Sections 3~3. 3-4 and 3-5 respectively, the directional 
influences of financial search costs, transaction costs and searcher's 
knowledge of sellers' relative pricing behaviour are examined. Section 
3-6 combines these influences in a discussion on advertising. In 
Section 3-7 the results of Sections 3-3, 3-4 and 3-5 are used to show 
that following an optimal search path will cause myopic and optimal 
sequential search behaviours to be equivalent. 
SECTION 3-3; FINANCIAL SEARCH COSTS AND THE OPTIMAL SEARCH PATH 
It is intuitive that financial search costs influence both the 
direction and duration of consumer search. To assist in understanding 
how financial search costs influence the choice of search path, 
directional influences due to transaction costs and searcher's beliefs 
about sellers' relative pricing behaviours are assumed not to exist. 
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Assumption: There are no transaction costs ie. t. = 0 for all i .. 3-3-1 
1. J 
J 
Assumption: The searcher has no knowledge of differences in different 
sellers' relative pricing behaviour 
i .. 
J 
ie. w. = w for all 
1. 
J 
Under assumptions (3-3-1) and (3-3-2), the p,m,f. of search 
3-3-2 
lengths (3-2-4) and the ex ante expected total expenditure on commodity 
1 (3-2-7) for a search path i 1"",i j simplify to 
pr(l/Ik*=llw. , .. , ,w. ,c. " .. ,c. ) = Pr(lll.*=llw,c. , ... ,c. ) 
11 1j 11 1j Tk 11 1j 
for all k = l, ... ,j, and 
j . k 
ETE(i1 , ... ,i.) = E[ ~ {p~~n + ~ ci }.I/Jklw] J k=1 m=1 m 
In a sequential search context the terms "length of search" 
and "number of observations on PIn are interchangeable, although this 
3-3-3 
3-3-4 
is not the case in the context of generalised search where many observations 
on PI may be made in anyone period, The term commonly used in the 
search literature is "length of search" so, to facilitate comparison of 
other writers' analyses to the present work, the term will be retained 
throughout Chapters 3 and 4 where sequential search is optimal. 
Nevertheless, writers should distinguish properly between the periodic 
duration of search and the total number of observations made. 
The analysis of this section begins by arbitrarily selecting 
a particular length of search j. The conditionally optimal search path 
of length j is found to be characterised by a monotonic increasing 
sequence of the smallest j marginal financial search costs. The 
optimal search path is then obtained by locating the search length j* 
corresponding to the global minimum for all values of j ~ 1 of the 
minima for each of the values of j. The search length for which the ex 
ante expected expenditure on commodity I is a global minimum need not 
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be the actual length of search. The problem analysed here, therefore, 
is one in which the searcher may vary the number of observations on 
PI' the physical method of search, the sellers contacted and the 
order in which they are contacted. The actual length of search is 
known only at the instant the searcher halts his search. 
It is intuitive that a searcher will wish to incur only the 
smallest marginal financial search costs. It is also intuitive that 
the relatively larger is a marginal cost, the later in his search is the 
point at which the searcher will wish to incur it. This is because 
there will then be a greater chance that the searcher will have found 
it optimal to halt search before incurring the cost and so avoid it 
entirely. This intuition is formalised in the following Proposition. 
Proposition 3~3~1: 
A search path of length j ~ 1 for which the ex ante expected 
total expenditure on commodity 1 is minimised is i1, ..• ,ij where 
ci ' = c em) for all m = l, •.. ,j. m 
Proof: 
The ex ante expected total expenditure on commodity I for a 
By analogy to (2-6-6) and (2-5-13), (3-3-5) may be written as 
ETE (i 1 ' ..• > i j ) 
3-3-5 
3-3-6 
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The problem is to select the values of the c. for which (3-3-6) is 
1. 
m 
minimised. Since c. is a component of the total expenditures at all 
1.1 
stages of search 1 to j, 
ETE (i 1 ' ... ,i j ) 
3[ 3 2[ 2 1 1 
+ c el ) + c i2 + ci3 .···1fg(PI Y2)dPl lfg(PI Yl)dPl1fg(Pl)dPl 
3-3-7 
JP~ . . { mln > L mm P11 PI 
3-3-8 
> ••.•••• 
3-3-9 
for any search path i 1 •...• i j . Q.E.D. 
The characterisation of the optimal search path ii •...• ij* 
in terms of marginal financial search costs follows immediately from 
Proposition 3-3-1. 
Proposition 3-3-2: 
An optimal search path ii, .. "ij* is such that 
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C(m) for all m = 1 •... ,j* 
ETE (ii) * l' ... , 
for any 
) above follows from definition (3-2~8). An optimal search 
minimises the ex ante expected expenditure on commodity 1. 
Hence Proposition 3~3-1 may be applied to establish (i) above. 
Q.E.D, 
The ex ante optimal search path will be unique and only if 
no two of the marginal financial costs incurred on the path are equal, 
If any two are equal then the seller will be indifferent as to the 
order in which he solicits quotations from the sellers whom the 
marginal costs are the same, The searcher will therefore be 
different between the two search paths containing these 
If all marginal financial search costs are equal, c. :;:: C all 
~k 
i k, then the searcher will be indifferent to any search path the 
ex ante optimal search length, 
Section 2~1 comments that the physical manner in which search 
conducted is an important factor determining the magnitude of the 
marginal financial costs of search.. Faced with a variety of search 
methods, the rational searcher will selectively util the method or 
methods for which the marginal financial costs are least, For instance, 
if only two sellers have telephones and the financial costs of 
search are least if the search method employed telephoning 1 then 
these two sellers will be the two sellers on the searcherls 
optimal search path, If the searcher more than two quotations 
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he must alter his method of search, perhaps to visit~ng sellers in 
person, for his third and subsequent observations. The marginal 
financial costs of these observations are consequently greater than the 
first two marginal costs. 
Increases in marginal financial search costs are increases in 
disincentives for search. One expects the number of observations taken 
on PI to decline as margi~al financial search costs increase. This 
is a reason for sellers to ensure they are accessible to consumers. 
A seller presenting a smaller marginal search cost to a searcher will 
appear in an earlier position on the searcher's search path and so is 
more likely to have the searcher ask him for a quotation. 
Kohn and Shavel! [20, p, 112, theorem 14] prove that the 
reservation price of a searcher at any stage of his search declines as 
the marginal cost of the next observation rises, and that the reservation 
price cannot rise with an increase in the marginal cost of any future 
observation. They comment that lower reservation prices mean a lowering 
in the expected length of search. In Section 4-3 the exact form of the 
dependence of the ex ante expected search length on marginal financial 
search costs is derived. In this section, the exact result is fore-
shadowed by Proposition 3-3-3 which shows that increasing the kth 
marginal financial search cost, 2 ~ k $ j*, may increase (cannot 
decrease) the ex ante probability of the searcher wishing to halt his 
search before taking k observations on PI and may decrease (cannot 
increase) the ex ante probability of the searcher wishing to halt his 
search after taking k or more observations on Pl' Consequently the ex 
ante expected length of search cannot be increased by an increase in 
any of the marginal financial search costs. 
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It is shown in Proposition 3-3-3 that the ex ante hies 
of search are .independent of the first marginal search 
cost *' although the ex ante expected expenditure on conunodity 1 is 
1 
upon c,*, The independence is caused by two 
11 
both which arise from imposing assumption (3~2-1) that the conditions 
of 2-7-1 are satisfied. Assumption (3-2-1) guarantees a 
searcher always searches and that his objective is to minimise his 
on conunodity 1. Always searching means c.* 
11 
always 
incurred, no matter how many observations the searcher makes on PI' 
c.* 1 therefore, always a component of any total expenditure on 
11 
conunodity 1 made by the searcher and thus has no effect in determining 
when one such expenditure is less than all other such expenditures. 
Consequently does not influence any of the probabilities of 
1 
search length. 
> O· 
• 
if k ::: j+l, j=l, •.• ,j*-l 
dPr (If! *" .. ,ci * ) 1 * o· if k 1, j 1, ..• ,j* :::: :: == , 
:;;; 0' if k ~ j, j ::: 2,.,.,)* 1 
The ex ante probability of a search leng'th of j, I $; j < j *, 
min 
::: PI' (PIj + 
) ::: PreTE
J
, < TE , for all n1L1:;;n~j*I\\I,c,*,,,,,C.*) 
n 11 1j * 
j min 
L: c,* < PIn 
m=1 1m 
for all nij,l~n~j*lw) 
3-3-10 
3-3-11 
j* 
::; Pre n 
n=l 
+ 
min , ( 1 j) 
P1j '" mm PI;'" ,PI 
min 
so Plj 
and min < min if and only if P1j PIn 
~ 
min 
P1n if and only if 
j ~ n 
3) and (3-3~14) into (3-3-12) gives 
Pr(~!::;1Iw,c·*""3c.* ) 
J ~1 I j * 
111. 
3-3-12 
j n 3-3-13 
3-3~14 
j -1 min min j j * min min n 
",pr([n{P1n-P1" > I: ci*}]fl n {Pl'-PIn < ~lCi*}]lw) 
n=l J m=n+1 m n=j+l J m=J+ m 
Note that * does not appear in (3-3-15) for the two reasons given 
1 
before Proposition. Since c.* does not influence the p.m.f. of 
11 
search lengths, 
"PrC ) 
* 
'" 0 for all j :: 1, ... , j '* 
k ~ j+l, an increase in c,* influences the event 
lk 
3-3-16 
3-3-17 
An c.* may increase, but not decrease, the probability 
lk 
measure of the ion (3-3-17) and may therefore increase, 
but not , the probability measure of event (3-3-15). 
) 
Hence, ~ 0 3-3-18 
all k ~. j+l, all j ::::: 1, .. qj* .. 1. 
3-3-15 
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If k ~ j, an increase in c.* influences the event 
lk 
. -1 ' J min min J 
n {PIn - P1j > L c i *} 
n=l m=n+l m 
3-3-19 
An increase in c,* may decrease, but not increase. the probability 
lk 
measure of the intersection (3-3-<19) and may therefore decrease, 
but not increase, the probability measure of event (3-3~15). Hence 
$ 0 3-3-20 
for all k ~ j ~ all j ;::; 2, ..•• j * , 
Combining (3-3",16), (3 .. 3-.18) and (3.,..3",20) gives the desired result. 
Q,E,D, 
Using Proposition 3,,3-3, it is easy to show the ex ante expected 
length of search cannot be increased by an increase in any of the 
marginal financial costs of search. The ex ante expected search 
length is 
3-3-21 
Proposition 3-3-3 shows that an increase in the kth marginal financial 
search cost (k ~ 1) may increase the probabilities in (3-3-21) for 
j < k and may decrease the probabilities for j ~ k. Since (3-3-21) 
is a sum of these probabilities weighted by j, increasing from 1 to 
j*. an increase in c,* may decrease, but not increase, the ex ante 
lk 
expected search length. 
ion 3-3-4: 
] :::: O. if k '" 1 
SO, if k - 2 •• ",j* 
From (3-3-21), 
<lE[jlw, '* aPr(~!=llw.c,*"", J J 11 
E j. ------;:--------"-
j=l eik 
) 
* 
k 1 aPr(~!=llw.c.* •. , .• 
- J 1 ) j* 
+ E j 
j=k 
aPr(~~=llw.c.* •.•. , 
J 11 
" . 1 ~ J.--------~~----~~ * 
j=l 
where, by Proposition 3-3-3, the first summation in 
non-negative and the second summation is non-positive. From 
dE[j Iw, j*apr(~j=llw.ei*····' 
___ --:-___ ---"-_ ::: k, E 1 o 
j=l 
since the sum of all the components of the p.m.f. 
113, 
3-3-22 
) 
3-3-23 
is 
3-23) • 
3-3-24 
lengths 
always unity. If k = 1 in particular, Proposition 3-3-3 shows 
(3-3-22) is zero. 
Q.E.D. 
It is important to realise that the of Propositions 
3~3-3 and 3-3-4 are valid only for small changes financial 
search costs. A large change in a marginal search cost 
could cause a change in the optimal search the results of 
propositions are derived with the impl assumption that no 
such change in the optimal path occurs, 
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This section has examined the manner in which financial search 
costs influence a searcher's ex ante decisions about the length of 
search, the physical method of search, the sellers contacted and the 
order in which they are contacted, Similar ex ante decisions on these 
variables will be made after each observation on PI up to the point 
where search is halted, The effect of financial search costs and the 
search path chosen on the optimal sequential search rule is taken 
up in Section 3-7. 
The next section isolates the directional influences of 
transaction costs. 
SECTION 3~4; TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE OPTIMAL SEARCH PATH 
This section isolates the influences of transaction costs on 
the direction of search, The analysis proceeds in a fashion similar 
to that of Section 3-3. Influences due to financial search costs and 
searcher's knowledge of sellers' relative pricing behaviour are 
assumed not to exist, A search length j is chosen arbitrarily and the 
search path of length j and least expenditure on commodity 1 is found 
to be characterised by a monotonic increasing sequence of the smallest 
j transaction costs, The optimal search path is then located by finding 
the ex ante expected search length j* for which the ex ante expected 
total expenditure on commodity I is the global minimum of the local 
minima for each value of j ~ 1, 
Transaction costs may take many forms, Governments commonly 
impose stamp duties on certain types of transactions. A buyer may face 
a delivery charge for his unit of commodity 1, Alternatively, the 
buyer1s transaction cost may simply represent his cost in returning 
to his home from the location of the seller from whom he purchased his 
1 
commodity 1. In this case the search path chosen and, 
financial search costs incurred, will be chosen with some 
to lessening the transaction cost incurred. 
The ional influences exerted by transaction costs will 
not be the same as the directional influences exerted by financial 
costs because of the differences in the nature of these two types 
cost. Two of the more important differences are: 
(i) a incurs only one transaction cost while he may incur 
many marginal financial search costs. 
(ii) a transaction cost is incurred only at the time a purchase is 
made, but marginal financial search costs are incurred incrementally 
at the end each of the periods over which search persists. 
These two differences mean that, in search models where the demand 
commodity 1 is fixed, such as the present model, transaction costs 
simply form a second component of a ~net price'» the first component 
of which is an observed selling price for commodity 1, In the 
models presented in Chapters 5 and 6, where demand for commodity 1 
free to be continuously variable w,r.t, prices and wealth, is 
seen that transaction costs of the type considered in this thesis 
cannot be incorporated as part of a Inet price', However, a sales tax 
which levies a fixed amount for every unit of commodity 1 purchased 
could still be incorporated as part of a lnet 
continuously variable w.r,t, prices and wealth, 
In this section, dh'ectional influences 
1 where demand is 
to 
knowledge of sellers' relative pricing behaviour are assumed not to 
by again invoking assumption ~~3~2), ex ante p.m.f, of 
search lengths and the ex ante expected total on commodity 1 
116. 
3-4-1 
3-4-2 
In Section 3-3 directional influences due to transaction costs 
were removed by assumption (3-3-1) which assumed all transaction 
costs to be zero. However, no directional influence on search will 
be exerted by non~zero transaction costs if they are the same for each 
seller. The optimal search path will then be determined entirely by 
the directional influences of marginal financial search costs. The 
following proposition shows that, if all transaction costs are equal, 
the ex ante optimal search path is exactly the same as the marginal 
financial search cost determined optimal search path derived in 
Proposition 3~3-2. 
Proposition 3-4-1; 
If t. = t, a constant, for all i., the optimal search path 
1. J 
J 
ii" •• ,ii* is given by Proposition 3~3"2. 
Proof: 
If t. = t for all i., the ex ante expected total expenditure 
1. J 
J 
on commodity I, (3-4",,2L for any search path i l ,.,., i j is 
. j min k 
ETE(11 •• ··,i.) ~ E[ ~ {Plk + I c i }'~klwJ + t J k=l m=l m 
3-4-3 
The ex ante probability of a search length of k, 1 ::; k '$ j, is 
Pr(lJik*:::;llw,c .. , ••.• c. ,t) ::: Pr(TEk < TE , for all n .,. k, I ~ n $ j I 11 1j n 
3-4-4 
j min 
::: PrC (1 {Plk 
n=1 
n~k 
k 
+ I: c. 1. 
m::::1 m 
j min 
::: PrC (1 {Plk + 
n=1 
nfk 
min 
+ t < P In 
n 
+ 
n 
1: c. 
m::::1 1.m 
+ 1: c. } \ w) 
1 
m:::::1 m 
Comparison of (3-4-6) and (3-3-12) shows 
Pr (l/Jk*= 1\ w. c. • ... Co ,t) ::: Pr (l/Jk*= 1\ w ,c. "'" c. ) 
1.1 1j 11 1j 
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3-4-5 
3-4-6 
3-4-7 
for all k :::: 1" .. ,j, The problem of selecting the search path for 
which (3-4-3) is minimised is therefore identical to the problem of 
selecting the search path for which (3-3-4) is minimised. The 
solution to this problem is provided by Proposition 3-3-2. 
Q,E.D, 
For the remainder of this section it is assumed that 
directional influences due to marginal financial search costs do not 
exist so that directional influences due to transaction costs may be 
examined in isolation, 
Assumption: The marginal financial cost of an observation on PI is 
the same for each seller ie. c. ::: C, a constant, for 
1. 
J 
all ij' 
The ex ante p.rn.f, of search lengths and the ex ante expected 
total expenditure on commodity 1, (3",4-1) and (3-4-2), subject to 
assumptions (3-3-2) and (3~4~8), for a search path il" .. ,i. are 
J 
3-4-9 
and 
3-4-10 
118, 
As the case of marginal financial search costs, is 
that, in the absence of other cost or benefit 
inguishing one seller from another, the 11 his 
ly towards those sellers with the smallest transaction 
costs. This intuition is formalised in Proposition 3-4-2. 
c. 
1 j 
c > 0 for all i., the search path of length j ~ 1 
J 
which the ex ante expected total expenditure on corunodity 1 
minimised l, .. "j. 
The reasoning involved in this proof is similar to that used 
in proving Proposition 3,",3",1, (3-4,,10) may be written in forms 
comparable to C3~3~5) and (3~3-6) of Proposition 
j rp~ 
= k~lj L ... 
PI 3-4-11 
3-4-12 
The problem is to select the order and values of the t. for which 
1 
12) minimised, Since t. 
11 
m 
a component of the total 
at each of the stages of search 1 to j, 
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ETE (i 1 ' , , , , i j ) 
3-4-13 
. 1 2 3 3
1 
3 21 2 
m1n(P1+t(1),P1+t(2),P1+ti3)+3C, .•• }fg(Pl Y2) dP l}fg (Pl Yl) dP1} 
1 1 
f g (P1) dP l 3-4-14 
3-4-15 
for any search path i 1 •..• i j . 
Q.E.D. 
The characterisation of the optimal search path ii, ... ,ij* 
in terms of transaction costs follows immediately from Proposition 3-4-2. 
Proposition 3-4-3: 
The optimal search path i 1, .. "ij* is such that 
(i) ti; = t(m) for all m = 1, ... ,j* 
(ii) ETE (i 1 ' , ... i j *) :;;; ETE (i 1 ' ' , , , i j ) 
for any search path i 1"",i j , 
(ii) lows from definition (3-2-8). The search 
the ex ante expected expenditure on co~nodity 1. Hence 
3-4-2 applied to establish (i) 
Q.E.D. 
Increasing a transaction cost. like increasing a marginal 
financial search cost, is an increase in a disincentive for search and 
may be expected to decrease the ex ante expected length of search. 
Results for transaction costs akin to Propositions 3-3~3 and 3~3-4 
for marginal financial search costs can be derived. So long as not all 
transaction costs associated with a search path are equal, the results 
are that an increase in the kth seller's transaction cost t. may 
Ik 
(cannot decrease) the ex ante probability of the search 
stopping after j < k observations on Pl and may decrease (cannot 
increase) the ex ante probability of the search stopping after j ~ k 
observations on PI' However, if all transaction costs associated with a 
path are equal~ and are all altered by the same amount, the 
optimal path will be unchanged. This may be seen from (3-4-6) 
of Proposition 3-4-1 which shows the ex ante p.m,f. of search lengths 
is independent of the value of equal transaction costs. 
Section 3-7$ following an optimal search path given by 
Proposition 3-4~3 or Proposition 3-3-2 is shovm to result in the 
coincidence myopic and optimal sequential search behaviours, 
next section isolates and examines the last of the three 
as influencing the direction of search ~ searcher's 
knowledge Iers' relative pricing behaviour. 
121. 
SECTION 3~5: I RELATIVE PRICING BEHAVIOURS AND THE OPTIMAL 
SEARCH PATH. 
In section directional influences on search due to 
financial search costs and transaction costs are as not to exist 
in order to directional influences due to 
knowledge of sellers' relative pricing behaviour. sumptions (3-4-8) 
and (3,.,5-1) are applied throughout the whole this section. 
Assumption; ion costs are equal for all sellers 
t~ a constant~ for all i j , 3-5-1 
The analysis section 3-3 was facilitated by assuming 
directional effects of transaction costs to be non-existent by 
assuming t, = 0 
1. 
J 
all i. (assumption (3-3~1)), 
J 
In ~ all that 
is required to ensure transaction costs have no directional effect 
is the weaker assumption just made, assumption (3-5~1) Proof of this 
is contained in Propos ion 3-4-1 which shows transact costs have no 
directional they are all equal. Thus no need to 
aSSUDle all transaction costs are equal to zero in particular. 
'Since the cannot distinguish any in cost 
or benefit factors between sellers other than those due to 
in relative pricing intuitive that the searcher will 
initially direct his towards those sellers he considers to be 
most likely to of£er him relatively low selling prices. The 
formalisation of thi,s intuition is presented in Propositions 3~5-3 and 
3~5~4. The optimal 
These propositions are 
provide a descript 
with index i j will 
path is presented in Proposition 3~5-5, 
on Lemmas 3~5~1 and 3-5~2 which 
ling price expected from the seller 
a change in w, , 1. 
J 
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In Section 1-4, w was defined as a vector of parameters 
conditioning the p.d.L of selling prices f(P1Iw). In the analysis 
prior to this section, assumption (3-3-2) has always required the 
searcher to regard all sellers as quoting selling prices from the same 
p.d.f. f(P1Iw). At least some of the components of ware uncertain 
and the searcher is able to refine his prior beliefs about the 
likelihoods of different values of these unknown components by 
Bayesian pre-posterior updating of his prior p,d.f. g(w). This makes 
him better informed about the likelihoods of receiving lower quotations 
from sellers not yet contacted. 
To describe how differences in relative pricing behaviours 
direct search, assumption (3-3~2) is revoked. Instead it is assumed 
that the searcher regards each seller as quoting from his own p.d.f. 
of selling prices f(Pllw. ). Since each seller is assumed passive in 
lj 
that he offers only the one selling price to all searchers who contact 
him, the 
relative 
p.d.f. f(P1Iw. ) describes the searcher's beliefs about the 
lj 
likelihoods of the possible values of the quotation from the 
seller with index i j . Because only one selling price is offered by 
anyone seller, there is no gain to be had from soliciting a second 
quotation from anyone seller. It is also assumed that a quotation from 
one seller provides no information about the quotation offered by any 
other seller. Recall assumption (1-4-10) that all observations on PI 
are independently distributed. Independence between observations on PI 
and only one observation per seller make no gain possible from the searcher 
using pre-posterior updating to refine values of w ascribed to sellers 
further along his intended search path. Under these conditions the 
123, 
ex ante p,m,f. of search lengths Hnd the ex ante expected total 
on commodity 1 for a search path i 1y •••• i j are 
11 c 1 t , w, ~" .• w. ) for all k '" 1, .. ,. j 
11 lj 3-5 3 
and 
j . 
) := [ {mIn k } * I ] E l: PI' k + C 111.* I VI. • ••• , w. +t 
k=l 'I< 11 lj 3-5-4 
choice of search path clearly depends upon the manner in which the 
p.d,f. f(Pllw. ) depends upon the value of w .. A large variety of 
1. 1. 
J J 
such dependencies exist. The two particular choices examined in this 
section are that an increase in the value of w. does not decrease, 
1-
J 
or does not increase, the probability of observing a quotation below 
L U 
a particular value of PI' for all values of PI e [PI,Pl]' 
or 
of(P1 IwL) 
J 
aw. 
l. 
J 
aF (PI I wi. ) 
J 
aw. 
1. 
J 
3-5-5 
3-5-6 
Figure 3-5-1 illustrates the meaning of (3-5-5). Note that F the 
cumulative p.d.f. of PI' The consequent changes in f(Pllwi.) for 
J 
(3-5-5) are illustrated in Figure 3-5-2. 3-5-3 is a 
diagram of the function of(p{lwi.)!awi .• showing the relationship 
. J J 
between the changes in F cpJII w. ) caused by a in the value of 
1. J . 
w. to the changes in the ordinates of f(pJ1iw. ). 
1'j 1j 
An examination of Figure 3-5-2 should 
an increase w. will cause an increase 
;I.. 
the intuition that 
E[Pllwi.] when (3-5-5) 
J J 
and, similarly. a in E[Pllw. ] when (3-5-6) applies. 
1, 
J 
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3-5-3 ises this intuition. Cont this 
intuit a will to solicit a quotation 
seller to whom he 
when 5) 
ascribed the most favourable value 
and WeI) when (3~S-6) ) s 
w (w (1) 
the 
quotatton seller is expected to be smallest, This the 
result of Proposition 3-5-4. 
It is mathemat ly convenient to assume the p,d,f. of 
sell is differentiable w,r.t, w. 
Assumption: f(Pliw) differentiable w.r.t, w. 
An example illustrating (3-5-7) and (3-5-6) now given 
using the cumulative exponential distribution. The p.d.f. f(P1iw) 
for the exponential distribution is 
'VJhere \'1 > 0 
-wp 
w, e 1, P1 > Q 
The cumulative density function (c.d.f.), F(P1iw), is 
Hence, 
1 
::: p e",wPl > 0 1 . for all PI > 0 
A point convenient to note now, and useful in understanding Lemma 
()f(p11 w) 3-5-1) that 10) implies that must be 
pos and later negative ie, 
3-5-7 
3-5-8 
3-5-9 
3-5-10 
3-5-11 
Figure 3-5~1 
o 
Figure 3~5-2 · · . 
· · .
· . 
· 
· 
· . 
· 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
Figure 3-5-3-
2 
w. 
1 
m 
· . 
m I 2 : : FCP l \\): : 
m. 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· · . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . , 
· , 
· . 
· . 
. 
. 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
'"' .. 
\ 
" 
" " . , 
.. 
. " . 
. '" 
125. 
1 
(lw. 
1 
m 
126. 
> 0, o < PI < l/w 
Of(PI\W) 
so :::: 0, PI I/w 3-5-12 
< 0, PI > l/w 
This sign property true any p.d.f. f(Pl\W) that is differentiable 
w. r. t. \'1 and sat The reverse property is true 
if the p.d. 
Lemmas 3-5-1 and 3-5-2 are now presented to describe how 
expectations taken w,r.t. f(P1Iw) are changed by changes in w. 
Lemma 3-5-1 
Inl 
if~;': 
3F(P I Wi ) 
0, o and m :S o for all ~ In L U 3PI In PI e: [PI,PI] 
3g 
aF(p~lwi ) 
o and m ~ o for all or -< m -
3PI m L U rp~ 3f(p7I w.) PI e: [PI 'P1 ] 
'm 1 In d In aF(p~\\<li ) J L g(P l ) 3w. PI 
if ~> 1- O. o and m ~ o for all PI m < m -
apl m L U PI e: [P1 ,P1] 
ag 
aF(p~l\<li ) 
o and m -s; o for all or -$ 
m 
aP1 m L U 
PI e: [PI ,PI] 
Proof; 
p,d.f, so 
3-5-13 
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a t: t: 
of(p7l wi ) 
mt m m d m 0 f(p1 wi )dPI PI :::: 
m 
PI PI 
3-5 14 
of(p~lwi ) df(p~lwi ) 
+ {p71 m :> O}. {p71 m < o} Let R = R :::: 3-5-15 
From (3~5",IS) , 
R+ n R- :::: 9> 3-5 16 
and 
L 
of(p7I w, ) L af(p~lwi ) 1m m m d m 0 dW. dP1 + oW. P =: 1 1m 1 m 3-5-17 
The equation "" 0 3-5-18 
may have an infinite number of solutions since it is possible that 
f(p7l wi ) == 
m o for values of P1 contained in some continuous subset 
m 
L U 
of [Pl'P1], Such a case 
solutions to (3~5-18) 
illustrated by the intervals 
denoted by 
:::: O} 3-5-19 
The remaining solutions to (3-5-18) are denoted by r 1,···.rn ¢ RO 
L U 
where PI S r l < r 2 '~' < rn $ PI 3-5-20 
For example, see "",rg in Figure 3-5~3, The remainder of 
proof is carried out for only the first of the four cases 1 
the statement of Lenuna, The reasoning may be replicated to 
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prove the result for any of the other three cases. 
Suppose 
and dW. 
1 
m 
3-5-21 
~ ° 3-5-22 
The next part of the proof details the construction of a sequence 
- + k* 
of paired sets {RpRi} i=l Nhere k*. ~ 1. The first set R~ is the set 
of all values of P~ in the longest continuous interval of P~ from P~ 
upwards for which df(p~lwi )/owi $ 0, The second set R~ is the set 
m m 
of all values of P~ in the longest continuous interval of P~ which has 
a greatest lower bound of R~ and for which of(p~lwi )/owi ~ 0. 
m m 
The third set R; is the set of all values of P~ in the longest continuous 
m + interval of PI which has a greatest lower bound of RI and for which 
of(p~lwi )/dwi :::; 0, and so on for R;,... (3-5-22) requires 
If 
define 
r3 If r 2 
and if 
define 
m m 
m m 
J
r 2 df(p~lwi ) 
ow. dPl $ ° 
1 
r i m 
ow. 
m 
,dP I > 0, 
R'" -1 -
1 
m 
{p7l r I 
Of(p~lwi ) 
m 
< r 2} ::; PI 
m m 
.dPI $ 0, ow. 
1 
m 
r4 df(p7l wi ) m m ow. ,dPI > 0, 1 
r3 m 
Rl: :::: {p~lrl $ m < r 3} PI 
3-5,..24 
3",5,,25 
Continue 
Then :$. p~ < r k} and one considers rk+2 a£(p~1 
l'k+l 
) 
< 0, 
J
T k+2 af(p~lw. ) 1m m 
If ---;:---- . dPl ~ 0, 
Tk+l 
j
r k+3 of(p~lwi ) 
m m 
-.........",.---- .dP1 < 0, 
rk+2 
A 
lnanneT, The two conditions (3~5-22) and that 
F(p~lw. ) = 1 for all w. 
lm 1m 
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3-5-26 
3-5-27 
3-5-28 
3-5-29 
up in this 
3-5-30 
are to ee firstly that at least one 
and, secondly, that they must exist in 
order all i = l •.. "k*. It should also be clear 
method construction that 
+ R. f1 
1 
k* 
n Ri = ~, for all i ~ j, where i.j 
U (R: U R~) ;::; 
1 1 
= R~, 
l., .. ,k* 
The bounds of the sets Ri and R~ will be denoted by 
and where 
R~ 
1 
Note that r: 
1 
} 
30, 
sets 
the 
3-5-31 
3-5-32 
3-5-33 
3-5-34 
3-5-35 
3-5-36 
From (3-5-31), (3-5-32), (3~5-33), (3-5-34) J (3-5-35) and 17) 
° 
3-5-37 
Similarly, jP~ af(p~lw. ) m 1 ( ) m d m g Pl'" . PI L oWl 
PI m 
m g(P 1) 3-5-38 
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(3-5-38) must be to be non-negat Consider the 
first tenn in the summation (3-5-38). 
since 
and 
III ger l ) ?: g(P1) 
af(p7l wi ) 
__ m < 0 
aw. 
1 
m 
m 
III L for all P1 E [P1' ) by (3-5-21) 
af(P7 Iw'i ) 
m 
3-5-39 
3-5-40 
since g(r1) s: > 0 for all P~ + g(P1) and aw. E [rl,r1) by (3-5-21) 1 
m 
and (3-5",35). Combining (3-5-39) and (3-5-40) gives 
3-5-41 
Continuing in this way for each of terms in the summation (3-5-38) shows 
3-5-42 
The first term in the sunmlation (3-5~42) is 
r L P 1 
Qf(P~IWi ) 
m ,dp7 > gw. .,. 
1 
m 
gCr21 J r~L df(p~IWim) m -"7Q-w 1-- ,dp 1 PI m 
QF(r~lwi ) 
dW. m ~ 0 by (3~5-22), 
1 
m 
Inserting (3-5-43) into (3-5-42) gives 
Inserting (3-5-45) 
r: df(p~lwi m' m g (P l ) . dW. 1 
PI m 
f 
+ 
k* r. 
L: ger.) 1 
. 3 1 1=' -
r. 
1 
o by (3-5-22) 
into (3-5-44) gives 
) r Qf(p~lwi ) k* r. m i~4g(ri) ~ m m . dP l ?: dW. .dP l 1 r. m 
1 
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3-5-44 
3-5-45 
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Continuing in this way shows that 
3-5-47 
by (3-5-37), 
This proves the desired result for conditions (3-5-21) and 
(3~5-22), Varying these conditions and applying the same reasoning 
given in the above proof will give the desired results for the 
remaining three cases, 
Q.E.D. 
The reasoning in this proof is also used in Lemma 4-2-4 where 
1 ~. 
aFgCPllpl.···pi) L U 
it is assumed that m < 0 for all PI E [P l ,P l l 
ap l 
m 1 j 
where PI E {Pl, ... ,Pl}' This similarity of the form of this assumption 
to assumption (3-5-5) is obvious. The above reasoning is applicable 
to any p.d.f. satisfying a condition of this kind and so the result 
of Lemma 3-5~1 is more general than a discussion of only search paths 
might seem to imply. 
Lemma 
ag 
If _1 > 
m ~ 
aPl 
Inl 3F(Pl Wi ) 
In < In L U 
as aw. ; 0 for all PI E [Pl'P I ], 
1 
In 
aw. 
1 
m 
Since 
m Let g(P1) ::::: 
ag 1 ag 2 
-> 
m - m 
ap1 apt 
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3-5-49 
Q.E.D, 
The effect a change in w. has on the selling price expected 
l.. 
J 
3-5-50 
to be quoted by the seller with index i. can immediately be determined 
J 
from Lemma 3~5-1. The result is presented in Proposition 3-5-3. 
Proposition 3~5~3: 
$ 0 
() ml 
-" -CE[Pl w. ]) ow. 1 
1 m 
m 
Proof: 
3-5-51 
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Therefore, 
3-5-52 
Since ~ m (p~) :::: 1 > 0, 
apl 
desired result lows immediately from 
Lemma 3,..5-1. 
If (3-5-5) appl ie, 
Proposition 3~5-3 shows the smallest selling 
Q.E.D. 
L U [Pl,Pl]' 
is expected from 
the seller ''lith index i j where wi. :::: w (1)' The next smallest selling 
J 
price is expected from the seller with index i k where wik 
= w(2) and 
SO on, The intuition mentioned at the start this section is that, 
when (3~5-5) applies, searcher will direct his search so that 
I 
similar intuitive reasoning suggests the will direct his 
search so that wi1 :::: w(l)' wi2 :::: w(2) and so on. 
Proposition 3-5-4 completes the formalisation of the intuition. 
Proposition 3-5-4: 
The search path of length j ~ 1 which the ex ante expected 
total expenditure on commodity 1 is 
Ca) w'l ;::: wCm) all m "" 1, ... ,j l' m 
(b) wi' :: w(m) all m '" I, .. .,j 
m 
aF (Pl i w) 
::: 0 for all 
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The ex ante expected total expenditure on conunodity 1 for a 
given by (3~5-4) as 
ETE ( . .) t + E [. ~ {mi.n k} 1/1* I ] 1 1",,1),;::; t.. Plk + C \IT." \'J . . k i1 ., i j 
J
' JP~ JP~ . mln 
= t + L .. , 1/Jk{Pl k + 1 L L 
PI PI 
) 3-5-53 
1 j P1"",Pl are assumed to be independently distributed by 10) 
1 k k m 
so f(P1" .. ,P1Iw. , •. "w. );:: 1T f(Pllw. ) for all k'" 1 •...• j. 
11 1k m=l 1m 
3-5-54 
Substituting (3-5-54) into (3-5-53) gives 
j JP~ JP~, k 
ETE(i1 .... , ) t+ E , •• 1/Ik{p7~n+kc}1ff(p7Iwi)dP~ k=1 L L m=l m 
PI PI 
3-5-55 
Rewriting (3-5-55) in the form of (3-3-6) gives 
JP~ JP~ ETE(i1,··., ) t + Lmin{pi+c, Lmin{min(Pi,pi)+2C, 
PI PI 
3-5-56 
= t + 
, ( 1 
.. "mln PI"'" ) 3-5-57 
3-5-58 
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The rate of change of ETE(i1" "i.) w,r,t, w. , for any 
. J 1k 
k '" 1"",j is 
3-5-59 
Clearly 
so, from Le®na 3-5-1 and (3~5-59), 
aETE ~ 0 for all k = 
aw. 
3F(P1 iw) 
I, , . , ,j if oW 1, 
lk 
and 
aETE < 0 for all k 
aw. -
ClF (P1iw) 
= 1" .. ,j if --a-w-
lk 
The remainder of the proof shows that the rate of change of 
ETE w,r,t, w. is greater than the rate w,r,t. w. and so on to w. 
11 12 Ij 
Then, since ETE(i1"",i j ) is most sensitive to the value of wi1 ' 
the searcher should place his most favoured value of w first on his 
search path ie, he should choose w
i1 
= WeI) if (3-5-61) is true or 
w
i1 
= w (1) if (3-5-62) is true, 
d 
ap~ 
3-5-60 
3-5-61 
3-5-62 
+ 
+ 
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(k~l)c 
(P~+c).{(l-F(p~-clw. )), .• (I~F(P~~(k-2)clw. ))(1 F(P~-kclwi )) 
. 12 lk_l k+l 
(1-F(p21-(k-l)clw. )).,.(1-F(p21- Cj - 2)Clw. )},f(p21! lk+l Ij 
.,.(h.P(pkl (j"k]clw. ))}.1 ~j 
f
pk 
- (j -k) c 
1. k ' 
+ (pJ1+jC){ (I-F(Pl+(j l)clw. »". (hF(pJ1+(j-k+1)clw. )), L 11 1k_l 
PI 
3-5-63 
= (pk1+kC)(1 F(p
k
1+(k-2)clw. ).,.(1-F(pk1+(k-j)Clw. »of(pk1+(k-l)Clw. ) 12 1j 11 
+ 
k 
+ {(l-F(Pl+(k-l)C! k k I » ..• (1-F(Pl+c1w. »(1-F(P1-c w. ).,. 
lk_l lk+l 
(1-F (p ~ + (k - j ) C ! » 
139, 
)).,.(I-F(P~+(k-j)cl 
)),.,(l-F(P~+(k-j l)cl )).f(pk1+ Ck- j )C!W. )} 1 Ij 
+ 
j k 
E (I-FCPl+(k-m)c!wi )) 
m=l m 
m#k 
(3-5-65) is non-negative and non-increasing as k increases from 1 
to j. Therefore Lemma can be applied to give 
dETE dETE 
-->--> dw. - 3w. -
11 12 
and 
dETE dETE 
-- s ~ dw. 
11 
aETE 
?; 
3F(Pl lw) L U 
::: dETE :s: 0 if :.:: 0 for all PI E: [PI'P1] dW. oW 
1. 
J 
3-5-64 
3-5-65 
3-5-66 
3-5-67 
Ca) Suppose (3-5-61) applies. Since ETE(i1" .. ,i j ) decreases most 
rapidly w. is decreased, w. should be chosen equal to W(l) 
11 11 
to minimise ETECil' .•.• i.) w.r.t. w .. Then, since ETECil' ...• i.) 
J 11 J 
decreases at the next most rapid rate 
be chosen equal to w(2) to minimise ETECi1, .. " 
decreased, w. should 
12 
) w.r.t. w. and 
11 
Continuing in this manner shows that, when (3-5-61) applies, w. , 
12 
the search path of length j which minimises ETECil' ...• i.) is 
J 
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(b) Suppose (3-5-62) applies. A similar argument to that in (a) 
above shows the search path of length j which minimises ETE(i 1, ... ,i j ) 
is i1, ... ,ij where wi ::: w(m) for all m ::: 1, .. "j, 
m 
Q.E.D, 
The characteristics of the optimal search path are immediate 
from definition (3~2~8) and the results of Proposition 3~5r4. 
proposition 3~5-5: 
Proof: 
The optimal 
(i) (a) 
(b) 
search ~ath ii",.,i~* 
aF(pl lw) J 
if dW ~ 0 for all 
for all m ::: 
aF(p1 iw) 
if dW 
1, •.. ,j* 
for all m::: 1, ... ,j* 
is such that 
(ii) ETE(ii •... ,ij*) ~ ETE(i 1, •.. ,i j ) for any search path 
i 1,····i j . 
(ii) above follows from definition (3~2~8). The optimal search 
path minimises the ex ante expected total expenditure on commodity 
1. Hence Proposition 3~5~4 may be applied to establish (i) (a) and 
(i) (b) above. 
Q.E,D. 
The recognition that a searcher's beliefs about sellers' 
relative pricing behaviour influence the direction of his search has 
resulted in a large, complex and persistently pervasive industry, the 
object of which is to influence these beliefs. In section 3-6 the 
results of Sections 3 .. 3, 3,,4 and 3-5 are applied to understanding 
some of the strategies employed by modern advertisers in pursuance 
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of this end. 
In Section 3-7 it is shown that following the optimal search 
path described by Proposition 3-5~5 results in the coincidence of 
myopic and optimal sequential search behaviour. 
SECTION 3-,6: ADVERTISING 
Approximately one half of Stigler1s seminal consumer search 
paper [50] is concerned with the relationship between search activity 
and advertising. Yet the search literature has chosen to largely 
ignore the relationship, This is directly attributable to the 
literature's lack of consideration of search paths, Advertising forces 
itself upon all economic agents of the modern world whether they like 
it or not. All agents' search behaviour is therefore modified by an 
;i;nformation flow due to advertisements, The modification is firstly 
to the stock of information possessed by the individual and secondly 
to the individual's preferences, Advertisements need not be planned. 
Casual observation of other agents I behaviour may modify an agent's 
behaviour, Observing the next door neighbour's sports car may 
suggest that owning a sports car is desirable. This section is 
restricted to the much narrower topic of those aspects of advertising 
related to prices and information on sellersl characteristics, 
Only three efforts have been made by authors other than Stigler 
to relate search activity and advertising to each other. Butter's 
advertising model [3] does combine the two, but only with difficulty. 
His model permits search if and only if consumers receive no sellers' 
advertisements and the conditions of search are such that consumers 
accept the first selling price quoted to them, Nelson's largely 
[34] contains a lengthy discussion on the manner 
in which sellers' advertising strategies are influenced by the 
nature the goods they sell. No formal theory is ed but 
14 . 
Nelson s the following conclusions. If searchers are easily 
able to discern the qualities of a commodity, then sellers' advert 
ments 1 contain a higher level of factual information concerning the 
purchase of some of the corrooodity than otherwise. Conversely, sellers' 
sements for durable goods, infrequently purchased and possessing 
qualities accurately discernible only by use, will contain a lower 
level of fact and more irrelevant "information", Manning [28] discusses 
a seller who is able to exactly determine the number of searchers who 
will contact him within a certain period by varying his expenditure on 
advertising. Optimal advertising expenditure is related to sellers' 
tastes for privacy and income. On the assumption that the marginal 
utility of income is diminishing, Manning's model predicts that wealthier 
sellers "advertise less, quote lower prices and sell more quickly" 
[28, p. 316]. 
Not all advertising is directed by sellers towards buyers. 
Advertisements by potential buyers towards potential sellers is not 
discussed by any of Stigler, Nelson or Butters, although Stigler does 
recognise its existence. Every daily newspaper a column of 
"wanted" advertisements from potential buyers hoping to locate sellers 
other than those already known to them. Such amounts to 
a search for sellers before~ or concurrent with, a search for a low 
expenditure on the commodity, The motivation identifying additional 
sel is that it may provide a new search path of lower expected 
expenditure than the previously optimal search path. Recall a comment 
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from Section 3-3 that a finite change in a marginal financial search 
cost could cause a completely new search path to become optimal. 
The same effect could result from locating a previously unknown se11er 
if the marginal cost of obtaining a quotation from this se11er is 
smaller than the marginal cost of obtaining a quotation from a seller 
on the hitherto optimal search path, Similar changes could result 
if a newly identified seller 1 s transaction cost is sma11er than the 
transaction cost of a seller on the optimal search path. or if the new 
seller seems relatively likely to offer a low selling price. Of 
course 1 such a "pre",search' \ search will be carried out if and only if 
an agent expects its cost to be exceeded by the gain due to an 
improved search path becoming available. 
Sellers 1 advertising is obviously more prevalent, more 
sophisticated and more widely broadcast than buyers 1 advertising, 
The object of a se11er l,s advertising is to either direct as many 
searchers as possible towards him or else to direct them away from 
competing sellers, The strategies employed to these ends by an 
advertiser can be viewed as attempts to place himself at an earlier 
position on searchers 1 search paths, He can do this either by 
arguing that his offers are relatively advantageous to searchers or by 
arguing that his competitors' offers are relatively disadvantageous. 
The earlier is the advertiser I,s position on a searcher I spath. the 
more likely it is that the searcher will actually ask the seller for 
a quotation and so give the seller a chance of making a sale, The 
strategies used by an advertising seller depend on the seller 1 s 
assessment of his ability to compete against other sellers. In any 
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real market, sellers' competitive abiH ties vary this is 
in part the reason wide vaTiation observed in the 
sellersl advertisements. A ional content common 
to all sell 
searchers 
ment may 
hours of 
ego they may 
of payment 
The specificity 
, however, is that they provide 
on how to contact sellers. M1 advertise-
sel 's address, his telephone number, his 
so forth. Some advertisements may be very specific 
exact selling prices and transaction costs, terms 
offers of free delivery of goods purchased. 
any advertisement will be partly determined by the 
competitive position of the seller. The preceding sections make it 
clear that competitiveness is not to be judged merely in terms of 
relative 
associated with 
advertising 
commOdity will 
alone but in terms of relative total expenditures 
seller. Since it is unlikely that a seller's 
conditions of relatively high expenditure a 
many searchers towards him, is likely that 
advertisements with total expenditure information are issued 
by sellers in atively competitive positions. The veracity of less 
specif;tc advert ing phrases such as Ureally great prices" are, 
therefore~ subject to some doubt in most people's minds, That doubt 
matters is a consequence of the existence of search costs. Once a 
searcher is to a seller there is an additional cost by 
the searcher~ the next marginal search cost~ if he does not make his 
purchase Vague, or even decept ing can 
be regarded as an by sellers to grasp this margin. The 
existence of 
is~ in part~ due to 
ing the deceptiveness of advertisements 
recognition of this, 
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Sellers with locations more accessible to searchers than 
locations of lower priced sellers may still receive higher patronage. 
For instance~ some large emporiums that have their own parking lots, 
and are in the midst of many sellers of other commodities, are able 
to charge higher prices than small, more isolated, suburban sellers 
with fewer customers, The advertisements from the sellers with 
favoured locations will presumably emphasise their locations and 
parking facilities and avoid emphasising their prices, except perhaps 
for the prices of a few specially selected commodities. These 
~dvertisements are directed at exploiting a trade off made by consumers 
between the benefits of purchasing at lower prices and the higher costs 
of p~tronising the lower priced sellers whose shop frontages are perhaps 
on busy clogged streets where little parking is available. 
Whatever the wording, the underlying object of a seller's 
advertisement is to cause a searcher to reorder his search path so as 
to place the advertising seller in an earlier position on the path. 
If advertisements do cause a searcher to reorder his search path, it 
is because the new search path represents a lower expected total 
expenditure on the commodity and, therefore, a greater gain from 
search. Advertisements may, therefore, benefit both buyer and seller. 
for the searcher~ any increase in the price of advertised commodities 
caused by sellers offsetting their advertising costs is offset by a 
lowering of their search costs, For the seller, the increase in revenue 
from higher patronage offsets his advertising costs. 
The effect of advertis~ng upon the length of search is in-
determinate, If a very low p:riced seller reveals himself. a searcher 
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will little gain continuing his search past this seller, I 
reveal several additional sellers, a searcher may 
it to contact more sellers than previously. Whichever of these 
it is dominant, however, the mean total expenditure on 
the searched commodity should fall as the mfiount of truthful 
provided to buyers by advertising increases. 
SECTION 3,.7; OPTIMAL SEARCH PATHS AND MYOPIC SEARCH RULES 
In Section 2~1 it was noted that an assertion common in 
previous authors I sequential search models (eg, [1], [3]. [11]. 
[43], [52]) is that a myopic expenditure minimisation search rule of the 
form (2 ... 1.,.1) is optimal. None of these models consider search paths 
and contain not the slightest notion of the direction of search. This 
section shows that the most logical justification for assuming 
optimality for a myopic search rule is to assume the searcher follows 
an optimal search path. 
Section 2-7 showed that myopic sequential search rules are 
equivalent to optimal sequential search rules if and only if 
maximum component of the sequence of utilities expected at subsequent 
stages of search is, after a certain length search. always the 
lity expected at the very next stage of Assuming the 
conditions of Proposition 2-7~1 throughout this ensures the 
equivalence of consumer utility maximisation minimisation of total 
expenditure on commodity 1, These conditions cause the optimal 
sequential search rule to be equivalent to a myopic sequential search 
rule of the form (2,...1",1) when the minimum component of the sequence 
of total expenditures on commodity 1 at subsequent stages of 
is the expenditure expected at next 
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This section shows some conditions which fol an 
path results in such a sequence of expected 
(3 submart Ie). Myopic sequential search rules are thus shown to 
be more than it would appear from an examination 
of the above models, which make no attempt to justify their impl 
ion of their searchers' indifference to all possible search 
The optimal search paths derived in Propositions 3~3-2, 
3-4-3 and 3,..5~5 all create conditions under which the sequence of 
marginal expected total expenditures on commodity 1 is monotonic 
ing~ ,a submartingale sequence, This is because the 
Propositions ensure that the marginal expected reduction in total 
expenditure from an additional observation on PI is non-increasing 
while also ensuring that the marginal cost of an additional observation 
on non-decreasing, Once the marginal expected net change in total 
expenditure on commodity 1 becomes positive, therefore, it will remain 
positive any subsequent observations, The searcher will always 
choose to stop searching at this point and, to locate this point, he 
need ever only look one stage ahead, 
Propositions 3-7-1. and 3~7r3 proye the optimality of 
myopic ial expenditure minimisation search rules for the search 
conditions Propositions 3",3-2, 3-4,,3 and 3-5-5 respectively. 
ex ante 
w. - wand t. "" t for all i. 1 and if minimisation of 
lj lj J 
total expenditure on commodity 1 is a valid proxy for 
ion of ex ante expected utility~ then the optimal sequential 
rule p* 
s 
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Proof: 
If W, :::: W for all L 3-7-1 
1- J J 
and if t. ::: t for all i. 3-7-2 
1- J J 
then the optimal search path is given by Propos ion 3,.,3-2, 
Therefore the sequence of marginal financial search costs incurred 
by following the optimal search path of Proposition 3-3-2 is monotonic 
increasing 
for all j :::: 1,,,,,j*-1 3-7-3 
Since minimisation of ex ante expected total expenditure on commodity 
1 is a valid proxy for maximisation of ex ante expected utility, the 
optimal sequential rule is 
O. TE. (8 *) > E [W. 1 (~* ,8 *) I y . ] J J+ J 
~~(y.) :::: S~ :::: 
J J J 
3-7-4 
It must be shown that conditions (3-7-1), (3-7-2) and (3-7-3) are 
sufficient for (3-7~4) to be equivalent to the myopic rule where, 
by (2-7-44), 
0, TE. (0*) > E[TE. 1(8*) Iy·] J J + J 
~~(y.) ::: S~ ::: 
J J J 
3-7-5 
1, TE. (0 * ) s; E [TE. 1 ( <5 *) I y . ] J . J + J 
By definition» 
3-7-6 
:::: E[minCTE. lC8*),E[min(TE. 2(<5*)' .. ,)ly· IDly·] J+ J+ J+ J 3-7-7 
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Suppose that, after j observations on PI' the searcher expects that the 
total expenditure required on commodity 1 will be no smaller after 
(j+l) observations on PI than at present ie, 
Under conditions (3",,7~1) and (3~7",,2) ~ (3~7'C<8) may be written as 
3-7-9 
3-7-10 
Now consider the expected change in total expenditure from taking an 
additional observation on PI' given (j+l) observations have already been 
taken 
E [TE, 2 ( <5 *) I Y . 1 ] ~ TE. 1 ( 0 * ) J+ J+ J+ 
. jP~ mIn I P1j +1 . f(P l w)dP l 
mIn 
Pl,j+l 
3-7-11 
3-7-12 
min min Since P1J' ~ Pl.J'+l and since c.* ~ c'* by (3-7-3), 
, Ij+2 Ij+l 
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E[ 
+1 
7-14 
, if the searcher expects TE.(o*) ~ E[TE. l(o*)ly.], he 
J J + J 
also +1(8*) ~ E[TE j +2(o*)ly j +1] and continuing in this 
manner shows he also expects 
TE. k(o*) $ E[TE. k l(o*)ly ... ] for all k:::: 1,2" •• J+ J+ + J ... k 3-7 15 
Comparing (3 7-15) to (3-7-7) shows 
E[W. l(~*,o*)ly.] :::: E[TE. 1(8*)ly.] J+ J J+ J 3-7-16 
Therefore (3,..7~1), (3-7-2) and (3~7-3) are sufficient conditions for 
equivalence of (3-7~4) and (3~7-5), 
Q,E.D. 
If w. :::: wand c. :::: C > 0 for all i., and if minimisation of 
lj lj J 
ex ante expected total expenditure on commodity 1 is a valid proxy for 
maximisation of ex ante expected utility. then the optimal sequential 
search rule p* is myopic. 
s 
if 
If w. = w for all i. 
1. J 
J 
:::: C > 0 for all i., 
J 
3-7 17 
3-7 18 
search path is given by Proposition 3-4-3. Therefore 
the of transaction costs imposed by following the optimal 
path of 3-4-3 is monotonic increasing 
3-7-19 
+1 
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The is lar to the proof of 3-7-1 that 
conditions (3 7 17) (3-7-18) and (3-7-19) are shown to be ient 
for 
E[W. 1 J+ * o*)ly·] = E[TE. (0*) iy.] P J )+1 J 
if ( 0 * ) ::; E [TE. 1 ( a *) I y . ] 
J+ J 
Suppose (0*) S E[TE. l(o*)ly.] J+ J 
3-7-20 
3-7-21 
Under conditions (3-7~17) and (3~7-18), (3-7-21) may be written as 
Rearranging (3-7-22) gives 
The expected change in total expenditure from 
observation on PI' given (j+l) observations on 
E 
3-7-22 
'= 0 3-7-23 
an additional 
have already been 
)~inl_(j+l)C 
J+ 
3-7-24 
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3-7-25 
3-7-26 
J 
min (Pl+t). -t. * J 1. . 
E[TE. 2(0*) Iy· 1]-TE. 1(0*).~ J+l{ (Pl+t. * )-(p1+t)I?lnL J + J + J + L 1j -I- 1 J 
PI 
~ 0, by (3-7-23) 3-7-28 
Therefore, if the searcher expects TE.(o*) $ E[TE. 1(0*) Iy.], he 
J J -I- J 
also expects TE. 1(0*) $ E[TE. 2(8*) Iy· 1]' Continuing in this manner 
J-I- J+ J+ 
shows he also expects 
TE. k(8*) $E[TE. k 1(8*) Iy· k] for all k = 1,2, ... J+ . J+ -I- J+ 3-7-29 
As in Proposition 3-7-1, (3-7-29) shows E[W. 1(~*.8*) Iy·] :::: E[TE. 1(0*) Iy·] J+ J J+ J 
so that conditions (3-7-17), (3-7-18), (3-7-19) are sufficient for the 
equivalence of the myopic and optimal sequential search rules. 
Q.E.D. 
If t. :::: t and c. = c> 0 for all i.. and if minimisation of 
Ij 1j J 
ex ante expected total expenditure on commodity 1 is a valid proxy 
for maximisation of ex ante expected utility. then the optimal sequential 
153. 
search rule p* is myopic. 
s 
Proof: 
If t. :::: t for all i. 
1- ] ] 
3-7-30 
and if c, ::: C > 0 for all i .• 
1- ] 
J 
3-7-31 
then the optimal search path is given by Proposition 3-5",5. Therefore 
the sequence of 'Values of the conditioning parameter W for the optimal 
search path of Proposition 3~5~5 is either 
ClF(P1 Iw) 
Wij = w(j) for all j = 1 •... ,j* if oW 
or 
Wi~ ::: w(j) for all j 
J 
of(P1 1 w) 
= 1, ... ,j* if ---
W 
::; 0 for all 
3-7-32 
2: 0 for all 
3-7-33 
The proof is similar to the proofs of Propositions 3-7-1 and 3-7-2 
in that conditions (3-7-30), (3-7-31) and either of (3-7-32) or 
(3-7-33) are shown to be sufficient for 
E [ W j + 1 (~* , 8 *) I Y j] = E [TE j + 1 (8 *) I Yj ] 
if TE. (8*) ::; E[TE. 1(8*) Iy.] 
J J + J 
Suppose TE. (8*) ::; E[TE. 1(8*) Iy.] 
J J + J 
3-7-34 
3-7-35 
3-7-37 
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The expected change in total expenditure from taking an 
additional observation on PI' given (j+l) observations on PI have 
already been taken, is 
fP~~j+l min = (PI-Pl' l)f(p1 Iw,* )dP1+c L ,J+ lj+2 PI 
jP7~j+l . I m1.n I E[TE. 2(0*) y. 1]-TE. 1(0*) ?: (PI-PI' l)f(PI w,*· )dP1+c J+ J+ J+ L ,J+ l.j+l 
PI 
E [TE. 2 ( 0 *) I y. 1] -TE, 1 (0 * ) J+ J+ J+ 
?: 0, by (3-7-37) 
3-7-38 
3-7-39 
3-7-40 
3-7-41 
Therefore, if the searcher expects TE.(8*) $ E[TE. 1(0*) Iy.], he also 
• J J + J 
expects TE. 1(8*) S E[TE. 2(8*) Iy. 1]' Continuing in this manner shows J+ . J+ J+ 
he also expects TE. k(8*) < E[TE. k l(d*)ly. k] for all k = 1,2, ... 3-7-42 J+ .. J+ + J+ 
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As in Propositions 3-7~1 and 3~7~29 (3-7-42) shows 
E[W'l *,o*)iy·]:=: E[TE. 1(8'*)ly.] so that conditions (3~7-30), 
J+ J J+ J 
31) and either conditions (3~7~32) or (3-7-33) are sufficient 
the ence of the myopic and optimal sequential search rules. 
Q.E.D. 
optimal search paths is restricted by their concentration 
upon only one directional influence on search at a time. The search 
path optimal when all three directional influences are present would 
not be characterised by anyone of monotonic increasing sequences of 
marginal financial search costs alone, or transaction costs alone, or 
expected selling prices alone, but by some combination of all of these. 
The results of Propositions 3~7,,1. 3",7-2 and 3-7-3 all have 
common effect of ensuring the sequence of marginal changes in total 
expenditure on commodity 1 expected by the searcher is monotonic 
increasing. Indeed~ it seems a reasonable conjecture that, as implied 
by the optimal sequential stopping rule p*, the optimal search path will 
s 
be characterised by a monotonic decreasing sequence of marginal 
expected utilities if marginal search costs are independent. Without 
the assumption of independence between marginal search costs, 
transaction costs or p,d.f.ls of sellers l , the optimal search 
path will remain as the solution to the complex dynamic programming 
problem referred to in Section 3".2, 
The major implication of this » therefore, that myopic 
behaviour will be rational (optimal) more frequently, and 
under more general search conditions, glance at search 
problems would at f:Lrst ;indicate, 
A sation 
the whole of the next 
the p,m .. of 1 and the p.d.f, of 
result , use of such a rule, e rule is 
the analysis of Chapter 4 more it to 
already 
be 
Some justification for the use of the rule can~ however, 
search 
the myopic 
by 1ng to the content of this chapter. Accordingly, 
assumed to exist in Chapter 4 are 
ial search rule to be optimal. 
for 
CHAPTER IV 
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS OF SEARCH LENGTHS AND 
TRANSACTION PRICES 
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SECTION 4 1: MODELS OF PRICE DISTRIBUTIONS ARISING FROM SEARCH 
Stigler introduced search as an economic activity to examine causes 
of istent price dispersion, To date, only six models. by Hey [15], 
Telser [53], Rothschild [42], Axell [1], Manning [28] and Ibannides [18], 
allow persistent price dispersion in a marke~ and attempt to specify 
the manner in which search may affect the extent of price dispersion 
in a market. Each model has a quite different approach to the problem, 
Telser [53] uSeS the device of many isolated sub-markets, each 
with many buyers and sellers and each of which clears perfectly at 
a which may vary from sub-market to sub~market. Movement between 
sub-markets costly and gives rise to persistent price dispersion 
between sub-markets, 
Rothschild [42] uses the statistical theory of the two-armed 
bandit problem to establish a model in which identical competitive 
sellers learn about consumexs' reservation prices and adopt optimal 
(maximising profits) pricing policies. These policies 
eventually make it optimal for a seller to offer a fixed price for all 
time. Rothschild shows that different experiences with customers' 
acceptances and of their prices are likely to cause the 
individual sellers' optimal policies to differ in the fixed 
prices eventually dispersion thus persists for all 
time, The consumers' decision-making left unspecified. 
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Manning [28] models a seller whose aim is to obtain the 
highest price possible for a single unit of a commodity. The seller 
knows the p.d.f. of buyers 1 reservation prices and the number of 
searchers who will contact him within a fixed period, Manning shows 
that, if all searchers appear identical to the seller, then it is 
optimal for the seller to quote to successive searchers from a 
particular monotonic decreasing sequence of prices. Which price offer, 
if any~ is accepted by a searcher depends upon the order in which 
buyers with different reseTvation prices approach the seller. Consumer 
decision making is again left unspecified, 
Axell's sequential search model [1] has been partly discussed 
in chapters 2 and 3, In the second half of his paper, Axell uses his 
model as the basis for a Monte Carlo study in which relative frequency 
plots are obtained for search lengths and observed minimum prices. 
Comparative statics results for the underlying probability distributions 
of search lengths and observed minimum prices are inferred from 
changes arising in these plots when changes are made in parameters such 
as financial search costs and variance of the p.d.f. of selling prices. 
The actual probability distributions are derived in Sections 4-3, 4-4 
'and 4-5 of this thesis, Comparative statics results are derived from 
these distributions and are compared to Axell1s results. As Axell 
notes [1, p. 91], a major deficiency in his model is the common 
simplifying assumption of passivity on the part of sellers, who are 
restricted to maintaining the same p,d,f. of selling prices throughout 
the duration of consumers~' searches, 
Hey [15] provides a description of a market in which the combined 
actions of consumers carrying out Stigleresque searches leaves a 
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Pareto p.d.f. of selling prices unchanged from one period to the next. 
The model differs from those previously discussed in that it assumes 
Stigleresque search is rational and that searchers' demands for the 
commodity are functions of the smallest observed selling price. 
Ioannides [18J has constructed an explicitly dynamic model in 
which neither buyer nor seller is passive and in which the p. d. f. of 
selling and reservation prices may vary continuously over time. An 
equilibrium is defined as a state in which the numbers of buyers and 
sellers and the probability distributions of reservation and asking 
prices are all stationary. The equilibrium "is characterised by price 
dispersion and unsatisfied supply and demand" [18~ p. 261J. Ioannides 
is unable to describe how the market may attain such an equilibrium but 
is able to point out some sources of persistent price dispersion apparent 
from his analysis, First, search takes time. Second~ market 
participants change and 1 as they change, maintain a stock of ignorance 
about the market, Third, as time passes, information becomes obsolete. 
The model constructed in this chapter is closest in objective 
to Axell1s model [1], For simplicity~ it is assumed that sellers are 
passive, so that the p.d,f. of selling prices of commodity 1 f(Pllw) 
remains unaltered for the duration of all consumers' searches. The 
conditions of search are assumed to be such that a myopic search rule 
which minimises ex ante expected total expenditure on commodity 1 is 
optimal, Within these restrictions, the probability distributions 
of search lengths and minimum observed prices are derived. The 
empirical results on search lengths obtained by Telser [52J and 
Gastwirth [l1J were mentioned in Sections 1-2 and 2,..1, These results 
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are compared to the theoretical results obtained in Section 4~3. 
Sections 4~6 and 4~7 discuss the relationships of the probability 
distributions of search lengths and minimum observed prices to the 
probability distribution of transaction prices and market equilibrium. 
SECTION 4~2: THE SEQUENCE OF RESERVATION PRICES FOR MYOPIC OPTIMAL 
SEqUENTIAL SEARCH 
In this chapter ~elative simplicity is achieved, at the expense 
of generalitYl by making assumptions sufficient for the analysis to 
be carried out in monetary terms, 
Assumptionl Minimisation of ex ante expected total expenditure on 
con~odity 1 is a valid proxy for maximisation of ex 
ante expected utility, 4-2-1 
Assumptions (1~4,...28) and C3",5~1) ~ that w. :::; wand t. :::; t for all i. , 
Ij Ij J 
are also invoked ie, the searcher cannot distinguish between sellers 
on the basis of their pricing behaviour and all sellers have the same 
transaction cost. Together, assumptions (4-2-1), (1-4-28) and (3-5-1) 
make it optimal for the searcher to follow a search path characterised 
by a monotonic increasing sequence of the smallest marginal financial 
search costs (see Proposition 3-3,..2), Proposition 3-7-1 shows that 
(4-2",1), (1,.4".28) and (3",5",1) are sufficient for the optimal sequential 
search rule to be myopic. Under the conditions of Proposition 2-7-1, 
all consumers will search and will terminate their searches by 
purchasing a unit of commodity 1 from the seller who offers them the 
lowest of the selling prices observed during search. Aggregate market 
demand for units of commodity 1 is therefore equal to the number of 
consumers and the p.d.f. of transaction prices will be the p.d,f. of 
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minimum observed prices. 
Assumption: There are only a finite number of sellers with associated 
U 
marginal financial search costs c i . < PI ~ E[PI]' 4-2-2 
J 
This assumption is needed because of the linearity of the consumer's 
min indirect utility function w,r,t, PI ,assumed by (4-2~1). It was 
shown in Section 2".1 that sequential search rules of the type employed 
by Rothschild, Axell etc,~ with a constant marginal financial cost 
of search c~ present the problem that there is no guarantee that 
search will be stopped before xi = 1 becomes non-feasible. In fact, 
if the marginal financial costs of search are all a constant 
U 
c < PI - E[Pl] then, for any finite number of observations, there is 
always a finite ex ante probability that a searcher will choose to take 
an extra observation, The only conclusion that can be reached on the 
finiteness of search length is that search will be of infinite length 
only with probability zero, Assumption (4-2-2) requires that there is 
only a finite number of sellers for whom the associated marginal financial 
costs of search are sufficiently small for it to be possible for the 
searcher to expect to lower his total expenditure on commodity 1 by 
contacting them, (4-2~2) thus ensures that any search will be of 
finite length, 
The myopic sequenttal stopping rule is ~* = (~o'~i"",~j, .. ,) 
where ~*(y ) = S* = 0 and o 0 0 
0, TE. ((; * ) > E [TE. 1 ((; *) I y . ] 
J J+ J 
, for all j ~ 1 4-2-3 
1, TE.((;*) $ E[TE. 1(0*) Iy.] 
J J + J 
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The value of the searcher l s jth reservation price C. is the 
J 
min . 
value of P1j for Whl.ch he would be indifferent between stopping his 
search j observations on P1 and taking his (j+l)th observation 
on PI' The searcher will be indifferent if and only if 
TE j (<5 * ) =; E [ TE j + I (<5 *) ! Yj ] ie, 
min j 
PI' +t+ l: 
J i=l 
4 2-4 
4-2-5 
as the condition for indifference between stopping and continuing search 
after j observations on PI' The L.H,S. of (4~2-5) is the lowering in 
the minimum price expected from taking observation p{+l, given a 
present minimum price of p~in. The R.H.S. of (4-2-5) is the marginal 
f ' . 1 f b ' j +1 h f . (4 2 ' InanCla cost 0 0 servatlon PI T ere ore, SInce - IS an 
equali ty, the change in total expenditure on commodity 1 expected from 
taking observation p{+l is zero. The consumer will therefore be 
indifferent between stopping his search after j observations on PI 
and taking observatl'on j+I PI ' 
min L The L,H.S. of (4-2-5) is bounded below by zero (when Plj = PI) 
and bounded above by P~ 
cj +1 < P~ - E[Pl!Yj] then 
I min E[PI Yj] (when P1j = 
there is a value C. £ 
J 
min 
of Plj 
such that the equality (4-2-5) is satisfied. Lemma 4-2-2 shows C. 
J 
is unique for a 
If c j +1 ' c. 1 J+ 
given vector y. 
J 
U 
> PI ,.. E IYjL 
and a given 
then there 
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financial cost 
L U 
no value Cj € [P1'P1] 
financial cost 
+1 exceeds the gain expected from taking observation p{+1 for any 
satisfying the equality (4~2-5), because 
f min [L U] Ob . j + 1 o PIj € Pl,PI' servat10n PI will, therefore, not be 
taken. Proposition 4~2~6 expresses the optimal sequential stopping 
terms of these values C. in the following way: observation 
J 
j+l. not taken PI 13 d 1 . f min C If th" b an on y 1 PIj $ j' 1S 1S to e true 
min U I any value of P1j when c j +I > PI " E[PI Yj ]. then the value of Cj 
U 
must be P1, 
Definition: 
The searcher~s jth reservation price is Cj ::: Cj(cj+l,yj ) where 
(i) 
(ii) 
c. I' J+ 
c. 1 J+ 
4 2-6 
Since [p~,p~], it follows from (4-2-5) and (4-2-6) that 
C. e 
J also. In Proposition 4-2-6 it is shown that the stopping 
rule E;* can be entirely in terms the sequence of 
reservation prices • , , •• Cj , .. '. but first is necessary to examine 
the properties of the reservation Observations on PI are 
assumed by (1-4-10) to be independently distributed, Therefore (i) 
of (4 r 2-6) may be written as 
JC. 
{ ~ (Cj-Pl)f(PlIW)dPl}g(wIYj)dW ::: c j +1 
W PI 
where g(wly.) the searcher's posterior p,d.f. on w 
J 
on PI' In Appendix 2, g(wly.) is defined J 
1 j f(Y·lw)g(w) 
g(wly.) f (p 1 ' . • • > P 1 I \~ ) g ( w ) :::: 
"" 
J 
J fWf 1 iw)g(w)dw f (y.) g J 
This an application of Bayes' rule. Bayes! rule is 
ian processes of refining uncertain knowledge 
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4-2-7 
j 
as 
4-2-8 
the basis of all 
parameters 
(w in this case) by using feedback from observations cpi, ... ,pi in 
this case) containing information about the true value of w. 
observations on PI are independently distributed, (4-2-8) 
may be as 
j . 
'If f(p~ Iw)g(w) 
I i::::1 g(w Yj) ::: --.-------
fW.TI f(p!lw)g(W)dW 
1=1 
4-2-9 
It should be apparent from a comparison of (4-2-6) and (4-2-9) that 
C. is a function parameterised by the next marginal financial search 
J 
1 j 
cost c j +1 and past observations Pl" •• ,P1 ie. 
4-2-10 
A searcher's reservation price j observations on PI is therefore 
dependent upon the values of these observations. The dependence is 
due to the searcher's Bayesian updating original prior g(w). 
all his observations have been high to values he ex ante 
considered relatively likely, he will think increasingly likely 
that his next observation on PI will be relatively high also. High 
165. 
values for previous observations on PI are therefore disincentives 
for further search and will be reflected in higher reservation prices. 
This is proved in Lemma 4~2-4 subject to the following assumption, 
1 . 
QFg (Pl lpl"",pi) i L U 
-=------.i--- $ 0 for all PI € [Pl'Pl] and all 
apl 
Assumption; 
i :::: l,,,.,j 4-2-11 
This assumption expresses the following rational Bayesian actions. 
Observing a high price will cause the searcher to revise his posterior 
p.d.f. on w, g(wlp~, ... ,pi), so that his subjective likelihood of 
observing other high prices in the future is increased. The searcher 
behaves in this fashion because these actions eventually cause his 
posterior p.d.f. on w to collapse to a limiting degenerate p.d.f. 
centred on the correct value of w (see De Groot [9, p. 202]). This 
writer suspects, but has not proved, that assumption (4-2-11) is 
redundant in that it may be a necessary consequence of assuming 
either of (3-5-5), that of(pllw)/aw ~ 0 for all PI € 
L U (3-5~6), that aF(pl iw)/aw ~ 0 for all PI € [PI,PI]' 
The information content to the searcher of any observation on 
PI is the same regardless of when the observation is taken because the 
p.d.f. of selling prices is static. The manner in which a particular 
set of observed prices modifies the searcher's p.d.f. on w is 
therefore independent of the order in which these values are observed. 
As a result, the value C. of the jth reservation price, corresponding 
J 
to a particular value of c j +1 and a particular set of observed prices 
p~"",pi, is also independent of the order in which these values 
were observed. This is proved in Lemma 4-2-3, 
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In models where the functional form and parameters of 
f(P1iw) are known exactly to searchers, searchers do not have a prior 
p,d.f, g(w) (alternatively, g(w) may be considered to exist but to 
be degenerate at the correct value of w), In these models, (4-2-7) 
simplifies to 
c. 1 J+ 
4-2-12 
and Cj is a function only of c j +l ' This case is examined in Section 
4~5, 
In the analysis that follows in Sections 4-2, 4-3 and 4-4, 
the reservation price will mostly be referred to only as C. for the 
J 
sake of notational simplicity, but the symbol C. must be understood 
J 
to be an abbreviation of the full expression given in (4-2-10), 
Cj is dependent upon the magnitude of c j +1' the next marginal 
financial search cost which will be incurred if the searcher makes 
an additional observation on PI' The greater the value of c j +1' 
greater is the disincentive for taking observation p{+l, and this 
the 
should be reflected in a higher reservation price, C. is proved to 
J 
be strictly monotonic increasing w,r,t, c. 1 in Lemma 4-2-1, a result 
J+ 
analogous to Kohn and Shavell's result [20, p, 112] that "The 
swi tchpoint falls (the reservation price rises t) with an increase in 
next-period expected search costs", 
Lemma 4-2-1: 
~. 1 
~C. 
J = 0 
is undefined 
t My Italics 
> c. 1 J+ 
< c. 1 J+ 
= c j +1 
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( 
By (i) U (4-2-6)~ (4-2 13) implies there is a value Cj < PI of 
such 
f
C. c. (c. l' Y . ) J J J + J 
(C·Ce. l'Y·) L J J + J 
P1 
c, 1 J+ 
Total differentiating (4-2-14) w,r,t, c. 1 gives 
J+ 
aC. 
(Plly].)dPl'ac.J .dcJ·+ l :::: dc. 1 J +1 J + 
Rearranging (4-2~15) gives 
By eii) (4-2-6) , (4-2,..17) implies C. U 
J = PI' 
U ()P1 0 ::: 
'" 
+1 
r PI (P~-P1)f (p1 \y·)dP l (iii) Suppose L g J PI 
< c. 1 J+ 
Hence 
:::: c. I J+ 
:::: 
By ) (4-2-6), (4-2-19) implies C. U However ::: PI' J 
18) imply 
aC. 
limit f limit J >'.+ de. I c. c. l+c J+ J+ J+ 
~ 
c 
(4-2-16) 
4 2-14 
4-2-15 
4-2-16 
4-2-17 
4-2-18 
4-2-19 
and 
4-2-20 
which implies 
is 
the non'?'\slnootl1ness of C. at c ::: C" J j+l 
(4-2-19) is true, 
c, 1 J+ 
Then! from (4-2-6), Cj = P~ and is unique, 
Suppose IP:(P~"Pl1'fg(PlIYj)dPl > Cj • 1 
PI 
168. 
Hence '::"~J'~ 
1 
Q,E,D. 
Then j.p~}n min (PI' -Pl)·f (PIly.)dPl = c. 1 L J g J J+ min PI]' = C.(c. l'Y') = C. ] J+ ~ J 
PI 
4-2-21 
Consider 
Q(z) 4-2-22 
dQ(z) = IZ f (p Iy.)dp > 0 4-2-23 
dz L g 1 J I 
PI 
provided (P1 IYj) f 0 for all PI S [p~,z1, Recall from (2 2-14) 
that c. I > 0, From (4-2-21) it is clear that 
J+ 
L for all P1 8 [P1.C j ]. Therefore, from (4 2 
f (p1 iy. )dP l > 0 for all C, g J J 
(Pli ) 1: 0 
4-2-24 
169. 
2 the L.H,S. of (4-2- is monotonic 
Hence 
Q.E.D. 
The value 
+1 the ordering 
of 
Let the same set 
ions on PI' 
are both unique, by Lemma 4~2~2, and are such that 
-
I
C. 
J -(C. 
L J 
PI 
Al "j (p 1 I PI' . . , ,p 1 ) 
j 
Iw)g(w) 
) • by (4~2-9) 
r W. 'IT f(Pi Iw)g(w)dw 
1=1 
j Ai 
7T f (p 1 I w) g (w) 
1 ~I -
since {PI"" } 
Ail 7T f(Pl w)g(vl)dw 
1 
+1 
4-2-25 
4-2-26 
4-2-27 
4-2-28 
- " Comparing (4-2-25) and (4-2-28) shmlls C. "" C.. The value C. 
J J J 
1 j is therefore independent of the ordering of Pl" '"Pl ' 
Q.E.D. 
If 
then I > : is undefined 
for any m = 1,.,,~j, 
Proof; 
170. 
c. 1 J+ 
c j +1 
c. 1 J+ 
(i) > c. 1 then, by (i) of (4-2-6), J+ 
U there is a value Cj < Pl of Cj such that 
4-2-29 
Therefore, 
4-2-36 
ie, 
Rearranging (4~2-31) gives 
17 . 
1 
consider the of the R.H,S, of (4,,2-32)" 
that C, m ) L 
'" ~'··,Pl"·· > PI and that J 
1 . 
(Pl\Pl" .. ,pi) > 0 at least some e: ,C j ] . Hence 
Now consider the numerator of the R.H.S. (4-2-32). Since 
a.nd since 
we may appeal to the reasoning of Lemma 3-5 1 to establish 
Compa.ring (4 .... 2.,.35) 
CJ. :::: C. (c. 1 J J+ 
(4-2~33) to (4-2'f'32) shows 
29) 
4-2 33 
4-2-34 
4-2-35 
4-2-36 
172~ 
ac. u 
Hence _J '" 
ap1 0 4-2-37 
a m m 
PI ap1 
(iii) 
Then, by (ii) c. C. (c. 1 ) U • '" !i "'? .. ::; PI' J J J + 
However. (4-2- (4-2-37) together 
a 
4-2-38 
m 
ap1 
aC. 
non-smoothness of C. at m -m Hence __ J is 
J PI PI' m 
aPl 
which implies 
-m 
PI' undefined for P~ 
Q.E.D. 
The results Lemmas 4-2-2, 4-2~3 and 4-2-4, C. is 
J 
I j 
unique w.r.t. a set of observations Pl •... 'Pl a marginal cost 
1 . 
c j +1 ' is invariant w.r.t. the order of the values of Pl""'P~ and 
m that acj/ap i > 0, do not offer any information about an upper bound 
on the sensitivity of Cj w.r.t. a change in p~. In general, it is 
not possible to specify such an upper bound because the sensitivity 
m 
of Cj w.r.t. PI depends crucially upon form of the p.d.f. of 
selling prices and upon the searcher'S bel about values 
of w. To demonstrate this dependence. consider the following 
Suppose only 
The searcher'S 
respective 
O,QQ, 0.00, 1,00. 
he will this 
However, a 1 
selling prices are $1, $49.99 and $50.00. 
on w is such that he believes that either 
of these prices 
If the searcher's 
as confirmation of 
in the 
are 0.99, 0.01, 0.00 or 
1 
observation is PI = $50.00, 
set of probabilit 
$50.00 to $49.99 would 
I 
the first set of lities. Because the second set of 
lities no from search the searcher would set a 
reservation price so as to However the first set 
ities mean it a lower than .99 
1 be observed and the will set a low reservation so 
as to continue search. A small change in may therefore cause a 
large change in Cl~ the value of the first reservation price CI , 
m 
ess1 some limits upon the sensitivity of w. r. t. PI 
do Lemma 4 2-5 m that aCj jap1 < 1 for some values of 
m L U PI € [PI ,PI]' Note that does not preclude the possibility of 
m m L U 
oCj!oPl ~ I for some values of P1 € [Pl,Pl]' as the example above. 
Suppose 
rp~ a m dp. 
m 1 
JpL OP1 
1 
ie. 
~ P~ - pi 
aC. 
_J_ ;':: 
m al~ 
~ 
pi 
1 
m for some values of P1 £ 
all m L U PI <: [PIIP I ], 
m 
1. dPI 
But, U PI' by (4-2-6), and, since 
Hence 
Then 
4-2-39 
4-2-40 
by (4-2-21)~ 
4-2-41 
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"': "-for any vectors of observations Yj and Yj " (4~2-40) and (4~2-41) 
are contradictory, so the result is established. 
The following propos ion proves that the optimal myopic stop-
ping rule ~* may be expressed in terms of the sequence of reservation 
prices C.. The reader must not confuse this with what has been called 
J 
the "reservation price property". The reservation price property 
applies to the narrow class of search problems in which 
(i) the p.d, f, of selling prices f(Pliw) is completely known 
to the searcher~ and 
(ii) the marginal co~t of all observations is the same. In 
these $earch problems~ the optimal sequential stopping rule is to 
continue searching until an observed price is either equal to or less 
than a single particular price called the "reservation price!!, Problems 
of this type are discussed more fully in Section 4-5. In problems 
of the type considered in Sections other than 4-5, Bayesian learning 
about an incompletely known p.d,£. f(P1iw) ensures that no one such 
reservation price exists. As expressed by (4-2-10), the reservation 
prices are functions of observed selling prices. While the decision 
to halt or extend search by one more observation is made by comparison 
of observed prices to a reservation price, the same reservation price 
ts not used for each such decision. Kahn and Shavell [20, p. 93] 
point out, in a sequential search framework more general than the one 
in use here, that switchpoints (reservation prices) always characterise 
an optimal sequential stopping rule, 
Rothschild [43, p. 701] provides a simple numerical example 
demonstrating this distinction. 
175. 
The myopic sequential stopping rule is V' '" (~o>~i"" ,~p 
where 
* ~O (y 0) :::: S* - 0 and min 0 
{ 
1 . 
0, Plj :> (c j + 1 ' PI' . . . ,p i ) 
1;:: (y . ) :::: S:' '" J J J mln 1 . 1, PI' ;; (C j +1 ,PI"" ,pi) J 
for all j ::: 1,2,." , 
Proof: 
(4~2-3) gives the jth component~ j (:: 1, of the myopic sequential 
stopping rule as 
0, TE. (<5 * ) > E [TE. 1 (<5 *) I y . ] J J + J 
I;~(y.) ::: S~ '" 
J J J 
4-2-42 
1, TE -1 (<5 * ) < E [TE. I ( <5 *) I y . ] 
,J - J + J 
Suppose TEJ.(o*) $ E[TE, 1(6*)ly,]. Then, from (4-2-4) and (4-2-5), J+ J 
fP~~n min (PI' -PI)·f (P1 Iy.) dP l ~ c. 1 L J g J J+ PI 4-2-43 
By (4~2-23) and (4~2-24), the L.H.S. of (4-2-43) is a function 
monotonic increasing in p~~n and strictly monotonic increasing for values 
min 
of P1j in the neighbourhood of Cj . Lemma 4-2-2 proves Cj is unique. 
Therefore (4-2-43) is true if and only if p~~n ~ Cj . Hence Sj ::: 1 
. f d 1 'f min .. I * O' f d I . f min C 1 an on y 1. Plj $ Cj . Slmllar y Sj:::: 1 an on y 1 P1j :> j' 
Q.E.D. 
The manner in which (4~2-6) is solved for the form of the 
reservation price functions C. is not discussed because it will depend 
J 
upon the specific functional forms of f(P1Iw) and g(w). 
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The actual value C, 
J 
any reservation will be 
determinate the jth observation on PI' For a search 
path, the likelihoods of values C1, , " C.".. for the J 
reservation 
p,d,L 
to 
least ODS 
... ,C j , • ,. are 
values for observed 
The p.d.f. of sell 
to the likelihoods 
J and to the 
is therefore 
that, after j observations on PI' the 
11, or will not, exceed the jth reservation price, 
a function the observed Prices. It is this relat which 
allows the derivation of the p. m,f. of search lengths and the p. d. f. 
of minimum observed prices in terms of the p,d.f. sel prices 
and the marginal search costs of the chosen search path. 
The next sect presents the derivation of the ex ante p.m.f. 
of search and examines its properties. 
SECTION 4~3; THE EX ANTE PROBABILITY MASS FUNCTION OF SEQUENTIAL 
SEARCH LENGTHS 
The reader is reminded of the point, made in Section 3-3, 
that the term "search lengthif is unambiguous only in the context of 
sequential 
it is neces 
which search 
In this as 
In frameworks other than that of sequent 
stinguish between the number of 
out, and the number of 
Chapters 2 and 3, the term search 
search, 
T. in ]. 
is 
retained because ial framework used causes the number of 
periods and the number of observations taken, to be 
same, Using the term length will also facil comparison 
177 . 
of this work with the work previous authors 0 
The p,m. , ex ante or otherwise, is trivial 
in the case of search (where can only be 
interpreted as the observations If the St 
searcher ex ante to make j observations on the p,m. f. of 
search lengths mass one length j and mass zero for any other 
length. The in deriving a p.m.f. of search for a 
sequential is that the search length depends upon the values 
of the sell observed during search, It is even more 
cOmp Ii cat ed the searcher has incomplete knowl of the p.d.f. of 
selHng 1 since his sequence of decisions on continuing or halting 
search is then made with di£fering amounts o£ information about the 
true p.d.f. sell prices he faces, The case examined here is that 
of a searcher with incomplete knowledge of p.d.f. of selling prices 
and an optimal sequential search rule which myopic and which minimises 
ex ante expected total expenditure on commodity 1. The p. m. f. is of 
interest not merely for its own sake? but because crucially influences 
the p.d. f. observed minimum prices, For instance, a p.m,f. of search 
lengths skelVed towards higher search lengths means that, on average, 
more observations are taken on PI' so that the p,d.f. of minimum 
observed will be skewed towards lower 
The starting point for the derivation the p.m.f. of search 
lengths the form of the optimal stopping rule given in Lemma 4-2'6, 
Recall Ch4-21) that search 
if and only if ~~ 
J 
1, The probability 
of length j I therefore, Pr(~~ 
J 
llw) , 
at end of period T. 
J 
an optimal sequential search 
cownents must be made 
178, 
about lity at the outset, First 1 it the 
I ' 
that the searcher will observe prices Pl, ..•• pi such that he will choose 
to st s without taking a (j+l)th observation on The 
1 S ovrn assessment of this p ,m, f, will coincide with the 
actual p.m,f, if and only the true value of w is known to him. 
Second, the probabilities are conditional upon the true value of w 
because the sequence of decisions to halt or continue search depends 
upon ~ the probabilities of which are conditional upon 
w, the searcher does not know the true value of w, although 
able to refine his knowledge of this value as search 
How his knowledge of w becomes depends, in part, on the accuracy 
of his knowledge of w ie, upon his initial prior p.d.f. on 
w, g(w), probabilities Pr(1J1j :::: l\w) are) therefore, also 
conditional upon g (w) , Cl-4~21) states that 1J1j ::: 1 if and only if 
S* S* ... :::: S~ 1 '" ° and S"!< 
::: 1. Therefore, 
° 
1 J"' J 
Pr(1jJ"!< l\w) ::::: Pr(S* :::: S* :::: ::: S* ::: 0, S,=, ::: 1\ w) J 
° 
1 j-l J 
for all j ~ O. Note that 
Pr(tJio l\w) = Pr(S5 = llw) ::: 0 
since, under the conditions of Proposition 2~7-1, S5 - 0, 
Therefore> 
Pr(tJiJ = liw) = PreSt = .• , = S;_1 = D, s; = llw).Pr(S5 = O\w) 
4-3-1 
4-3-2 
= PI' S"!< 1 0 I\l'l) 4-3-3 J ~ ~ 
in terms of minimum observed prices and 
reservat by from Proposition 4",2".6, that for all 
i = 11,.,~j 1~ 0 and only if p7in > Ct , and Sj = 1 and only 
if p7~n ~ The probability that search is of length j is the 
probability that of the j observed prices are such that 
all these events occur ie, 
Pr(~i = llw) = Pr 
for all j ~ 1, It 
C min C min c.lw) 4-3-4 
> 1'" ,Pl,j,,-1 > j",l'Plj J 
emphasised that the probabilities (4~3-4) are 
ex ante, In , they must be from the searcher's 
assessment, j observation on PI' the probability of 
his taking a (j+l)th observation on PI' The latter probability is 
either zero or 
whether or not 
unity since the searcher can observe with certainty 
min > Plj < Cj . Certain sets of j observation on PI will 
cause this probability to be zero. All others will cause it to be 
unity. The linear combination of these values 0 or 1, weighted by the 
ex ante likelihoods of the sets of j observations that give rise to 
them~ is just the searcher's ex ante expectation of the value of ~~, 
J 
The equivalence this expectation and the ex ante probability (4-3-4) 
is shown by 5), 
O.Pr(~~ = Olw) + 1.Pr(~~ = llw) 
J J 
Pr(~~ = llw) 
J 
4-3-5 
The searcher's decision~making after j observations on PI utilises his 
jth posterior p.d,f, on w, g(wly.), a function 
J 
I j 
Pl'''''P1 ' In 
I j 
expressing (4-3~4) in terms of values of price observations PI'" "PI' 
therefore, account must be taken of the effects different values for 
I j P1"",Pl will have upon the searcher's ion of his initial prior 
p.d.f. on w, g(w). The revision of the is reflected in the searcher's 
revision of the values of his reservation C1 ,.,. ,C j , so (4-3-4) 
must take account the different values possible for-the reservation 
prices, To see how the likelihoods of reservation price 
values are related to the p,d,f. of selling f(P1Iw), consider 
one observation on PI' the searcher decides that 
1 
PI > 
180. 
ie. 4-3-6 
If C1 = p~, then pi > Cl is impossible and search will halt after 
the first observation on Pl' If Cl < P~J there is some non-zero 
probability that (4-3-6) is true. Lemma 4-2-4 shows that. if 
Cl < P~J Cl is strictly monotonic increasing w.r.t. pi. Lemma 4-3-1 
shows that if, in addition, 3C I /3Pi < I for all pi € [p~,p~]. then 
there is a unique value of pi, pi € 
pi :::: CI (c 2,pi) 4- 3-7 
and that I > I if and only 'f I:> Pi- The value of pi PI < CI (C2,PI) 1 PI < 
summarises the effects the possible values of I have upon the value PI 
o£ CI and upon the likelihood of the searcher deciding to take more 
than a single observation on Pl' Lemma 4-3-1 and Proposition 4-3-2 
extend this argument to reservation prices subsequent to CI , and 
show that the ex ante p.m.f. of search lengths may be expressed as 
the probabilities of joint events determined by the values of a 
sequence pi, ... ,Pj defined as follows. 
Definition: 
The set of solutions to the simultaneous equations 
pi = Ci(ci+l,pi.··"pi), for all i = I, ... ,j 
i L U is PI = pi where pi € (PI,PI] for all i = l,o .. ,j 
4-3-8 
Uniqueness of the set of solutions pi •... ,pj can be guaranteed by the 
following assumption. 
Assumption: 
4-3-9 
The result of Lemma 4-2~5, that 3Ci/3P~ < I for some values of 
m L U PI S [PI ,PI]' is not sufficient to guarantee uniqueness. Figure 
181. 
4-3-1 illustrates a case where three solutions pI,pi*,pi** exist for 
h . 1 t e equatIon PI 1 := C1(c2,P1)· Non-uniqueness may arise without (4-3-9) 
because the result of Lenmla 4~2-S does not rule out the possibility 
that aC i /3P7 > 1 for some p7 8 [pt,p~]. Non~uniqueness among the 
pi greatly complicates the derivation of the ex ante p.m.f. of search 
lengths, so assumption (4-3-9) is invoked throughout the rest of this 
chapter, This is equivalent to assuming small changes in values of 
observed prices cannot cause revisions in the searcher's beliefs about 
values of w that are so great as to cause large changes in any of the 
reservation prices, 
Figure 4-3-1 
L 
p*** 
PI 
pi Pi* 1 
L 1 U 
PI PI -+ P1 
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Lemma 4-3-1: 
(ii) (4- sufficient for pi."" to be unique. 
Anil of the proof is in Figure 4-3-2. The 
proof of existBnce first for pi achieved by 
applying Brouwer's theorem, Note 
(a) L U the interval [Pl~Pl] is a non-empty, compact and convex subset 
4-3-10 
I U (b) CI(PI) ~ PI' 
I L U for all PI E: [PI ,PI] by (4-2-21). Hence 
L U L U L U [PI ,PI ] + (PI,P1J C [P1,PI] 4-3-11 
(4-3-10) and 1) show two of Brouwer's theorem's three sufficiency 
conditions are The third condition is that C1 
1 1 L U is continuous w.r.t. PI for all PI € [P1,Pl]' The proof of the 
continuity of CI w.r,t. P~ is in two parts, 
(i) Suppose 
1 L U 
all PI £ [PI'PI ], Then it is a trivial to prove CI 
I I L U 
continuous w.r.t. PI for all PI € [P I ,P1]' 
(ii) Suppose is such that 
4-3-13 
for some pi 
4-3-14 
183, 
Also, < ° 4-3-15 
1 < 0, 
IP~ U I 1 > 1 <: II (PI-P1)fgCPI Pl )dPl < c2 as PI > PI pr 4-3-16 
(4~3-I6) and (4~2~6) imply 
1 U 1,., C1(c 2,P1) = PI for all PI > PI 4-3-17 
and 
4-3-18 
1 The reasoning in (i) above establishes that C1 is continuous W.T.t. PI dC 1 II U 1 for all PI € (Pl'P I ], Lemma 4-2-4 establishes that for 
C1(c 2,pi) < P~. Therefore, by (4-3-18), C1 is continuous w,r.t. 
1 L " for all PI € [ppP1). It remains to show that C1 is continuous w. r. t 
1 1 A PI for PI = Pl' By (4-3-17), 
4-3-19 
U L bounded above by PI and below by PI so, by the Lesbesque 
Dominated Convergence theorem, 
4-3-20 
184. 
) 4 3 21 
4-3-22 
implies there exists 
C ( 1) U f I ':I 1 c2,P1 < PI 'or some PI > PI' 4-3 23 
3-,23) contradicts (4",3,,17) so (4~3~21) is false. 
Suppose 
1 
C1 (c2 ,Pl) .. (1l.mlt 4-3-24 
1 
Then, by (4-3-13)~ 4-3-25 
but this contradicts (4-2-6) so (4-3-24) is Hence 
4-3-26 
Comparing (4~3-13) and (4'1"3-26) shows 
4-3-27 
Combining (4-3-14), (4-3-19) and (4-3-27) proves is continuous w.r.t. 
Hence C1 continuous w.r.t. 1 all 
This proves the third sufficiency condition of Brouwer's 
theorem so there exists a 
4-3-28 
185. 
Also, by assumption (4~3-9), 
4-3-29 
This is sufficient for pi to be unique. 
Kow consider the second reservation price C2(c3,p~,pi). 
2 PI = pi is the solution to the equation 
pi = C2 (c3 ,pi,pi) 4-3-30 
where pi has been determined by equation (4-3-28). (4-3-30) is 
of the same form as pi = C1 (c 2,pi), so the above reasoning can be 
reapplied to establish the existence and uniqueness of pi, and of 
p~ for all j > 2, 
J 
Figure 4-3-2 
Q.E.D. 
U PI ::: <Pl(c~l) 
= <Pl(c2,i) 
186. 
The fixed points p~ are used in the derivation of the ex ante 
1 
probability distributions of search lengths and minimum observed 
prices. It is, therefore~ important to establish that the P~ can 
1 
be evaluated prior to search. It is clear from (4-3~7) that the value 
of pi depends on the value of c2 alone ie. 
Similarly? pi depends only on c2 and c3 ie. 
pi = C2 (c3,pi,pz) = C2(c3'~1 (c2),pz) 
so pi ::: ~2(c2,c3) 
In general~ p:'" :::: ~. (c2~'" ,c. 1) ~ 1 . 1+ 
4-3-31 
4-3-32 
4-3-33 
4-3-34 
The searcher has complete knowledge of all costs so it is clear from 
(4-3-34) that he has all the information required to evaluate the 
p:'". 
1. 
(4-3-4) expresses the ex ante probability of a search length 
of j in terms of the reservation prices C1 , .. "C j , The probability 
may be rewritten as 
I min I min Pr(wj ::: 1 w) = Pr(Plj ~ Cj w,Pli > Ci for all i = 1, ... ,j-1). 
min I Pr(p1i > Ci for all i = 1, ..• ,j-1 w) 
The following Proposition expresses (4-3-35) in terms of the 
solutions p~ and completes the derivation of the ex ante p.m.f. of 
1 
4-3-35 
search lengths. Expressing the p.m.f. in terms of the pi captures the 
searcher~s assessments of the effects of different samples of observed 
prices upon his re~evaluations of his prior p.d.f. on w, and of his 
sequence of reservation prices, It is noted above that, since the 
p:'" are functions of only c2, ••• ,c. l' the values of the p~ can be 1 1+ 1 
determined ex ante. Remember, however, that once an observation on 
187, 
PI has been taken. the searcher will recalculate a new of 
I I 
solut .Pg I'" in an assessment of a p.m,f. of search I 
of two or more, conditioned by the value of the ce observation. 
A s lar of the p.m,f. of search lengths will ace 
observation until search is halted. 
If minimisation of ex ante expected total expenditure on 
commodity I a valid proxy for maximisation of ex ante expected 
util and if w. = wand t. = t for all i .• then the ex ante 
Ij Ij J 
probability mass function of optimal sequential search lengths is 
F(piiw). for j = I 
liw) ::: Pr(1/J~ 
J j 1 j 
n (l~F(max{p~" .. ,p~ 1}lw))~ n (1 F(max{p~, ...• p~}iw)). 
1 ]. J~ i=1 1 J 
consider j '" 1, 
1 PI ~ Therefore 
I min I Pr(1/Ji = I w) = Pr(p11 ~ C1 w) 
NO"l consider j ~. 2. From (4",3,.35), 
Pr(1/J'!' 
J llw) 
. min I min 
= (I-Pr(P1' >C. w,P1' >C. J J . ]. 1 all i = 1 •... ,j 1)). 
min I Pr(Pl' >C. for all i = l"."j 1 w) 1 1. 
j ~ 2. 
4-3-36 
4-3-37 
min C 
:: Pr (PI' > , 1 1 
min PreP1' >C. 1 1 
Pr 
188, 
4-3-38 
all i=1» .•• ,j Iw) 
4-3-39 
By (4~3~9), > CI (e 2 ,pi) if and only if P~ :> pi :::: c1 (C 2 ,pi), Again 
1 by (4,,3.,..9). PI > 1 if and emly if 
C ( 1 2) > C ( * 2) C ( I 2 j) > C ( * 2 j) 2 c 3 ,Pl'Pl 2 c 3 ,Pl'P I '"0' j c j +1 'Pl'Pl',,,,Pl j c j +1 ,Pl'Pl' ...• Pl 
(4~3~39) may therefore be rewritten as 
min I Pr(pli :> Ci for all i 1,." ,j w) 
>c. (c, I'P1* J J+ 
If min (p~ 'P~) > 
, .... p~)lw) 
2 I 2 2 (c3 ,pi'PI ), then both PI,PI > C2 (c3 ,Pi,Pl)' 
But, by (4~3-9), pi > C2(c3,pi,pi) if and only if 
4-3-40 
4-3-41 
pi > P2 = C2 (c3 ,pi'pz)' Therefore min(Pi,pi) > C2(c3'Pi'P~) if and 
only if both P~'P~ > p~. (4-3-41) may therefore be rewritten as 
min I Pr(p1i > Ci for all i = 1, .. "j w) 
= pr(pi > pi, min(Pi,pi) > Pz' min(pi·p~,p~) > C3 (c4·Pi,Pz,pf).··· 
Continuing the above 
P C min C fall . r Pli > i or 1 
( * c 3 j)1 ) Cj +1,Pl,PZ,Pl" .. ,Pl w 4-3-42 
shows 
4-3-43 
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The event described in (4",3-43) is true if and only if pi is 
2 
Pr 
all Pi,P2"",Pj and if and only if P1 is greater than all of 
; (; t • ~ p'!< 
J 
so on, Hence, 
> C, for all i '" 1" .. , j 1 w) 
1 
P (,1 { * *} 2 { * *} j *1) r PI> max Pl" , . ,p j , PI> max P 2' , , , ;; P j - , ... ,p 1 > P j w 4-3-44 
j 
'If (l 
1 
4-3-45 
since all observations are assumed to be independently by 
(hA,.10)., Similarly~ 
min j-l 
Pr(p1+ > C. for all i = 1, .•. ,j-llw)::::: 'If (l~F(max{p~,.,.,p~ l}lw)) 4-3-46 
'" l. i=l 1 J 
Substituting (4".3",,46) and (4-3-45) into (4~3-38) gives, for j ;:: 2, 
j -1 j 
pr(wJ~=Ilw) = 'If (l-F(max{p~" .. ,p~ l}lw))- 'If (l-F(max{p~, ... 
1 1 J'" i=l 1 
Jlw)) 4-3-47 
Q.E.D. 
Before continuing, it is worthwhile not that eventually a 
p~ 
J 
U PI' In Section 4,.2 it was noted that assumption (4-2-2) meant 
that there were only a finite number of sellers for whom a 
U 
would set a reservation price below PI' For all other sellers, 
U Cj :: PI regardless of the vector of observations taken up to this 
stage of the search, For these sellers therefore, 
pJ = Cj(Cj+l·Pil""pi~l·PJ) = P~ 
It is an easy matter to show that the p.m,f, derived in 
Proposition 4-3-2 satisfies the fundamental 'of a proper 
p.m,f. that its components sum to 
4-3-48 
From 
E Pr (Ij;'~ 
j 1 J 
1, . J llw) = Imlt E P ( * = J-t<JO r ljJ. j=l J 
J 
E PrC~~ = llw) = F(pW1- Iw) + (1 - F(P*llw)) j 1 J 
2 
~ IT (1 ~ F(max{pi.p~}lw)) 
i""l 
2 
+ IT (1 p F(max{pt.p~}lw)) - .,. 
i=l 
J 
'" ~ IT (1 - F(max{Pi •... ,pj}lw)) 
i=l 
J 
~ 1 ~ IT (1 - F(max{p~ •... ,pj}lw)) 
i=1 1 
(4-3-48) shows that eventually a p~ 
J Suppose pjt 
E Pr(ljJ~ == llw) ::: 1 
j 1 J 
::: 1 
J 
II (l-F (max{p:< , ... ,pj} I w)) 
i=J'+l 1 
::: 1 limit U Jl J * J-t<JO (1-F(P1i w)) IT (l-F(max{p., ... 
i=Jl+1 1 
} I w)) 
== 1 
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4 3-49 
4-3-50 
4-3-51 
4-3-52 
4-3-53 
4-3-54 
Q.E.D. 
This completes the derivation of ex ante p.m.f. of search 
lengths. The p.m. depends upon the magnitudes the marginal 
search costs and the sequence which will be incurred. 
Consequently, the p.m,f, is dependent upon the 's choice of 
19 . 
search path. At the same time, the choice of search path is made 
the expected total expenditures on commodity 1 assoc with 
them, These expected expenditures are calculated the use the 
ex ante p, m, f, corresponding to the search path under cons ion. 
in this section was pointed out that, as search proceeds 
and observations on Pl acclITflulate. the p,m.f. of search lengths will 
be reassessed by the searcher. The reassessment of the p.m.f. of 
lengths is, therefore, necessarily accompanied by a reassessment 
the optimal search path. 
The following lerr®as and Propositions examine some of the 
properties of the ex ante p.m,£. Lemma 4~3-4 proves p~ is a strictly 
J 
monotonic increasing function of each of c2 ' ••.• c j +1. This result is 
useful in Propositions 4~3~5 and 4-3-6, which provide some comparative 
stat results for the p,m,f, of search lengths. 
The first result of Proposition 4,..3-5 is that the p.m.f. of 
searGh lengths is unaffected by a change in the first marginal financial 
search cost cl ' As explained in Section 3,,3, the reason for this is 
that 1 under the conditions of Proposition 2~7~1~ a searcher will 
always choose to search. c1 is therefore incurred whatever the length 
of search undertaken and can never influence the length of search for 
which total expenditure on commodity 1 is minimised, Since expenditure 
minimisation is the criterion by which the advantages of different 
search lengths are judged~ and since a change in c1 does not alter any 
of these advantages, the p,m.f. of search lengths is unaffected by a 
may 
C1 ' The remaining results of Proposition 4-3~5 are that an 
(j + 1 )th marginal financial search cost C j + l' j ~ 1. 
the probability that search is of length j, may decrease 
192. 
the probability that search is longer than j observations, and does not 
affect any of the probabilities of search being of lengths 1 to (j~l) 
observations on PI' The explanation is as follows, An increase in 
c j +1 is an extra disincentive to take the (j+l)th observation on PI' 
The probability that a searcher will choose not to take this observation 
is therefore increased '. Because the optimal search rule is myopic, the 
decision on whether or not to take a (j+l)th observation on PI is 
made only after j observations on PI have been taken, Consequently, 
only the probability that search is of length j is increased, thereby 
causing a corresponding decrease in the probability that search is of 
any length of more than j observations on PI' 
The ex ante expected length of search is 
00 
E [j I w] :::; E j,Pr(ljJ~ :::; 11w) 4-3-55 j:::;l J 
An immediate implication of the changes caused in the p,m.f. of search 
lengths by an increase in c j +1 is that an increase in c j +1 ' j ~ 1, 
may cause a decrease in the ex ante expected search length. This is 
the result of Proposition 4-3~6. 
Proof: 
Hence 
and 
dp~ 
{: 
O? for 
J 
dCk 0, for 
By (4-3-34), p'i;" 
J 
dp:: 
J - ° dC
1 
-
dp:: 
all k > j+l, 
all k .,; j+l, 
is a unique 
J _ 
dCk -
01 for all k > j+l 
or k:::;l 
k~l 
function of c2 , ..• ,c j + 1 . 
4-3-56 
4-3-57 
Let k ::: 2, Consider pi :::: ~1 (c 2) ::: Cl(c2~pi)' 
dp* 1 oCI aC1 dpi 
dC
2 
-
-+ 8p*'dc 8c2 1 2 
dC 1 By (4-3-9) and Lemma 4~2~4~ 1 ~ (1 ~ api) > 0 
Combining (4~3~59), (4-3-60) and (4-3-61) shows 
dPZ aC2 dpi aC2 dPZ 
dC 2 :::: api'dc2 + dPZ'dc2 
dPZ aC 2 
dC 2 - api 
By (4-3-9) and Lemma 
aC2 
0, 1 ?: (1 - api) > 0 
Combining (4",3-65), (4'"'3,.64) and (4,..3,..62) shows 
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4-3-58 
4-3-59 
4-3-60 
4-3-61 
4-3-62 
4-3-63 
4-3-64 
4-3-65 
dp* 2 
- > 0 4-3-66 dC
2 
-
In general, for any i :::: 1 •... ,j, 
dp"!' i-I ac. 
1 1 
dC
2 
= .2:
1 
ap:: 
J= J 
dp:: aC. 
d/ / (1 - 8p~) , 0 
2 1 
4-3-67 
since 
194. 
dp'!' i-I aC. dp~ ac, 
1 1 dl (1 1 4-3-68 1 I dCk "" L: --- , " p) '-k l~P~ J - - J k Pi 
dp* 
any 2 ::; k ~ j+l, a,nd, by beginning with k-l it may be shown 
dp~ 
that 1 ~ ° for all i == k~l,.,.,j, 
Q.E,D. 
(i) (1jJ"!' :::: 1Iw)) :::: 0. for all j ;:: 1. 
J 
(ii) d llw) ) 0, for all k > j +1, all j ~ 1. r(Pr(l/l; == ::: 
ck J 
(iii) d 1Iw)) --(Pr(l/l~ :::: dC jt1 J 
;:: 0, for all j ~ 1. 
co 
(iv) d ( l: Pr(l/lk llw)) ~ 0, for all j :?: 1. ::: dC j +1 k=j+l 
(i) and Cd): From Proposition 4,..,3-2; 
For j 1: a~k CPr(l/Ji =: llw)) ::: d~k CFCpilw)) :: 0 
dp* 
'f 11k 2' 1 0 f k 1 k 2 b L 4 'Z 4 1 (= or > SInce - =: or '" or > y emma -..)- . dCk 
The case k ~ 2 is dealt with in (iii) below. 
d d j-1 
dck(pr(l/JJ"!'::: llw)) '" -d (II (l-F(max{p::",.,.,p~ l}lw)) 
ck 1 1 J-
For j ::: 21 
j 
- II (l-F(max{p~, •.. ,p~}lw))) 
i=l 1 J 
::: 0 
4-3-69 
4-3-70 
dp* 1 k > jtl since all of ---d :::: ,., 
ck 
dp:" 
~ ° if k > j+l by Lemma 4-3-4. dek 
s 
(iii) From Proposition 4 .. 3~2; 
(l/Ji::: liw)) ::: d~2(F(Pilw)) ::: f(pii 
dpi 
dc ~ 0 by Lemma 4-3-4. 
2 
o 4-3-71 
For j 
j 
~ 2: d d (pr($j* 
c j +1 
1Iw)) 
\ (1 (max{pi>,· ~PP I w) n 
195, 
j 
}) TI (l~F(max{p~, .. , ,p~}lw)) 
1 1 J 
4 3-72 
dp! 
$ince .I. 
dc. 1 J+ 
o by Lemma 4~3~4. From (4-3-72), 
d rp ( * 
d l r $. c. 1 J J+ 
since 
eiv) 
00 
llw)) ::: 0 
E Pr($*:::: llw)) 
k=j+l k 
j-l 
llw)- E Pr($k 
k=1 
j 1 d 
l!w)) E d (Pr($k llw)) 
k=l c j +1 
- d d (Pr($~ = llw)L by (U) above 
c. 1 J J+ 
s 0, by (iii) above. 
ion 4-3-6: 
~(E[j Iw]) ~ 0, for all k ;?::. 2 dCk 
0, for k = 1 
Q.E.D. 
4 3-73 
11 w)) 
4-3-74 
4-3-75 
4-3-76 
4-3-77 
From (4 
~(E[j Iw]) = dCk 
(i) of Propos 
E j, 
j=1 
for all j ~ 1, Hence, 
d~ (E[j Iw]) 0 
1 
(V j "" 11 w)) 
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4-3-78 
4-3-79 
Consider any value of k ~ 2. From (4~3-55) and Proposition 4-3-2 
dd (E [j I w]) ck 
00 j 
+ l: j[E 
j=2 
j f(max{p*"",p~}lw)'dd (max{p*, ... ,p~}). IT (l-F(max{p~, ... ,p~}lw)) 
n J ck n J i = 1 2 ) 
j-l 
- E f(max{p*,.t"p~ l}\w)'dd (max{p*, .. "p~ 
n=l n J - ck n J 
i~n 
j -1 
I }). IT (l-F(max{p~, ... ,p~ i=l 1 J 
i¥n 
4-3-80 
00 j-1 
- - E l: f(max{p*, ... ,p~ l}lw)'dd (max{p*, ... ,p~ I}) j =2 n=l n J - ck n J-
j -1 
IT (l-F(max{p~" .. ,p~ l}\w)) 
i= 1 1 J-
4-3-81 
i#-n 
j-l 
IT (1 F(max{p~, ... ,p~ l}\w)) 
1 1 J-
4-3-82 
irn 
since 
dp* 
n 
197. 
Also, 
dp"" 
n ~ 0 for all n <: k~l, by Lemma 4~3-4. this 
shows [j IwJ) <; O. 
"'" 
Q,E,D, 
These results are compared to some of the empirical results 
obtained by Axell [1]1 Gastwirth [11] and Telser [52] and to the 
results of Proposition 3~3~3 and Proposition 3~3~4. Telser [52] 
concluded that an increase in the marginal financial cost of search 
c reduced the gain expected from search. Gast\virth [11] concluded 
that increasing c reduced the ex ante expected length of search. 
Axell [1] concluded that increasing c increased both the mean and 
of the ex ante p.d,f. of minimum prices found during search. 
These results are similar to the theoretical results presented here, 
but there is one essential difference. The comparative statics results 
presented in this chapter refer to a change in only one of the marginal 
~inancial search costs at a time, AxelI 1s , Gastwirth's and Teiser's 
assumption of a constant marginal financial search cost allows them to 
consider only changes of the same amount in all such costs at once. 
Their results are, therefore, efforts to measure the combined effects 
of simultaneous changes of the same amount in all marginal financial 
search costs. The quantitative results obtained are similar to the 
results predicted by the analysis of this section, The two sets 
results are still directly comparable though, because each of the 
marginal results derived here is shown to push in the same direction. 
198. 
Consequently, the joint effect of combining all the individual 
marginal results will have the same qualitative behaviour as each 
marginal result, 
Both Proposition 3"3,,,4 and Proposition 4-3-6 show the ex ante 
expected search length is non-increasing w.r.t. any of the marginal 
financial search costs, 
The results of Proposi tions 3-3~3 and 4-3-5, while not at 
variance with each other, are not completely the same. They are 
similar in that both show that the ex ante p.m, f. of search lengths is 
unaffected by a change in cl' that an increase in c. 1 increases the J+ 
probability of a search length of j observations on PI' and that an 
increase in c. 1 J+ decreases the probability of a search length of greater 
than j observations. However, the two sets of results do not 
completely coincide in two respects, Firstly, Proposition 3-3-3 shows 
that, for k ~ 2, 
aPr(ljJ~ = 1I w)/()ck ;:: 0, for all j = 1, ... ,k-2 J 4-3-83 
while Proposition 4-3-5 shows 
QPr(1jJ~ = 11 wln ck = 0, for all j = 1, ••. ,k-2 ,J 4-3-84 
The proof of Proposition 4-3.,.5 recognises that, under the assumed 
conditions of search~ the optimal search rule is myopic. A change in 
ck does not affect the searcher1s decision-making until he has taken 
Ck-l) observations on PI' This is what is expressed by (4-3-84). 
The proof of Proposition 3-3-3, however, does not utilise myopia. 
As a result, all of the marginal financial search costs, except c1 , 
influence the searcher's decisions at all stages of the search. A 
change in ck can therefore alter the searcher's decision on whether or 
not to take an additional observation on PI at some stage prior to his 
199. 
having (1<-1) observat;ions, An increase ck is an 
in a search which may be incurred at a later of the 
so is a disincentive for additional search. This is what 
by (4 .. 3-83), 
Secondly~ Proposition 3~3~3 shows that~ for k ~ 2~ 
aPr(ljij = llw)/ack $. 0, for all j ~ k 
while Propos ion 4~3~5 shows 
00 
This has not succeeded in showing the stronger result of 
(4-3~85) in the context of Proposition 4~3~5. 
The next section contains the derivation of the p.d.f. of 
minimum observed prices and an examination of properties. 
SECTlON 4-41 THE EX ANTE PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION OF MINIMUM 
OBSERVED PRJCES 
The search literature shows considerable in the 
distribution of searchers' minimuml observed prices because it is 
related in some way to the distribution of prices at which market 
4-3-85 
4-3-86 
transactions occur (see Rothschild [41] for a survey of such articles). 
The effects of changes in the conditions of search may be traced through 
the distributions of search lengths and minimum observed prices to the 
distribution of transaction prices and, from , to the effects on 
the distribution of selling prices in the next period. An understanding 
the processes by which these changes are will assist 
economists 1 understanding of their theorised adjustment processes for 
a sequence of market equilibria, In this section the p.d,f, of minimum 
observed prices is derived and its n~,nnf'~T examined. In the case 
200. 
treated distribution of minimum observed and the 
distribution transaction prices coincide because the conditions 
of search cause all to purchase one. and only one) unit of 
commodity 1. In other, more realistic, situations, the relationship 
of;' the ion of transaction prices to the distribution of minimum 
observed prices will be less simple. For instance, the searcher's 
freedom to choose not to buy and the presence of transaction costs 
will cause the transaction prices distribution to be a version of 
the distribution of minimum observed prices that attenuated at 
the high price end, 
In the Stigleresque search case, the number j of observations 
taken on fixed prior to search and never revised. Appendix 4 
shows that the resulting p,d.f. of minimum observed prices is the p.d.f. 
of the minimum of a sample of size j drawn from a population with p.d.f. 
4-4-1 
sequential search case has two major complications. 
First, and well recognised? is that the length of search is a random 
variable which is a function of observed prices. Second, and hitherto 
completely ignored. is that, unlike the Stigleresque expression (4-4-1), 
the sequent p,d,f, of minimum observed prices must take into 
account the order in which different selling are observed 0 For 
example, suppose there are only two sell in the market. $10 
and $20, 1 A searcher whose first observation PI ~ $20 may well decide 
to take a second observation, Suppose the value of this observation 
$10, The minimum of this sample size 2 is $10. However, 
a samp ze 2 with a minimum of $10 irrational if it was 
201. 
1 2 
collected in the order PI ~ $10, PI ~ $20, The first observation of 
$10 would have caused the searcher to halt his search immediately 
since the expected net gain from taking another observation is 
negative, 
Proposition 4~4,,1 presents the derivation of the cumulative 
p.d,f, of minimum observed prices, H(p~inlw). 
Proposition 4~4~1: 
If minimisation of ex ante expected total expenditure on 
commodity I is a valid proxy for maximisation of ex ante expected 
utility and if w. = wand t. = t for all i., then the cumulative 
lj Ij J . 
d . f . f" b d' mIn [L U] . ensIty unctIon 0 m1n1mum o serve prIces PI € PI,PI 1S 
min I min I min I H(PI w) = 1-(FCmax{Pl ,pP w)~F(PI w)) 
00 • • j-l . 
mIn I m1n I mIn I E (F(max{Pl ,p~} w)~F(PI w)} IT (l~F(max{PI ,p~} w)) 
j =2 J i=1 I 
Proof: 
H(p~inlw) is the probability that the smallest observed price 
does not exceed p7in whenever search is halted, In order to derive 
the above c,d.f" consider instead (I~H(p~inlw)), the probability that 
min the smallest observed price does exceed PI when search is halted. 
The searcher halts his search after his first observation if and 
only if P~ ~ pi, Similarly, the searcher halts his search after two 
observations if and only if pi > pi and pi ~ PZ' In general, search 
is of length j if and only if the searcher~s first j observations 
h h I * j "I * j < * T1 f are suc t at PI > P1"",P1 ~ Pj~I,PI '"' Pj' lere ore, 
1 He mini) p ( min> min d 1 * 
- PI w:= r Pli PI an PI ~ PI 
202, 
or . '." Iw) 
(4~4~2) is the probability of the union of a sequence of 
mutually exclusive events, Lemma 2~5~4 proved all such sequences to 
be of finite length. Since the events are mutually exclusive, 
mini min min I I-H(PI w) = Pr(P I I > PI and P1 $ pi lw) 
+ P~ Iw) 
J 
4-4-3 
I min 1 I 
= Pr(pl > PI and PI $ pi w) 
00 
+ 
1 min j min 1 j -1 > * j 
L: Pr(p i > PI ""'P1 > PI ,PI> pi"",PI PJ'-l,P I j=2 
00 
::: P~ I w) 
J 
4-4-4 
I 
+ L: Pr(P l 
min * j-I min * min j I 
> max{P l ,PI}'" "P1 > max{P I ,P j - 1},P1 < PI ~ pj w) j=2 
4-4-5 
Assumption (1-4-10) is that all observations on PI are independently 
distributed. 
min j I Pr(P I <Pl~Pj w) 4-4-6 
203, 
j ~ 1 , 
mIn I IT CI-FCmax{PI .P~} w)) 
i=1 I 
4-4-7 
Rearranging (4~4-7) gives the desired expression, 
Q.E.D, 
The following remarks verify some of the properties essential for 
mini Hepl w) to be a proper c.d,f. 
Remark 4",4,,2; 
Proof; 
L 
PI' 
00 j ,,1 
H(PILlw) = I-F(Pl*lw)- E IT (I-F(p~lw)).FCp~lw) 4~4-8 
j =2 i=1 I J 
= I-F(prlw)-(l-F(prlw)).F(p~lw)-(l-F(prlw)) CI-F(p~lw)).FCp~lw) 4-4-9 
":'" .,' 
4-4-10 
= [1-F (p r I w) :I [1 - F (p ~ I w) ] [1" F (p 3 I w) J [ • • • ] 
00 
4-4-11 
(4-3-48) noted that assumption (4-2-2) was sufficient to guarantee 
that only a finite number of p~ could have values less 
J 
U 
than PI' 
Therefore, eventually a pj = P~. From (4,,4~11) it is easily seen 
that H(p~lw) = 0 if anyone term 
Q.E.D. 
til H(P1 w) 1, 
Proof: 
From 
mini H(p1 w):::; min I mini 1 (F(max{Pl ,ptJ w)-F(P1 w)) 
co , • j-l . 
mln I m;m I mIn I 
- Z (F(max{P l IP~} w)~F(Pl w)) IT (l~F(max{Pl ,p~} w)) j 2 J i=l 1 
All * U b' . min U. (4 4 12) . Pi ~ PI' so su stltutlng PI = PI Into ~ - gIves 
'" 1 
Q.E,D. 
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The c,d , of minimum observed prices should have the property that, 
if search is always of a length of exactly one observation on PI' it 
should coincide with the c,d.f. of selling prices F(Pllw). 
Proof; 
U if and only if pi :::; PI 
The proof is immediate upon substitut U PI into 
Pr(~~ :::; llw) for all j ~ 1, given by Propos ion 4-3-2, 
J 
Q.E.D. 
H(p~inlw) _ F(piinl w) if and only if search conditions are 
U 
such that pi PI' 
4-4-12 
4-4 13 
is shoml that if pi = p~, then H(p~inlw) 
Second it shONn . min I min I that 1£ H(PI w) = P(p1 w), then pi 
) Substituting pi = P~ into (4r4~12) gives 
UI mini 1 (FCP1 W)rF(Pl w)) 
f min (L U]. H(pmlinlw) _ F(pmlinlw). or any PI E Pl,Pl le, -
205. 
mini FCP1 \\I). 
U 
= Pl' 
4-4 14 
4-4-15 
(ii) mini Hep1 w) 
mini F(P I w). then, from (4-4-12), 
F Cpmlin I .. ,) _ 1 (F ( {min *} I ) F ( min I )) n ~. ~ax PI ~PI w. PI w 4-4- 6 
00 min. I min I j -1 min I Z (F(max{Pl IP~} wl-F(PI w)) IT (l-F(max{P l ,p~} w)) j 2 J i=1 1 
Clearly equivalence (4-4-16) true if and only if 
• <» • • 
mln I mln I mln I o 1 F(max{Pl ,pi} W)-.E (F(max{P I ,p!} w)-F(PI w)) J =2 J 
j 1 
min I IT (1 F(max{Pl ,pi} w)) 
i=l 
4-4-17 
(4-4 17) is true if and only if pi 
Q.E.D. 
force for systematic consumer search of more than 
one observation on P1 is the belief that, on average, this will provide 
a \\lith a lower selling price for commodity 1 than would be 
obtained on average from a random search of just one observation on 
206, 
Stigler showed thls to be the case for his version of the search 
problenl Previous research on the sequential search problem has asserted 
but not proved, that the mean Eh[P7inlw] of the p,d,L of minimum 
mini 
> h (P1 w) ~ must be no greater than the mean sell 
[P1 1 w] > where· 
h(p~inlw} = aH(p~inlw)/ap~in 4-4-18 
jp~ min he mini )d min = PI PI w PI L 
PI 
4-4-19 
4-4 20 
Lemma 4~4-6 derives a property of the cumulative p,d,f, of 
minimum observed prices which is used in Proposition 
the assertion that Eh [P7
in lw] $ Ef[P1Iw], 
to prove 
The more frequently searchers extend their searches to tlVO or 
more observations on PI' the more frequently selling below the 
mean selling price Ef[p1Iw] will be observed, and the lower will be 
the mean minimum observed selling price Eh[P7inlw]. Accordingly, any 
change in search costs which increases the mean search length, should 
also decrease the mean minimum observed selling This too is a 
cOmnlon unproved assertion among previous authors. A proof is given 
by Proposition 4-4~7. 
A third frequent assertion may be as llincreased 
search decreases price dispersion". IS seminal paper contains 
statement that "Since the ed minimum price 
decreases with additional search, the by inexperienced 
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buyers will also a larger variance" [50 p. 219], Axell's 
empirical results [1, p, 8S-90] indicate both the mean and variance 
of the p,d.f. of observed prices are by an increase 
in the cost of search. Rothschild seems to sum 
up the ion ious writers when he says !lIt should turn out 
in most sensible models increased search activity will decrease 
price dispersion" [43~ p, 692], The measures of ion 
quoted are e the variance or the coefficient of of the 
p,d.f, of minimum observed prices. What has been overlooked, however, 
is that the change variance, or coefficient of variation, caused 
by a change in a search cost, depends upon the form the 
p.d.f, of selling prices f(Pliw). For instance, the assertion true 
and either symmetric or skewed to the right. 
However, if f(Pliw) is skewed to the left, it is quite possible for 
the variance or of variation of the p.d.f. of minimum observed 
prices to be increased by a decrease in a marginal search cost. The 
derivative of the variance of the p.d,f, of minimum observed w.r.t. 
the kth marginal search cost ck is presented in Remark 4-4 9, along with 
a simple numerical example in substantiation of the claim that these 
measures of price dispersion may be increased by an increase in a 
marginal search cost, 
Lemma 4~4 6: 
~_(H(pminlw)) S 0, fo),' all k ;:: 1, and for all but a finite QCk 1 
number of values of I 
L U 
S [PI >Pl] for which left and hand 
derivatives di but are non~positive and exist. 
Proof: 
a mini From Proposition 4,,4,,1 ~(H(PI w)) 
k 
f ( { min * } I ) 0 ( {min - *}) max PI 'Pj W oC
k 
max P1 'P j -
00 J'-1 '-I 
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min I min 
+ E (F(max{PI ,p'} w) F(PI Iw] E 
j 3 . J n=1 
J min 
IT (l-F(max{P l >p~}lw)) i=1 1 
ifn 
min I Q min f(max{P l ,p~} W)ack (max{Pl ,p~}) 
(X) • ,j -1 , 
mln I mln I mln I + L: (F(max{P I ,pn W)-F(P1 w)) IT (I-F(max{Pl ,pn w))J j =3 J i=2 1 
00 
} I w)) , 
+ 
min I 3 min L: f (max {p 1 • P *} w) -" -(max {p 1 ' P * } ) 
n=2 n oCk n 
n-l 
min I IT (1 F(max{Pl ,pi} w)) 
i=1 
+ 
00 min I min I j -1 min 
L: (F(max{P I ,pn W)rF(Pl wJ) II (l-F(max{Pl j=n+l J 1 
} I w))] 
ifn 
4-4-21 
4-4-22 
Note that (i) 3 min *} dC
k 
(max{PI ,Pn ) '" 0, for all k > n+l, by Lemma 4-3-4. 
(U) (1 min dC
k 
(max{P l ,p~}) 
and is undefined . f min - p* 1 PI - n' 
=: 0, 
2: 0, 
'f min p* 1 PI > n 
'f min 
1 PI < p* n' by Lemma 4-3-4 
Hence the derivative _d_(H(pm1
in lw)) will be undefined for all values ()ck 
p*, for all n = 1,2"" 
n 
Since search is 
mini always of finite length, H(PI w) will depend upon only a finite 
number of p~, so the result will hold for all but the number 
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values f min = p* 8 
o Pl n 
u ~PIJ, To complete the proof consider the 
nth term 
n-l . 
mIn [- n (1- F (max {p 1 
i=1 
00 • 
I mln *} w))+ E (F(max{Pl j=n+l 
'-1 
J {min}1 TI (I-F(max PI ,P~ 
i=1 1 
) ] 
iFn 
I . min I } w)~F(PI w)) 
n-l . 
m1n } I min I min I 
= IT (1-F(max{P1 .P~ w))[ 1+ F(max{Pl ,Pn*+I} W)pF(p l w) i=1 ]. 
co • • j-l . 
mIn I mIn I mln } I ] 
T. E (F(max{P1 ,p-n w)-F(P1 w)) II (l-FCmax{Pl ,pi w)) 4-4-23 J =n+2 J i==n+l 
n-l min I mini min I 
::: i~ 1 (1- F (max{PI ,P~tl w))[ -1 + (I-F (PI w)) - (1-F (max{PI 'P~+ I} w)) 4-4- 24 
00 min I min j -1 min 
+ E ((1-FCP1 w))-(l F(max{PI ,p'llw)D TI (l-F(max{P l .p~}lw))] j=n+2 J i=n+l I 
(4-2-2) guarantees that 
(I-F(max{p~in'Pj}lw)) 
U 
eventually a P~ :::: PI' 
(I-F(P~lw)) 0 
and (4-4-24) may be rewritten as 
U Suppose pj :::; PI' 
n-l. . . 
{ mIn } I . . m1n I mIn I TI (I-F(max PI .pt w))[(-1+I-F(P1 w))+(-1+1-F(P1 w)) 
min I (1 F(max{PI ,P~+I} w)) 
. J,.1 . 
mln I < mln + ... +(-1+1 F(PI w)) TI (l-F(max{P l i=n+l 
llw))] 
n-l . . J-l 
mIn I m1n I -TI (l-FCmax{PI .P~} w))C-F(PI w))(l+ E 
i=1 1 j 
~ a 
Then 
4-4-25-
4-4-26 
4-4-27 
4-4-28 
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Simi! the SU1Tunation terms of (4-4 22) can be shown to be 
00 
[-1 + (F min *} I) (min I) (( {min *} I ) PI 'P2 w F PI w)+ ~ F max PI .p: w j ",3 J 
j-l min I iw)) IT (1 F(max{P I ,pi} w))] i",2 4-4-29 
:::: min I min . I 
-1+ (I-FePl W))+(l-F(max{Pl .P~} w))+ 
00 mini min I j-l min I E ((1 F(P1 W))-(l-F(max{Pl ,p*)o} w)D,rr (I-F(max{P1 ,prJ w)) j=3 1=2 
~ 0 
Comparing (4-4",28) and (4-4-32) to (4",4",,22) shows each of the terms 
of 
k ~ 1 
() mini 2) is non-positive. Therefore 3c
k 
(H(PI w)) ~ 0 for all 
min L U for all values of PI E [PI,P1] except values of 
p* for n :::: 1,2,.,.,J-1 where the left hand derivatives are 
n 
negative and the right hand derivatives are zero. Q.E.D. 
ition 4-4 7: 
()~k(Eh[p7inlw]):;: 0, if k 1. 
~ 0, if k > 1, 
4-4-30 
4-4-31 
4-4-32 
4-4-33 
4-4-34 
The result of Lemma 3".5,,1 may be applied to show 
8 min I min ~(Eh[PI w]) ~ 0 by noting (i) that if g(Pl ) 
k 
then 
3 (min) g PI 
= 1 » 0 
d min 
PI 
(li) the result of Lemma 4~4~6 that 
except for a finite number of values of p~in 
Q.E.D. 
211, 
4-4-35 
This result is a theoretical verification of the result inferred 
by Axell? Telser and Gastwirth from their numerical studies. 
Proposition 4-4~8l 
Ef[PIlw] ~ Eh [p7in lw] 
Proof: 
Remark 4,,4-5 shows H(p~inlw) == F(PIlw) if and only if pi = 
U if and only if pi = PI 
pi is a function of c2 alone and Lemma 4-3-4 shows 
3pi 
-- > 0 4-4-36 oc -2 
U Consider a decrease in c2 such that now pi < Pl' Then, by Remark 
4-4-5 and Proposition 4~4-7. 
4-4-37 
Hence. for any sequence of marginal financial search costs, 
4-4-38 
Q.E.D. 
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Remark 4-4-
Proof: 
rp~ 
j' ( min _ E [ min I ] ) 2 h ( min I ) d min P1 . h P1 w • P1 w PI L P1 
4-4-39 
mini 
' ' 2 ah (PI w) . 
( mln E [ mln I ]) d mln PI - h PI w, . PI 
4-4-40 
mini 
. . aEh PI W • • ( mln -E [ mln I ]) h ( mln I )d mln PI h PI W c PI W PI 
k 
[ min I ] . f' f min Eh P1 W lS not a unctlon 0 P1 so 
. I U 
::: 
3Eh[pm11nlw] P
1L 
P1 
aEh[p~inlw] 
ck 
::: 0 
( min_E [ mini ])h( mini )d min PI h PI W PI W PI 4-4-41 
4-4-42 
Substituting (4-4~43) into (4~4-40) gives 
= Jp~( min E [ mini ])2 PI r h PI w 
L 
PI 
Q.E.D. 
mini Consider (4-4~44). 3h(Pl wl/ack will be positive for some 
1 f min d 'f h IA~ h va ues a PI an negatIve or at ers. nllet er or not 
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mini a(varh (pl w))/3ck is positive or negative depends on the relative 
weightings given to the positive and negative regions of 
3h(p~inlw)ldck by the corresponding values of (p~in ~ Eh[p~inlw])2. 
In any event, it is definitely not the case that the variance of 
the p.d.f. of minimum observed prices must always be decreasing 
w.r.t. any of the marginal financial search costs. A simple 
numerical counter~example is now presented. 
Suppose there are only two selling prices in the market, $10 
and $20, with respective probabilities of 0.2 and 0.8, ie. 
__ {0'2, PI = $10 
f(Pl lw) 
0.8, PI = $20 
4-4-45 
Also suppose that the searcher's prior p.d.f. g(w) and the costs of 
his chosen search path are such that pi = pi = $20. Then he will only 
take one observation on PI and his ex ante probabilities for minimum 
observed prices of $10 and $20 are 
{
0.2. p~in = $10 
JIlIn 0.8, PI Fi $20 
4-4-46 
The mean, variance and coefficient of variation for this distribution are 
18,0 
4".4 48 
C,V, :::: 0.222 
Now suppose the second financial search cost c2 is lowered 
$20 still. The searcher's ex ante so that pi 
probabil 
$15 but pi 
minimum observed prices of $10 and $20 are now 
:::: 
{
min 
0.36, Pl._ • $10 
mIn 0.64, PI :::: $20 
4-4-50 
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The mean, variance and coefficient of variation for this distribution 
are 
4-4-51 
23,04 4-4 52 
4-4-53 
Comparing (4-4~47) to (4",4",51), (4~4-48) to (4-4~52) and (4-4-49) 
in c2 has caused the mean minimum 
observed price to fall and both the variance and coefficient of 
variation of the distTibution of minimum observed prices to rise. By 
either criterion, • the decrease in c2 has caused an increase 
in price dispersion. 
This section establ the p,d.f. of minimum observed 
prices and examined some properties, The model used was a 
sequential search which myopic search was optimal and in 
which the searcher about a partially unknown p,d,f. of selling 
15. 
The next section treats the simpler case in which the 
and ers of the p.d,f, of selling prices are known completely 
to the searcher, Following this, Section 4~6 d ses the relation-
of the p,d.f, of minimwn observed prices to the p,d,f. of 
ion prices. 
SECTION 4-5: THE EX ANTE PROBABILITY FUNCTIONS OF SEARCH LENGTHS AND 
MINIMUM OBSERVED PRICES FOR A MYOPIC SEQUENTIAL SEARCH 
IN WHICH THE PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION OF SELLING 
PRICES IS KNOWN 
In this section it is assumed that w is known to the searcher. 
This provides the searcher with complete information about the functional 
form and values of conditioning parameters of the p.d.f. of selling 
f(Pllw). The additional information simplifies the searcher's 
and the analysis, considerably because there is no longer a 
need to glean information from observed prices as to the likely values 
of the parameters w conditioning f{Pliw). Recall from (4-2-10) that, 
in search models where w is not known to the searcher, reservation 
prices are functions of observed prices, because the values of observed 
prices alter the searcher 1s perception of the p.d,f. of selling prices 
him, If f(Pllw) is completely known~ however, the reservation 
are only functions of the marginal financial search costs, since 
the searcher's perception of f(P1iw) is perfect and unchanging at each 
stage search. By analogy to (4~2-6), therefore, the searcher's 
jth reservation price is C. 
J 
C. (c. 1) J J+ 4-5 1 
(i) 
r U iP l 
(Cj"P1lf(P1iw)dP! = ejt!, if J L (P~"Pl)f(Pliw)dPl > Cjt! 
PI 
4~5-2 
) C. 
J 
U if PI' 
The llowing analysis first of all shows Cj is strictly 
216. 
is a 
w.r,t. c j +1 alone, Corollary 4~5~11 which proves this, 
case of Lemma 4,,2~1 which proves the corresponding result 
when reservation prices are functions of observed prices as well. 
Corollary 4-5",1 is presented merely for the reader's convenience. 
The conditions assumed in order to guarantee the optimality of myopic 
search also guarantee the optimal search path is characterised by a 
monotonic non-decreasing sequence of marginal financial search costs. 
Hence, the searcher will possess a monotonic non-decreasing 
of reservation prices. This monotonicity allows the expressions for 
the ex ante probability functions of search lengths and minimum observed 
prices to be greatly simplified, 
Corol 4-5-1: 
{ 
> 1 r { c. 1 ~ PI > J+ = 0 as . L(P~~PI)f(PIIW)dPl < c. 1 J+ is undefined PI Cj +1 
(i) 
= 0 4-5 3 
(ii) > c j +1 then, by (i) of (4,..5,..2), 
there 1 C U f C. - h a va ue j < PI 0 J such t at 
(C. 
J c. 1 J+ 
Totally ing (4-5~4) w.r,t. c j +1 gives 
(r~ I -1 1 so :::; f(PI w)dP1) > '" 
PI 
(iii) The non-smoothness of C. for c. 1 such that J J+ 
r PI L (P~-Pl)f(Pllw)dPI ::: c. 1 J+ PI 
is implied by (i) (ii). 
217. 
4-5-4 
4-5-5 
4-5-6 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 4~S~2; 
If f(Pliw) is known., myopic optimal sequential search is 
characterised by a monotonic increasing sequence of the smallest 
reservation prices C., 
J 
Proof; 
Propos ion 3-4~1 shows that, under assumptions (4-2-1), (1 4-28) 
and (3-5-1), the opt search path is such that ci = cCi) all 
i ::: 1,2,... ie.. the search costs associated with 
the optimal search path form a monotonic increasing sequence of the 
smallest marginal search costs. The desired result is therefore 
given immediately by Coroll 4-5-1, 
Q,E.D. 
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The ex ante probability of a searcher, who does not know w 
exactly, stopping after j observations on PI' depends upon the values 
of all of pi, ... ,Pj (see Proposition 4~3~2), The simplification 
obtained by applying the result of Proposition 4~5-2 is that the ex 
ante probability of a searcher, who has complete knowledge of f(Pllw), 
stopping after j observations on PI' depends only upon the values 
of C. 1 and C .. The ex ante p,m,f. of search lengths and the ex J r J 
ante p.d.f. of minimum observed prices for such a searcher are 
presented in Corollary 4-5-3 and Corollary 4-5-4, 
Corollary 4-5,.3; 
If f(P1Iw) is known, the ex ante probability mass function of 
search lengths is 
and 
Pr(I)i~=llw) 
J 
'-1 . 
= Cl-F(C. 11wnJ ,-(l-F(C·lw))J for all j 2: 2. 
J'" J 
Proof 
First consider j=l. From (4-3-36), 
I min I 1 I Pr(l)ii=l w) = Pr(p11 $C1 w) = Pr(p1$C1 w) 
Now consider j ~ 2. From (4-3-38), 
Pr(I)i~=1Iw) = pr(pm1~n>C. for all i=l,.,.~j_llw)_pr(pml~n>C. for all J 1 1 1 1 
min I From (4-3-39), Pr(p1' >C. for all i=l"" ,j w) 
1 1 
= pr(p~>Cl,min(p~,p~»C2" •. ,min(p~) ••• ,p{»Cj Iw) 
i=l, ... ,jlw) 
1 2 ' 
::: Pr(pl>max{C1,.,. ,Cj}l P1>max{C2,·,. ,Cj }, ••• ,pi>C j Iw) 
4-5-8 
4-5-9 
4-5-10 
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However, by Proposition 4 5-2, 
I) , , . ,j 
Insert (4-5-11) into (4-5~10) gives 
P ( min r PH > for all i~l., ..• j Iw) 
:: (1 Fcc·lw))J 
J 
4 5 13 
since observations on PI are assumed to be independently 
by (1-4-10), Combining (4",,5 13) and (4-5-8) shows, for j 2: 2, 
Pr ( 1jJ ~ = 1 I w) (1 ~ F (C. 1 I w) ) j -1 ,.. (1-F (C. I w) ) j 4 - 5 14 
J J" J 
Q.E.D. 
Coral 4-5-4' 
If f(p1Iw) is known, the cumulative density function of minimum 
observed prices is 
.. .. eo .. 
mIn I mIn I { mIn e } I = h(F(max{P l ,e l } w)-PCP l w))-.2: (F(max PI • ' w) J =2 J 
min I j -1 min I 
-F(PI w)) TI (1-F(max{P I ,C.} w)) 
. 1 1 1= 
As for (4.,..4-2). (4-4-4), and (4-4-5), 
1 He mini) p ( min> min d 1 C 
- PI w = l' P11 PI an PI S I 
or 4 5-15 
220, 
min 
or Plj min d 1 C j ,,1 '" (l j C > Pl an Pl > 1,·",P1 / ~j~ll PI ~ j 
•• Iw) 
+ 
P ( min 1 C I ) = r PI < PI < 1 w 
• • 00 • ~ 
m~n I m~n I m~n I m~n I F(max{PI ,el } W)-F(PI wJ+.E (F(max{PI ,C.} w)-F(PI w)). ]=2 J 
. I 
J min 
IT (l-F(max{P I ,C.}lw)) i=1 1 
Rearranging (4-5-18) gives the desired result. 
Q.E,D. 
4-5 16 
4-5-17 
4-5 18 
SECTION 4-6: THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION OF 
MINIMUM OBSERVED PRICES TO THE PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION 
OF TRANSACTION PRICES AND PRICE DISPERSION 
The analytic thrust of search models towards a description of 
the attainment and maintenance of a market equilibrium in which prices 
are dispersed. The distribution of transaction and the 
corresponding distribution of quantities are therefore 
desirable goals for search theorists s will provide under-
standing of the nature of such an equilibrium. chapter provides 
one such distribution of transaction prices, but only under a set of 
22L 
severely restrictive conditions, the foremost 
that the demand for commodity 1 one 
xi 1. It is sible to that such a restrie is not 
unreasonable in a real world frequently by ind 1 
but such an must be supplemented by a restriction that the 
commodity is a and that the marginal util of a second 
unit of the commodity very small (or negative) when compared to 
the marginal utility of the first unit, Only in such cases can we be 
assured that "realism" of the restriction xi 1 is lIreasonable". 
A more general approach than the one used in this chapter will be 
necessary to 
general applicabil 
One 
It was stated in 
a distribution of transaction with more 
isation is to the problem of bulk buying, 
1 that the severity of the as ion that 
xi :: 1 was due to being independent of prices and wealth and that 
xi being ident ly unity in particular was merely a matter of an 
appropriate choice of units, If the single unit demanded actually 
m units of another ze ~ then all the preceding analys of Chapters 2, 
3 and 4 may be viewed as solving the problem of a search for the best 
possible purchase conditions for a bulk order of m units of commodity 1. 
Adapting the analysis of this chapter to variable int demands 
for commodity 1 not at first appear to be a substant 
difficult problem than the one solved in this chapter. 
removing the 
necessary for the use 
1 also removes one of the 
minimisation of total expected 
more 
ly, 
ions 
on 
commodity 1 as a val proxy for consumer utility maximisation. The 
analysis required developing more general distributions of 
transaction based on optimal search behaviour 11 have to be 
carr out in utility terms, rather than terms 1 and 
will be more difficult. 
TI1e p,d,f, of transaction prices. by itse is an 
measure of only if each transaction is an 
the same quantity, If the amount exchanged varies from one 
transaction to another, then, to completely characterise the extent 
dispersion in a market, the distribution of transaction 
must be supplemented with the quantities exchanged at each transaction 
price, Compare two markets, 100 transactions are carried out a 
time period in each market, In both markets SO of these 
are carried out at a transaction price of $10 and the 
remaining 50 transactions at a price of $20. In the first market, 
all transactions are unit exchanges, In the second market, all 
transactions at a price of $20 are unit exchanges while all transactions 
at a of $10 are two unit exchanges, Clearly price dispersion 
measured on a transaction basis is different to price dispersion 
measured on a per unit exchanged basis, To distinguish between these 
two measures 
demands 
The I 
behaviour 
dispersion, a joint consideration of the p.d.f.ls of 
is required, 
already contains some discussion about the 
dispersion in the long-term, The conclusions 
, principally because the models from which these 
cone are drawn vary widely in their structures, Even so, 
Fisher's model [10] leads to the conclusion that any initial price 
eventual collapses to the perfectly competitive price 
while Hey's model [ ]~ which is not too dissimilar in structure to 
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Fisher1s model, leads to the conclusion that any initial price 
dispersion eventually collapses to the monopoly price. While they 
may not agree about the price to which this collapse converges. almost 
all search models in which market conditions are unchanging predict 
that initial price dispersion eventually vanishes. This conclusion 
is what such models should produce, since they consider a possibly 
infinite time horizon within which the same market agents may continue 
to amass information. If) as Stigler put it, "Price dispersion is 
a manifestation ~ ,.. of ignorance in the market" [50., p. 214] 
then these agents have an infinitely long period in which to reduce 
their stocks of uncertainty to zero and remove any price dispersion. 
Dynamic models permit changing market conditions and so produce 
more realistic conclusions, In Mortensen's model [33] a wages 
distribution does not collapse with the passage of time. Instead it 
varies in response to variations in the actual and expected rates of 
wage inflation, the rate of product price inflation, the unemployment 
rate and the rate of adjustment of expectations. Ioannides' model 
[18Jj which also shows a persistent price dispersion, comes closest 
of all to giving meaning to the term "equilibrium" in the context 
of price dispersion. He recognises that equilibrium requires equality 
between the rate at which sellers supply goods and the rate at which 
buyers purchase the goods, and that the distributions of selling prices 
and buyers' reservation prices must be stationary. The far more 
realistic conclusion reached is that a major source of price dispersion 
is the continuous turnover in market participants, thus maintaining 
a stock of ignorance about prices in the market. 
224., 
One may reasonably ask if it is worthwhile to pursue the 
argument over the long-term behaviour of price dispersion in models 
which assume unchanging market conditions. After all, many market 
conditioning factors are beyond our control. For example, a drought 
on the Canadian Prairies will cause an upward shift in the distribution 
of wheat prices. Such factors cause changes to a market which can be 
learnt about only slowly by the majority of the agents in the market. 
The changes therefore depreciate the stock of knowledge of the market 
that the market's agents possess, Consequently these factors are a 
source of price dispersion, To ignore them, however, is useful if it 
assists in gaining an understanding of the processes by which markets 
approach equilibrium~ and in understanding what influences the rates 
of these processes. This understanding will contribute towards 
understanding market reactions as changes in market conditions alter 
the position of the equilibrium to which the market strives. 
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CHAPTER V 
AN INDIRECT UTILITY FUNCTION APPROACH TO SEARCH PROBLEMS t 
SECTION S~l: THE APPROPRIATENESS OF USING THE INDIRECT UTILITY 
FUNCTION IN SEARCH PROBLEMS 
Many of the previous analyses of consumer search problems have 
been carried out in financial terms, Considerable attention was 
given in Chapters 2/ 3 and 4 to determining when such analyses could 
be considered equivalent to the more familiar neo~classical problem 
of a consumer maximising his utility while restricted by constraints 
on the amounts he can consume, The conclusion reached was that the 
problems were equivalent if psychic search costs did not exist and 
if the consumer's utility function belonged to a severely restricted 
set ~ defined by (2~7~14). In Section 1~4 the restriction of a fixed 
demand for the searched for commodity was shown to make all consumer 
preference pre-orderings other than those with a particular degree of 
non-smoothness inadmissible for these consumer search problems. 
Together, these restrictions show that only a very heavily restricted 
set of consumer preference pre~orderings is admissible to consumer 
search problems analysed in financial terms, In addition, psychic 
search costs undoubtedly are a large component, sometimes the only 
component, of a searcher's overall search cost. The rationale for 
carrying out solely financial analyses of search problems is 
presumably that the generality lost is compensated for by the 
analytic ease gained, The loss in generality has been shown to be 
great. This chapter shows the additional difficulties encountered 
in a cardinal utility analysis of consumer decision~making in search 
t: Much of the material in this chapter was presented by Manning 
and Morgan [29] to the Fifth Conference of Economists, Brisbane, 
Aust ralia, in August 1975 .. 
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problems are quite surmountable .. 
The principal motive for analysing consumeI' search problems in 
teI'ms appears to be that prices and consumer wealth are 
variable, The usual neo",classical analysis p conducted in 
utility terms, takes these parameters as given and fixed~ but this 
only because the usual objective of a neo~classical consumer problem 
is a specification of the consumer's demands. The dual to this 
problem the minimisation of the consumer's indirect utility 
function, subject to a constraint or constraints in which the consumer's 
quant demanded are taken as given and fixed. The indirect utility 
function contains exactly the same information about the consumer's 
preferences as the direct utility function. Which function chosen 
depends only upon the analytic objective which one has in mind. If the 
objective is the specification of consumer demands corresponding 
to given prices and wealth, then the analysis is conducted more 1y 
with the direct utility function since the demands are arguments this 
function. If the objective is the specification of prices and wealth 
corresponding to given demands, then the analysis conducted more 
easily with the indirect utility function since and wealth are 
arguments of this function, Hotelling [16, p. 583-597) made exactly 
this distinction in 1932 in a paper which used pricing functions, as 
opposed to demand functions~ to resolve a paradox put forward by 
Edgeworth, Later Roy [44]~ [45J specified the dual consumer problem 
and Houthakker [17] gave the name of 
the objective function of this problem. 
The duality of the direct and indirect 
function" to 
functions has 
been shown to be complete~ each possessing all the general properties 
of the other (see Samuelson [39] and Haque [14]), The reader is 
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to these works, to Sato [49] and to Hadar [13, p. 197 208] 
on the properties of the indirect utility function. 
The main point for us to realise is that, as Houthakker says with 
to the use of the direct or indirect utility functions, nThe 
choice between them is, therefore, a matter of mathematical convenience, 
at any rate in one~person problems" [17, p, 158, footnote 1]. The 
variables of a consumer search problem are usually prices and wealth. 
The utility function is ~ therefore ~ usually the most 
appropriate objective function to use in the analysis 
search problems, 
consumer 
SECTION 5~2; NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The search models examined in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 were all 
assumed to be such that sequential search behaviour was optimal. In 
this chapter 
that 
assumed that the conditions of search are such 
search is optimal. A reason for this is that, 
until now, the thesis has not specifically considered Stigleresque 
search, The indirect utility function approach is equally useful 
in analysing sequential search problems (see Chapter 2 and Kohn and 
Shavell [20], and Chapter 6 of this thesis which includes sequential 
search as a ial case of an indirect utility function approach to 
general search), 
Assumption; The nature of the search problem is such that 
search is optimal. 5-2 1 
The problem by the Stigleresque searcher is the ex ante choice 
of number observations on PI which he expects to maximise 
his ex ante utility, Recall from (1,.,4 .. 23) that Stigleresque search 
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s only through the first period TI and that any number of 
ions on PI can be made in this period. The number of 
observat on PI decided upon at the beginning period TI 
not varied once search has begun. The marginal search costs 
by the searcher when taking his ith observation on PI are, from 
Section 1~4, a financial cost of cli and a psychic cost of Kli . 
Assumption: The total psychic cost of taking j observations on PI 
in period Tl is 
j 
l: Kl , 1 1 
The searcher's wealth at the end of period T1, after j 
observations have been taken on PI' is, from (1-4-18), 
M ~ e(l) :::: M ~ 
5-2-2 
5-2-3 
Ml and e(l) will be written as Ml(j) and c1 (j) to denote their 
dependencies on j, ie, 
5-2-4 
In Appendix 4, the p.d.f. of the minimum of a sample of j 
independent price observations drawn from a population with p.d.f. 
shown to be 
j(I_F(p~inlw))j"'lf(p~inlw) 5-2-5 
min L U . for all PI £ [PI ,P1] . The utility the searcher expects ex ante 
to enj oy at the end of period T 1 is thus, by (1,,4,,11), 
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The searcher's indirect utility function is assumed to possess 
the following properties, In Section 5~3, these properties are 
shown to be sufficient for the indirect utility function to be strictly 
concave with respect to j, 
dI 0 ap. < 
l 
for all i = 1" •• ,t 5-2-7 
a2I 
> 0 
-2 
ap. 
l 
5-2-8 
ie. the marginal indirect utility of the ith price is negative and 
diminishing 
5-2-9 
5-2-10 
ie. the marginal indirect utility of income is positive and diminishing 
for all i = 1~ • . o,l 5-2-11 
ie. the marginal indirect utility of the ith price is diminishing 
with respect to increasing wealth, 
j is, of course, a non~negative integer so, in reality, it is 
meaningless to talk of functions being continuous with respect to j. 
Nevertheless, for analytic convenience, it will be assumed that j 
is continuous and that psychic search costs, financial search costs 
, and utility expected ex ante at the end of period T1 are all functions 
which are differentiable with respect to j. 
Assumption: j;;:, 0 is continuous. 5-2-12 
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Assumption; E[I(p~in~p2A'" >P.t»Ml ) ij ,w] ,Kl (j) and c l (j) are 
differentiable with respect to j. 
The optimal number of observations on Pl for a Stigleresque 
searcher, obtained under assumptions C5~2~l2) and (5~2-13), will be 
denoted by j*, It is shown in Section 5~3 that, since I possesses 
properties (5.,..2~7) to (5,..,2,..11), the absolute error between j* and the 
actual integer optimum jO is always less than unity. Furthermore, 
the actual integer optimum jO can be located simply by comparing 
the utilities expected ex ante at "the end of period T 1 for the two 
integer values of j within one unit either side of j*. 
It is also assumed that marginal financial search costs are 
positive and non~decreasing with respect to j and that marginal 
psychic search costs are non,..decreasing with respect to j. 
Assumption; dC l (j) d
2
C l (j) 
:: cl (j) > O' dj , d/ 
Assumption; dKl (j) 
> 0 
dj2 " for all j ~ 0 
= c"(j) 1 > 0 for 
j G: 
all 
0 5-2-14 
5-2-15 
Note that (5-2~15) does not require all marginal psychic search 
costs to be positive. It permits the searcher some psychic enjoyment 
from taking at least his initial observations on Pl' 
SECTION 5 .... 3: THE STIGLER SEARCH MODEL WITHOUT FIXED-ORDER QUANTITY 
RESTRICTIONS 
Prior to search the Stigleresque searcher can evaluate 
E[I(p~in,p2""'P.t,Ml) ij,w], the level of utility he expects ex ante 
to enjoy after taking j observations on PI in period TI . However, 
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he will incur psychic costs while searching through period T1, 
Prior to search, therefore, he will choose to make j* observations on 
PI where j* maximises the difference, with respect to j, between the 
utility expected at the end of period Tl and the psychic costs incurred 
in attaining it. It is assumed that the consumer's indirect utility 
function is additively separable with respect to psychic search costs 
so that the consumer's ex ante expected utility, net of psychic search 
costs, from taking j observations on PI is 
The Stigleresque searcher's problem is to choose j* such that 
Q(j*) = max Q(j) 
j ~O 
5-3-1 
5-3-2 
Two comments on the Stigleresque searcher's decision-making 
must be made at the outset, First, even if it is possible, there is 
no purpose to a Stigleresque searcher's updating of his prior p.d.f. 
on w, g(w), The sequential searcher's gain from refining g(w) with 
information about w gleaned from his observations on PI is that it 
enables him to more accurately decide upon the best length of search. 
The Stigleresque searcher's selection of the best length of search, 
j*, is an ex ante decision which therefore utilises g(w) and the 
constraints of the search problem are such that j* is not revised 
as search proceeds. Since the Stigleresque search length is not revised, 
there is no gain from revision of g(w), Stigleresque search will often 
be optimal in problems where price information does not flow to the 
searcher until the end of a period, even though the cost of the observations 
may have been incurred earlier in the period. For example, a consumer 
may write to j sellers of a commodity asking for price quotations. The 
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sellers ~ are mailed back, arriving at the end of period T1. 
The consumer's costs of these observations were all 
incurred at the beginning of the period \vhen and mailing the 
requests for information. Additional psychic costs, perhaps anxiety 
or frustration, would accumulate throughout the period. No 
information on prices is obtained from the sellers until the end of 
the period so it is not possible to revise g(w) within the period. 
Second, unlike a sequential searcher, a Stigleresque searcher will 
never choose to alter any part of his ex ante optimal search path 
ii, •.. ,ij*, Optimal Stigleresque search paths are examined in 
Section 5~4. 
The Stigleresque searcher chooses to make j* observations on 
PI where j* sat the necessary maximising conditions 
O· '* aQI - o· '* 0 
*:s , J . 3J j =:j * - ,J ?: 
The sufficient maximising conditions are proved satisfied in 
Proposition 5~3~5. 
(i) 
(U) 
(iii) 
if j *=:0. ~I S, 0 and search does not occur 
• a j j *=0 c 
if j*~I, ~91, * =: 0 and at least one observation 
'lJ J 
on PI is taken. 
* =: 0 and either 
(a) Q(O) > Q(l) and search does not occur 
or (b) Q(O)':: Q(l) and exactly one observation on PI 
is taken, 
From (5.,.2",6) and (5",3 ) ~ 
Qrj) 
5-3-3 
5-3-4 
5-3 5 
5-3-6 
Differentiating (5-3~7) with respect to j gives 
aQ _ 
8)-
233 0 
5-3-8 
By (5-2-4), Ml (j) = M - c1 (j) 
aMI 
so ar = -ci (j) 5-3-9 
Therefore, 
5-3-10 
Combining (5-3-10) and (5-3-8) shows 
j U , P h( mln I' ) "Q _ 1. a PI J ,w , o mln - mln ar - L I (PI ,P2'0" ,P.t,M1)---=-a-;-j -- dPl 
PI 
j U P 1 "I ' , ,. _0 _ mln, mln c 1 (J) aM h(Pl IJ,w) dP l L 1 . 
PI 
5-3-11 
The first term on the R.H.S. of (5-3-11) is the marginal expected 
utility of an increase in the likelihood of a lower price for 
commodity 1 being revealed by the extra amount of search undertaken. 
This quantity, which is dependent on the form of the p.d.f. of selling 
prices, is proved to be positive and diminishing with respect to j 
by Proposition 5-3~3. 
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The second term on the R,H,S, of (S~3~11) is the marginal 
expected utility of a decrease of ci(j) in the searcher's wealth caused 
by extending the number of observations on PI from j. This term is 
identically zero if there are no financial costs of search, c l = 0, 
since then c1 U) = O. Proposition 5~3-4 proves assumptions (5~2-9) 
and (5,..2-10) sufficient for this quantity to be negative and 
I 
diminishing with respect to j, 
I 
The third term on the R.H,S, of (5 .... 3-11) is the marginal psychic 
cost incurred by extending search from j observations on PI' This 
quantity is identically zero if there are no psychic search costs. 
The following two lemmas are used to establish the behaviour 
of the first and second terms of the R,H.S, of (5~3-11) with respect 
to j. Lemma 5~3-1 establishes a result similar to that offered by 
Lemma 3-5-1, which considers changes in the p.d.f. of selling prices 
caused by changes in the value of the conditioning parameter w. In 
Lemma 5~3,..1, however, the change is to the sample size j and not to 
the p.d.f. of selling prices from which samples are taken. 
Lemma 5-3-1: 
if 
Proof: 
f 
U . 
PI h( mIn [. 
. a PI· J 1W) mIn 
L g (p 1 ) . ---:-0 J-:-' -
PI 
og < min 
o for all PI min > 
oPl 
d min > P O for all J' > 0 
. 1 < 
h(p7in lj,w) is a proper p.d.f. Therefore, 
fp~ h( mini' )d min 1 5-3-12 Pi J ,W Pl ;:; L PI 
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and 
j U P ,,1. . a mln . mln ~ h(P I IJ.w)dPI J L 
PI 
It is impossible for 
"'hC- minl-' ) 
a PI - - J. w __ 
::: O. so (S-3~13) requires 
j ()h(pmIinILW) . J ah(pmlinILW) . __ -::-;-__ dp~1TI + __ ~-- dp~1TI = 0 
R+ R~ 
where R+ := 
minldh(p~inlj,W) 
{PI > O} 
-
. {)h (p~in I j,w) 
R ::: {p~1TI I < O} and 
Consider the equation ::: 0 
min I j -1 min I' min I ::: (I-F(P1 w)) f(p1 w)(l+J.In(l-F(P l w))):= 0 
The solutions to (5-3-19) are all p~in 8 RO and p~in ::: r where 
1 + j.In(1-p erlw)) ::: 0 
r is unique because F(P7inlw) is a monotonic increasing function 
in p7in By definition, 
5-3-13 
5~3-14 
5-3-15 
5-3-16 
5-3-17 
5-3-18 
5-3-19 
5-3-20 
o n r ::: R n r = 0 5-3-21 
and 
R+ U R- U 0 [L UJ R U r ::: . Pl~Pl 
From (5-3-20), 'f min 1 PI <: r. 1 + j.ln(I_F(p~inlw)) 
and, 'f min 1 PI :> r, 1 + j.ln(I~F(p~inlw)) 
Combining (5-3-19), (5-3-23) and (5-3,.24) shows 
ah( mini" ) PI J ,w :<: ' 
., 0 mln < 
aj $. as PI > r 
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> 0 
< 0 
r is therefore an upper bound for R + and a lower bound for R~, 
Also, 
ah (p~in 1 j. w) 
o for 11 min RO 
aj = a PI € 
since h( min I' ) = 0 for all min 0 Combining (5-3-14), PI J ,w PI € R , 
(5-3-16), (5-3-21), (5-3-22) 1 (5-3-25) and (5-3-26) shows 
(a) 
and 
Ir min I' ah(p1 J,w) , mln a' ,dP l L J PI I 
u , 
P h mln I' 1 a (PI J ,w) , mln 
+ aj dP I = 0 
l' 
Then 
( min) g PI :s g(r) L min for all PI $ PI ~ r 
ah(pm1inlJ' ,w) , 
, mln 
aj dPl ~ g(r) L _a h_(_p_~,,-in.-I_j_, _w) dp ~in 
PI 
From (5-3,..29) and (5-3 ..... 25), 
I U . P mln , 1 . ah(P l IJ,w) , ' mln . mln g(PI) aj dPl r 
5-3-23 
5-3-24 
5,,3-25 
5-3-26 
(5-3-15) 
5-3-27 
5-3-28 
5-3-29 
5-3-30 
5-3-31 
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Combining C5,,3~30) and C5~3",31') shows 
J
p ~L -~ h_C_p_mI.,...in-=--1 j_~_w) . 
_ d m1n 0 PI :: 
PI 
by (5\""3~27). 
(b) S · . I I l' f 3 g min [L UJ 1m1 ar y~ - < 0 for all p E PI,PI ' then 3 min.... 1 
PI 
3h(pmlinlj,w) . 
m1n 
3j dPI > g(r) J
p UL1 _3 h_C_p_m1-:-in-:--1 j_,_w) . 
d m1n = 0 3j P1 
P1 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 5-3-2: 
2 mini' 3 hep1 ),w) . 
---,.--- d mn < 0 for all j > 0 
3j 2 P1 > 
l'f ~_< min [L U] o for all P1 E P1,P1 . 3 min > P1 
Proof: 
The proof of this lemma closely follows the arguments used in 
proving Lemma 5-3-1. From (5-3-13), 
- 0 is impossible so (5,..3-34) requires 
5-3-32 
5-3-33 
f 
(l2h (' min I' w) '. Pi J1 mln 
-----,;:'-- dP i Rt+ (lj f 
2 min I' Cl h(Pl J1 W) min 
+ R'~ aj dP i 
+ 
where R' 
and R' 
2 mini' 
, (l h(p1 J,w) 
== {pmm I __ ~;:;--_ 
1 aj 
Consider the equation 
> O} 
::: 0 ie, 
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:::: 0 5-3-35 
5-3-36 
5-3-37 
min I j -1 min I min I ' min I 
= (i-F(P I w)) f(p 1 w)ln(l-F(PI w))(2+).ln(I-F(P I w))) = 0 5-3-38 
min 0 min 0 The solutions to (5-3-38) are all PI E R and PI = r' where R 
is defined by (5-3-17) and r' is such that 
2 + j,ln(I-F(r' Iw)) = 0 
r' is unique because F(p7inlw) is a monotonic increasing function 
in p7in By definition, 
+ - + 0 - 0 + R' fl R' :::: R' fl R :::: R' fl R == R' fl r' ::: R' 
and R'+ U R'- U RO U r' L U :::: [P1,P1]· 
From (5-3-39) , 'f min 1 PI < r' , 2 + j.ln(I~F(p7inlw)) > 0 
and, 'f min 1 PI > r' , 2 + j .In(hF(p~inlw)) < 0 
5-3-39 
5-3-40 
5-3-41 
5-3-42 
5-3-43 
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Combining (5-3~38)? (5-3-42) and (5-3-43) shows 
Cl 2h ( min I' ) PI ),W $.0 
;:: Clj 
min < 
as Pi > r' 
r' is therefore an upper bound for R'~ and a lower bound for R'+, 
Hence, from (5~3~44)J (5-3-35), (5-3~36). (5-3-37), (5-3-40) and 
(5-3-41), 
Cl h(p1 ),w) . 
J
r
L
, _2 __ m-",in,......I_' _ d mln 
Pi Clj 
+ JP~ _a_2h_(_p_~o:::;'"in_1 j_,_w) " d mln = 0 Pi 5-3-45 Pi r' ClJ' 
(a) Suppose Clg o for all min L U Then, by 
a min ~ Pi E: [Pl'P I ], 
Pi 
(5-3-28) , (5-3-29) and (5-3-44), 
r 2 mini' r 2 mini' L g(p7in) Cl h(P I ),w) , Cl h(P I ],w) . d mln > g (r') d mln 5-3-46 aj 2 PI - aj 2 PI PI PI 
and 
r 2 min I" r 2 mini' ( min) Cl h(P I ) ,w) " Cl h (Pi ) ,w) , d mln g(r' ) d mln 5-3-47 g PI Clj 2 PI > Clj 2 Pi r' r' 
Addition of (5-3-46) and (5-3-47) shows 
r 2 mini' r~ 2 mini" Pi Cl h(PI ),w) " Cl h(P I ) ,w) " L g(p~in) dpmm ~ g (r') d mln = 0 Cl j 1 Clj PI PI PI 5-3-48 
by (5-3-45). 
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(b) ag min L U Similarly, if < 0 for all P £ [PI,Pl]' then a min ~ 1 < 
PI 
2 min I' o h(p i J»w) min 
---,,--- dP1 ~ ger') 
aj 
2 min I' o h (PI J ) w) . 
___ -::;-___ d mIn = 0 
aj PI 
by (5,,3,..45). 
Q,E,D, 
Proposition 5~3-3: 
(i) 
(ii) < 0 
Proof; 
By (5",2-7), aI < O. Therefore (i) is proved by applying 
a min 
PI 
the result of Lemma 3~5-I and (ii) is proved by applying the result 
of Lemma 3-5-2, 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 5-3-3 proves that the utility the consumer expects 
to enjoy at the end of period TI increases at a decreasing rate as 
the number of observations taken on PI increases without financial 
penalty. 
Proposition 5-3~4: 
(i) jP~ II hemin I' ld min aM PI J~w PI 
L I 
PI 
;> 0 
5~3-49 
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(ii) 
(i) and (ii) follow immediately from (5~2~9), that > 0, 
and from (5-2-10), that 
Q.E,D. 
The results of Propositions 5~3~3 and 5-3-4 can be used to show 
that assumptions (5 .... 2-7), (5-2-10), (5-2-11), (5-2-14) and (5-2-15) 
are sufficient for Q(j) to be strictly concave with respect to j. 
This ensures j* unique and that Q(j*) a global maximum over 
all Q(j), j ~ O. Concavity of Q(j) with respect to j is equivalent 
to diminishing marginal ex ante expected net ut ity with respect to 
j. 
(i) The marginal ex ante expected net utility from search is 
diminishing with respect to j. 
(ii) j* is unique. 
2 • j U . nun I' . p m1.n I' ) a h (p 1· J , w) min I' lora h (p 1 J ,w mil 
---=:---- dp 1 -2c 1 (J ) atvr ---;:...,...---- dp 1 
aj L 1 
PI 
5-3-50 
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3 31 
min (3M) < O. by (5",2~11)! so by Lemma 3~5.,.1 > 
3P1 1 
> 0 5-3-51 
Combining (5-3-50), (5",3~51), (ii) of Proposition 5-3-3, (ii) of 
Proposition 5-3-4, (5~2-I4) and (5-2-15) proves (i) above, that 
3
2Q 
--- < O. Q(j) is therefore strictly concave with respect to j and 
3j 2 
j* is globally optimal and unique. 
Q.E.D. 
In Section 1~4, search models without either financial or 
psychic search costs (Type 1 variations) were dismissed as unrealistic 
and uninteresting because optimal search always continued until 
the lowest price for commodity 1, p~, was discovered. This result 
is apparent from (5-3-2) where the first of the necessary maximising 
conditions is 
jP~a! h( min I' )d min 3M PI l,w PI L 1 
P1 
5-3-52 
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If there are neither financial nor psychic costs of search (5-3~52) 
becomes 
5-3-53 
Since Proposition 5-3-3 shows the L.H.S. of (5-3-53) is strictly 
I 
I positive for finite j, (5-3-53) can only be true if an infinite 
I 
number of observations are taken on PI ie. j* = 00. This is because, 
as j + 00, the p.d.f. of minima of samples of size j collapses to a 
L degenerate p.d.f. centred on Pl' The marginal utility of an 
additional observation on PI' therefore, becomes vanishingly small 
limit 
j+oo 
L 
d I (Pl'P 2 ' ... ,p l,M) 
= oj 
Either one of (5-3-55) or (5-3-56) is sufficient for j* < 00 
limit (') > M j+oo c i J 
5-3-54 
5-3- 55 
5-3-56 
L I(pl'P2"" ,Pl,M) is the highest possible level of utility attainable 
in the absence of any search costs at all. If, as in (5-3-55), 
accumulated psychic search costs eventually exceed this utility 
level~ then the optimal number of observations on PI must be finite. 
(5-3",56) makes the obvious comment that a Stigieresque 
searcher will make only a finite number of observations on PI 
o 
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if continuing without limit bankrupts him. 
shows that j* = 0 because the marginal gain in 
utility from one observation on PI is exceeded by either, or both, 
of the marginal changes in utility due to financial or psychic 
dKl 
search costs. Of course, if c = 0 and ar- 1 j::::l < 0, then j* ~ 1, 
since c = 0 and (i) of Proposition 5.,.3".3 guarantee that marginal 
ex ante expected net utility of the first observation on PI 
positive. Search will always take place. 
assumptions (5-2~14) or (5~2~15) are revoked, ex ante 
expected net utility Q(j) need no longer be strictly concave with 
respect to j, but j* will still be unique except in rather unusual 
circumstances. Again consider the necessary maximising condition 
in (5-3,..2) of ~jlj=j* :::: 0 for j* > O. 
From (5-3-11), 
5-3-57 
The slope of the L.H.S. of (5-3-57) has been proved to be strictly 
decreasing with respect to j by Propositions 5-3-3 and 5-3-4 
(lKI (see Figures 5-3-1 and 5.,.3",2) so, unless ~ is strictly equal 
to the L.H.S. for all j in some continuous interval, there will 
be a sequence of 
of the solutions ji,jz"" will represent local minima or points 
Figure 5-3-1 
QCj) 
: J" , 
: 1 
Figure 5-3-2 : 
oQ 
3J 
oE[Ilj] 
oj 
· 
· o 
o 
· 
· o 
· 
· 
· :j2=j* 
· 
· • 
· 
· 
· • 
j '=j * 2 
j 
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Q(j) 
oE[Ilj] 
3j 
8Q 
3J 
of inflection of Q(j). The remaining solutions will represent 
local maxima. The Stigleresque searcher will choose as j* the 
j! for which Q(j) is greatest. j* is the global maximum ie. 
1 
j*::: ji where QUi) : QUIP for all k '" 1,2, ... 
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j* will be unique unless psychic and financial costs are such that 
Q(ji) = Q(jk) for some ji f jk' While this is possible, it is not 
likely for most functions I and K. In reality it is even less 
likely since j* will necessarily be an integer. Should such a 
tie occur, however, the Stigleresque searcher is indifferent between 
the two sample sizes and can use some tie breaking procedure such 
as flipping a coin to choose one search length over the other. 
Comparative statics results are obtained from the Stigleresque 
search model in Section 5~5. The reader is reminded of the 
discussion of Section 1-4 which showed the difficulty of doing 
this when the search model is constrained by a fixed-order quantity 
restriction, 
The next section discusses the nature of a Stigleresque 
searcher's optimal search path. 
SECTION 5-4: OPTIMAL SEARCH PATHS FOR STIGLERESQUE SEARCH 
Chapter 3 discussed why sequential search paths should be 
considered and some of the factors which will influence a sequential 
searcher's choice of sellers to contact. There the discussion was 
couched in financial terms rather than utility terms. The conclusions 
reached were that, for a given search length, the optimal search 
path was the search path of least expected total expenditure on 
commodity 1. Under assumption (3-2-3)~ that the marginal financial 
cost any on is independent any 
of other it was shmm that the 
sequential search was characterised by a ion of non-
costs and 
benefits, No ionaI properties for a 
searcher's optimal search path. 
Definition: 
The leresque search path is 
Q 
5-4-1 
for any s 
The optimal search path is the path ex ante expected 
net util is greatest. Some results are from (5-4-1). 
Propositions 5-4-1 and 5-4-2 should be compared to Proposition 3-3-2. 
there are no psychic search costs and no 
sellers! 
, , .. , i'lf * where 
J 
pricing behaviour, the 
in 
path is 
Q 
From 
Consider any 
net 
, '" ., .. , ) 
2-9), 
search path i1,··"i j , 
from llowing this 
E[I (p~1n ,P22' , • ,Pi,M 
dI 
--"'"""";"---> 0 
o(M E c. ) 
1 
m::::1 m 
Since K -
search path 
j ) I w. I: c. 
m=l 1. m 
there are no differences in sellers' relative 
j 
248, 
0 ex ante 
is 
Jl '" '* fl , 5-4-2 
5-4-3 
behaviour, Q(iI' •.. ,L) is greatest if E c. is least. Therefore. 
J m=l 1m 
for any given number j of observations on PI' the 
j j 
path . * . * where L: c.* ::: L: c. for any 1 1,··"l j m::::! 1m m:::::1 1 m 
Q.E.D. 
If there are no financial search costs and no 
in sellers' relative pricing behaviour, the path 
for any search path i 1 , .. ,. *' 
Consider any search path c _ 0 the ex ante 
net utility from lowing is 
j 
L: 
m:::::1 
Since there are no differences in sellers' relative 
E [I 
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5 4-
of 
The search path of length j is, ,0", * where 
j j 
E Kli * $ E Kli for any search path i 1, .. "iJ" m=l m m:l m 
Q,E,D, 
The import of Proposition 5-4~1 is that an optimal 
path provides the minimum total financial search cost for 
j* observations on PI' The value of j* will be partly determined 
by total cost. If the marginal financial search costs are 
independent (assumption (3,.2".3)), then an is 
to contact the j* sellers who represent the j* smallest 
financial search costs to the searcher. In the result 
Proposition 5-4-1 is similar to the result 3-3-2. 
There is, however, an essential difference. The St 
searcher's optimal search path is a path for which the total 
financial cost of j* observations is a minimum. If the marginal 
search costs are independent then the same total cost is incurred 
ess of the order in which these same j* costs are 
In Proposition 3,.3-2 the searcher's 
path was characterised by 
search costs because he had the the number of 
observations taken in the light past on No 
such opportunity exists for the Stigleresque who is 
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committed to exactly j* observations on PI and whose interest, 
therefore, is in the total cost of j* observations rather than in 
the manner in which the marginal costs are incurred. The Stigleresque 
searcher will be indifferent between all of the j*! possible search 
paths over the j* sellers offering the j* smallest marginal 
financial search costs. 
If the marginal financial search costs are not independent~ 
an optimal Stigleresque search path is the solution to a dynamic 
programming problem. Furthermore~ the optimal path may be unique 
since, in general, interdependence of marginal costs will ensure 
that variations in the order in which the j* sellers are contacted 
will vary the total financial search cost. The order for an optimal 
path will be determined as part of the solution to the dynamic 
programming problem. In general, this order need not be the same 
as the order in which marginal financial search costs are non-
decreasing. Indeed, such an order may not be possible. Also, 
because of the interdependence of marginal costs, an optimal 
search path need not be a search path over the sellers representing 
the j* smallest marginal financial search costs to the searcher 
(where marginal is with respect to the searcher's state at the 
start of his search). 
Similar arguments can be put forward for the psychic costs 
determined optimal search path described by Proposition 5~4-2. 
An optimal Stigleresque search path where both financial 
and psychic search costs are incurred is more difficult to describe. 
Even if marginal financial search costs are independent and marginal 
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psychic search costs are independent~ there will always be a strong 
dependence between the marginal financial and marginal psychic 
costs of contacting a particular seller. In general, an optimal 
search path for this case appears to be determinate only as the 
solution to a dynamic programming problem. However, if marginal 
financial and psychic search costs are perfectly positively correlated 
(ie, the seller representing the ith smallest marginal financial 
cost to the search also represents the ith smallest marginal psychic 
cost to the searcher. for all i ? 1), then the optimal Stigleresque 
search path can again be characterised by increasing marginal costs, 
This is the result of Proposition 5",4".,3. It is often the case 
that marginal financial and psychic costs are positively correlated. 
For instance, the higher financial cost incurred in travelling to 
a more distant seller would usually be accompanied by incurring 
a higher psychic cost from loss of time used in travelling, the 
additional discomforts of travelling a longer distance and so on. 
Proposition 5-4-3: 
If marginal financial search costs cli and marginal psychic 
m 
search costs Kli are ranked identically with respect to i m• then 
m 
the optimal search path is ii~ ...• ij* where 
j * j * 
L: cli*; L: cli m~l m m=l m 
and 
for any search path il" .• ,i j , 
Proof: 
The ex ante expected net utility from following any search 
252. 
Let ii,. ".,ij be the search path of length j for which 
j 
and L: K1. 1 1 m= m 
5-4-6 
for any search path il~.,.,ij' There are no differences in sellers' 
relative pricing behaviour so 
since ar ---:-j -_. > 0 by (5-2-9). 
E cli ) 
m=l m 
5-4-7 
Combining (5-4-5), (5-4-6) 
5-4-8 
ii, ... ,ij' satisfying (5-4",6), is therefore the preferred search 
path of length j. 
Q,E,D. 
The next section provides some comparative statics results 
for the Stigleresque search model with variable demand~ 
SECTION 5-5: THE DEPENDENCE OF THE QUANTITY OF SEARCH UPON WEALTH, 
PSYCHIC SEARCH COSTS AND THE NATURE OF THE SEARCHED-
FOR COMMODITY 
Section 1-4 showed comparative statics results could be obtained 
in search models with fixed demand restrictions, but only if qualified 
by a that changes in the modelts not 
exceed amounts by the degree of necessari 
possessed by the indifference hyper surfaces these 
models. section shows that no such 
when the model not constrained by a 
The qual examined in Section 1-4 was 
when search costs were present in the model, 
search costs the searcher's disposable wealth and can cause 
a contradiction with the fixed demand restriction if they become 
sufficient ly Section 1~4 examined the restrictions a fixed 
demand xi = ~1 implies for the searcher's utility 
function, Sections 2~1 and 2-7 point out that~ even if the searcher's 
utility function satisfies these restrictions, an assumption that 
xi = Xl is always feasible is still necessary to avoid a 
" with the fixed demand restriction xi = Xl' 
The approach adopted in the search model examined in 
chapter subject to none of these qualifications. Variable 
demand commodity 1 allows both financial and psychic costs 
of search to be included in a neo-classical analysis of consumer 
search models in a natural manner. While the present search 
model is St , the reader is reminded that the same approach 
can be adopted a sequential search model. 
Comparative statics results are presented first for changes 
in P2~' ."Pi' second changes in M, and third for changes in 
marginal psychic search costs, 
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5 5-1' 
If C 0, M) then 
If c 0, ex ante expected net utility at the end of period 1'1 is 
QU) EI(j) Kl(j) 5-5-1 
where EI(j) is the ex ante expected utility exclusive of psychic 
search costs. Proposition 5-3~3 established that EI(j) is increas 
at a decreasing rate with respect to j, 
ie. dEl a 3)= 
5-5-2 
2 min \ , Q h(Pl J ~w) min 
---~-dpl < 0 5-5-3 
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The optimal number of observations, j*, is the solution to (5-3-3). 
dEl Since ar- > 0, the second-order maximisation conditions require 
dEl ar- -
oKI (j) < 
dj as j ; j * 5-5-4 
dK1 , ar- 1S unaffected by a change in Pi so the change in j* is dependent 
h h ,dEl d b h h ' on t e c ange ln ar- cause y t e c ange ln Pi' From (5~5-2), 
J 
u , 
p mml' 
= I ~ dh(Pl J,w) dpmin < ° 
L dPi dj 1 > 
PI 
(a) Suppose 
increased, 
oEI(j) I 
oj j=j * 
< oK(j) I 
oj j=j* 
Therefore, the new optimum j' < j*. 0'* Hence _J - < 0, op, 
1 
5-5-5 
5-5-6 
(b) 
(c) Simi 
Q,E,D, 
Figure illustrates the results of Proposition 5-5-1 for the 
case ------;-- > O. 
Figure 5-5-1 
EI (j) 
K1 (j) 
j' j * j 
E I (j ) ; 
EI(j); 
1 p.=p. 
1 1 
2 p.=p. 
1 1 
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The conclusions of Proposition 5~5~1 are intuitive once it 
a2r 321 . is realised that the signs of min and 3p.3M deterwlne whether 
3Pi3Pl 1 
or not commodity i is a substitute or a complement for commodity 1. 
This can be shown by examining the first-order optimality conditions 
for the constrained indirect utility consumer problem (see Hadar 
[13, p. 201]), 
Comparative statics results are obtained more easily if it is 
assumed, like Stigler~ that the marginal utility of income is 
constant. 
Assumption; ar constant 
aMI -
Then, from (5-5-7) and C5-5~8), 
aI 
- > ° by (5-2-9) so 
aMI 
5-5-8 
5-5-10 
If > 0, then demand for commodity 1 is reduced by an 
increase in p., implying commodity i is a gross complement for 
1 
commodity 1. Since the gains from locating a lower price for 
258. 
corrunodity 1 are thereby reduced, the incentive for additional 
search is also reduced. 
Consequently, j* is reduced by an increase in Pi' 
321 
---m7i-n--- < 0) then demand for corrunodity 1 is increased by 
3P1 3Pi 
If 
an increase in p., implying cOlnmodity i is a gross substitute for 
1 
corrunodity 1. The incentive for locating a lower price for corrunodity 
1 is therefore increased by an increase in p. and j* is thereby 
1 
also increased. 
321 If --~----= 0, then demand for corrunodity 1 is unaffected' 
min 
3Pl 3Pi 
by an increase in p. so that the gains from search are not altered. 
1 
Consequently. j* is unaffected by a change in p .. 
1 
These results are an alternative explanation of the results 
of Proposition 5-5~1, but only for the special case of a constant 
marginal utility of income. 
The effect on j* of a change in the consumer1s initial wealth 
M is now considered. 
Proposition 5~5-2: 
If c :: 0 and if l~:tKI (j) > I(Pi,P2"" ,Pf,M), then 
3j * < 0 3
2r > 
3M :; as 3M3 min 
,. 0, 
< 
PI 
Proof: 
The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of 
Proposition 5-5-1. In Proposition 5~5,.1. (5,.5-2) and (5-5,,3) 
established that 3E~ij) ;> 0 and that 1,)2EI(j) < 0, (5,..5,.4) gave 
oj 2 
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the second-order maximisation conditions as 
-< 
as j > j * 5-5-11 
dK1 . 1.S unaffected by a change in fv1 so the change in j* caused by 
a change U' d d h h . dEl d b h ~l 1.S epen ent on t e c ange 1.n ar- cause y t e 
change in M. 
From (5-5 11), 
~ 0 as ---,-- ~ 0 
> < 
5-5-12 
(a) From (5~5~12) and 11), if M is 
increased, 
oEI I· J * 
oKl (j) 
< 1 j=j * 5-5-13 
* hA1~At'n~A, the new optimum jl < j*. Hence < O. 
260, 
(b) a
2r a'* 
aMa min < 0, then a~ > O. PI 
a2r a'* 
, if 
oMa min 
::: 0, then _J~ ::: O. aM 
PI 
(c) 
Q,E,D. 
As with Proposition 5~5~1. the conclusions of Propos 
a2r 5~5-2 are intuitive once it is realised that the sign of ----~ 
influences whether or not commodity 1 is a superior or 
good, 
Referring to (5~S-7)J 
31 
-> 3M 
a2r aI o and < ° by (5,..2-9) and (5 ... 2-10) and < 0 by 3 min 
PI 
(5-2 .... 7) so 
--~< 0 
'" 
5-5-14 
5-5-15 
5-5-16 
ie. commodity 1 a 3
21 good if < 0 and a neutral or aMap~in '" 
inferior good if --....,........ sufficiently positive. If commodity 1 
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is a superior good» then an increase in wealth M will increase the 
demand for commodity 1 and so increase the gains from search. 
this is the diminuition of the conswner's marginal 
income due to his increased wealth, 
(321 
If ----,-- < 0, 
then commodity 1 is a sufficiently superior good for the increase 
in the gains from search to exceed the increase in the consumer's 
disincentive for search caused by increased wealth diminishing 
his marginal utility of income, Consequently, j* is increased 
2 
by an increase in wealth, If a I, = 0, then, while still a 
aMqp~m 
superior good, commodity 1 is only sufficiently superior for the 
increase in the gains from search to be exactly offset by the 
increase in the consumer's disincentive for search. j* is 
therefore invariant with respect to changes in consumer wealth M, 
d21 If ----~- > Op the increase in the consumer1s disincentive for 
search the increase in the gains from search and j* is 
2 
If 0 I , ff" 1 ----:-. - ~s su ~clent y 
aM'" m~n 
"PI 
decreased by an increase ;in wealth. 
aX1 positive (see (5~5~16)) for ~ < 0, then commodity I is an inferior 
good. An increase in wealth M therefore not only increases the 
consumer's lethargy towards search but also reduces the gains from 
search, j* will therefore decrease more rapidly with respect to 
an increase in M commodity 1 an inferior rather than a neutral 
or superior good, 
The on j* an increase in marginal psychic search 
costs now To allow such changes to be expressed 
formally. psychic costs are regarded as being conditioned 
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by a parameter y, To denote this the psychic cost function is 
written as K(j Iy). The interpretation of y is left open, y may 
represent many factors, For example 1 y may be used to denote 
exogenous factors such as the weather. If search is conducted 
on a face-to-face basis. psychic costs will be higher if it is 
raining than if it is a bright warm sunny day, For analytic 
simplicity it is assumed that marginal changes in K with respect 
to yare either only monotonic increasing with respect to j or 
else only monotonic decreasing with respect to j, In the context 
of the above example~ this is equivalent to saying that, if it 
begins to rain, the additional marginal discomfort of the fourth 
observation on PI is greater than the additional marginal discomfort 
of the third observation and so on, 
Proposition 5~5-3: 
Ifc 
aj * > a:y ;;: 0 as 
Proof; 
In Propositions 5~5,"1 and 5,,.5~2 the second""order maximisation 
conditions for an optimum of j* observations were given as 
8EI(j) 
8j 
as j < j* 
> 
aE~{j) is unaffected by a change in y~ so the change in j* caused 
263. 
oK! (j Iy) 
by a change in y is dependent on the change in caused 
by the change in y, 
(a) 
(j 2Kl (j \Y) 
Suppose > 0, From (5-5-17), if y is increased, 
(jEl I· J * 
* 
5,..5-18 
Therefore, the new optimum jl <: j*. a'* Hence _J_ < 0, oy 
(b) Similarly, if 
()2Kl (j Iy) a"* 
ayaj <: 0, then a~ > O. 5-5-19 
a2Kl (j Iy) a"* 
:::: 0, then _J_ = 0, 
ay (c) Similarly. if 5-5-20 
Q,E,D. 
Figure 525-2 illustrates the results of Proposition 5-5-3 for 
o Kl (j Iy) 
the case of > 0, 
EI (j) 
Kl (j h) 
5-5-2 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
j I j * j 
EI (j) 
K1 (j\Y2) 
Kl (j I y 1) 
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The results of Proposition 5~5~3 are intuitively obvious, 
If all marginal psychic search costs are increased (decreased), 
while marginal expected gains are not altered, then it will be 
optimal to decrease (increase) the number of observations taken 
The expected minimum value of j* observations taken on PI' 
E[p~inlj*], is clearly a function of j*, Variations in parameters 
affecting j* will, therefore, cause variations in the searcher's 
expectations of the minimum observed price. The following Corollary 
shows how E[p~inlj*] is affected by changes in P2"" ,Pt' M and y. 
Corollary 5-5-4: 
If c - 0 and if l~~tK(j Iy) > I(p~'P2, •.• ,Pt,M), then 
(i) 
ClE[ minl'*] PI J > 
o as 
ap. "" .:; 
1. 
ClE[p7in lj*] 
> 
aM o as < (ii) 
(iii) 
Proof; 
aE[p7inlj *J= jP~L 
Therefore, aj* 
PI 
a
2r > 0 
min ;: 
ap i apI 
a
2I > 
aMa min 
~ 0 
< 
PI 
h( mini '* )d min PI J ,w PI 
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Also, 
Combining (5-5-21), (5~5-22) and the result of Lemma 5~3-1 shows 
Combining (5-5-23) and the results of Proposition 5-5-1 proves 
(i) above. 
Combining (5-5-23) and the results of Proposition 5,..5 ... 2 proves 
(ii) above. 
Combining (5~5-23) and the results of Proposition 5-5-3 proves 
(iii) above. 
Q.E,D, 
This thesis has, to this point, treated sequential and 
Stigleresque search behaviours separately. Sequential search 
was examined in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 wherein the sequential search 
models of Rothschild, Telser, Axell and Gastwirth were extended 
considerably. This chapter has made considerable extensions to 
the Stigleresque search model. The advantages of analysing either 
kind of search behaviour in utility rather than financial terms 
have been demonstrated and a much larger collection of comparative 
statics results have been assembled than was possible in the 
theoretical frameworks of these authors, In Section 1-4 it was 
promised that both Stigleresque and sequential search behaviours 
would be demonstrated to be opposite extremes of a more general 
form of adaptive search behaviour, called "gen~ralised search". The 
promised demonstration is part of the development and analysis 
of the generalised search model presented in Chapter 6. 
CHAPTER VI 
GENERALISED SEARCH 
SECTION 6-1: MOTIVATION OF GENERALISED SEARCH THEORY 
266. 
The incomplete fashion in which the literature on search problems 
specifies the ways in which time constrains search is described in 
Section 1-3 as one of the two greatest deficiencies in the search 
literature. In that section, three examples were provided which 
demonstrated that time constraints had an important influence in determin-
ing an individual's optimal search behaviour. The last of these examples 
was one in which the searcher could choose to take any number 
observations on PI in any period and could extend his search over many 
periods, This type of adaptive search behaviour was termed 
"generalised search". It was claimed that Stigleresque and 
sequential search behaviours are special cases of this more 
behaviour. the constraints of the problem faced by a searcher 
are such that, at the end of period Tl , the expected marginal net 
gains from continuing search are always negative, then the generalised 
search rule takes on the characteristics of the Stigleresque search 
rule. If the constraints of the problem are such that, in any period, 
the expected marginal net gains from more than one observation on PI 
are always negative, then the generalised search rule takes on the 
characteristics of the sequential search rule. Generalised search 
behaviour emerges from 
are relaxed. 
two of its extremes as these constraints 
It is easy to visualise how a change in what one might call the 
"technology of search" can cause this emergence. Modern society 
has developed a variety of to communication and search. 
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Telephones, television, radio, mail services, advertising and motor 
vehicles have all endowed the modern searcher with the ability to make 
observations on prices far more rapidly and at a far smaller cost than 
his ancestors. Rising technological levels thus relax the constraints 
faced by a searcher and can cause his search behaviour to be described 
completely by neither Stigleresque nor sequential search patterns. 
The notation required for the description of the generalised 
search problem was presented in Sections 1~4 and 2-2 and is listed 
alphabetically in Appendix 1 for the reader's convenience, along with 
all the notation used in all other sections of the thesis. A resume 
of the generalised search notation is given here as part of the 
motivation of generalised search and to assist the reader in his 
comprehension of later sections of this chapter. 
Unlike sequential or Stigleresque search, a generalised search 
may last any number of periods and any number of observations may 
be taken in any of these periods. The generalised search rule 
describing this behaviour is written in Section 1-4 as an ordered 
triple p = (~,v,o) where ~ is a stopping rule, v is an observation 
number rule and 0 is a terminal decision procedure. 
If using search rule p results in a search persisting over 
periods TI, ... ,T j and if the numbers of observations on PI made 
in these periods are nl , •. '. ,n j , the searcher's terminal action space 
is 
A. = {aO,all, ••• ,al 1" •. ,a. l , ... ,a. } 6-1-1 J n l J Jnj 
Terminal action aO is to purchase none of commodity 1. Terminal action 
aik is to purchase a positive quantity of commodity I from the kth 
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seller contacted in the ith period. Given the vector of price 
observations Yj = (p~l"",p{nj)p defined by (1~4-14), ° selects 
an element from Aj,o(Yj) ;:;: aik € Aj . In general, therefore, 
6-1-2 
Note that if j = 0, the terminal action space is AO = {aO} ie. a 
non-zero quantity of commodity 1 can be demanded only if at least one 
seller is contacted for a price quotation. Hence, 
for any terminal decision procedure 0, 6-1-3 
The number of observations taken in period T. 1 is n. 1 where J+ J+ 
n. 1 is a non-negative integer. The J+ 
the beginning of period T. l' is not J+ 
value n. 1 is determined at J+ 
altered throughout period T. 1 
, J + 
and depends upon the values of prices observed in periods T1,.,.,T j 
and upon the terminal action selected by the terminal decision 
procedure 0. For instance, if o(y.) :: aO for all j :;:: 0, there is J 
nothing to be gained by selecting a value nj+1 > 0 since none of 
commodity 1 will ever be purchased. Given the vector of price 
observations y. and the terminal decision procedure 0, the observation 
J 
number rule v determines n. 1 € 1+, the set of non-negative integers. J+ 
In general, therefore, 
x ,., x "00 6-1-4 
The jth component of the stopping rule t;, is t;,j' t;,j determines 
whether or not search is carried on past the end of period T .. If 
J 
t;,.(y.) = S. ;:;: 0, search is carried on at least to the end of period 
J J J 
T. l' If t;,. (y.) ;:;: S. ;:;: 1, search is halted at the end of period T .. J+ J J J J 
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Once stopped, search is never reco~nenced. It , however, possible 
that = ° and nj+l = ° so that, although search carries on through 
period Tj +1, no observations on PI are taken in period Tj+l' Such 
an action is rational only if more observations are taken on PI in a 
later period; ie. some n > ° where r > j+1 and where S. 1 
r J+ 
0. Calling a temporary halt to the taking of observations on PI 
is not an uncommon real life search phenomenon. For some reason search 
costs may be very high in period T. 1 compared to costs in period 
J+ 
Tj+2' Temporary halts are a phenomenon which cannot be encompassed 
by either of the narrower Stigleresque or sequential search frameworks. 
A Stigleresque search, by definition, lasts only to the end of period 
TI , A sequential search requires that exactly one observation on PI 
is taken in every period over which search persists. A sequential searcher 
thus does not have the freedom of not taking his single observation in 
some period Ti and then taking single observations in periods 
subsequent to period T .. If search is halted at the end of period T., 
1 J 
no observations are taken on PI in any subsequent period. Hence, 
Sj = 1 implies nr = 0 for all r ~ j+l. The converse is also true. 
Given a vector of price observations y., an observation number rule 
J 
v and a terminal decision procedure 0, the stopping rule ~ determines 
. ~.(y.) s {O,I}. In general, therefore, 
J J 
X 11 t' -+ {O,!} x {O,!} x.,. 6-1-5 
The optimal ised search rule is an adaptive rule which is 
used by the searcher in the following manner. At the beginning of 
the period searcher assesses the present values of all the 
net ut from search expected at the end of all periods in which 
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it is possible for him to search. These net utilities clearly depend 
upon the searcher's optimal terminal decision procedure 8*. For 
a given sequence n l ,n 2 , ••• of numbers of observations on PI in periods 
Tl ,T2, ... the searcher is able to decide at the end of which period he 
expects the highest present valued net utility. If this maximum is 
now, the searcher will not search and so So = 1. If this maximum is 
expected in some subsequent period, the searcher will search through 
at least the first period T1 so So => O. The magnitude and expected 
position of the maximum expected net utility depends upon the values 
of n1 ,n2 , .••• There will be a sequence nrJn~, .•. for which the 
magnitude of the highest present valued expected net utility is 
greatest. The sequence ni1nz"" and the corresponding sequence 
So~Si"" are the values given ex ante by the searcher to the elements 
of his optimal stopping rule s* and his optimal observation number 
rule v*, Only the first elements of s* and v* are binding on the searcher. 
If So = 0 and nr = m, search proceeds through period T1, and exactly 
m observations are taken on PI' At the end of period T1 , the searcher 
will reassess the values Sr,SZ"" and nZ,n3"., in the light of the 
. 11 1m 
values of his m observatIons PI "."P1 on PI' The same decision 
process undertaken at the start of period T1 is now undertaken again 
at the start of period T2, Such adaptive behaviour is a direct 
consequence of applying Bellman's principle of optimality, 
The marginal financial search cost of taking the kth observation 
in the ith period is cik ' The number of observations taken in the 
ith period is ni ~ O. Therefore, by the end of period T' 1 the J 
accumulated financial cost of search is c(j) , defined by (1-4~16) as 
c (j) = 
j 
l: 
i=l 
n. 
1 
1: 
k=l 
6-1-6 
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The searcher's net wealth at this point of his search is 
M. = M - c(j), If search stops at the end of period T. and if the 
J J 
terminal decision procedure 0 selects action aO' the searcher will 
allocate his net wealth of M. = M ~ c(j) to purchases of commodities 
J 
2 to t. If 0 selects action a ik f aO then the searcher has chosen to 
purchase a positive quantity of commodity 1 and, in so doing, may 
have chosen to incur a transaction cost tik' The searcher will be left 
with a net wealth of only ~. ~ t. k) to allocate to purchases of J 1 
commodities 1 to t. 
The psychic search cost of taking n. observations in the ith 
1 
period is K(i,n i ). 
Given a discount rate a) the present value of the searcher's 
ex ante expected net utility from using a generalised search rule 
Definition: 
Vo(~,V,o) is the present valued ex ante expected net utility 
from search conducted according to the generalised search rule 
p = (~,v,o). 
(1-4-22) defines the optimal search rule p* ~ (~*,v*,o*) as 
the search rule which maximises the present valued ex ante expected 
net utility from search, Hence, p* must have the property that 
6-1-7 
for any search rule p = (s.v,o). 
Definition; 
v. (~)v,o) is the present value, at the end of period T., of 
J J 
the expected net utility from search conducted according to the 
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search rule p = (~,v>8). 
V. ,v,o) 
J 
the greater of the utility attainable at the end 
of T. and the present valued searcherts of the net 
J 
utility e from continuing search past the end period T. 
J 
according to the search rule p = (~.v,o). 
Section 6~2 develops the optimal stopping rule component ~* of 
p*, Section 6~3 develops the optimal observation number rule component 
v* and Section 6"4 develops the optimal terminal decision procedure 8*. 
The results of Sections 6~2, 6~3 and 6~4 are combined in Section 6-5 
to prove optimality of p*, The conditions under which Stigleresque 
and sequential search behaviours coincide with the more generally 
optimal generalised search behaviour are examined more formally in 
Section 6",6. 
SECTION 6-2: THE OPTIMAL GENERALISED SEARCH STOPPING RULE 
In Sections 1-4 and 6-1 1 the optimal generalised search rule 
is described as an application of Bellman's principle of optimality. 
The flavour of Bellman's principle is seen in the construction of the 
optimal sequential stopping rule constructed in Section 2-3. The 
stopping rule component ~* of the optimal generalised search rule p* 
is shown this to also be a backward induction stopping rule. 
1; * is an adapt stopping rule \\Ihich continues search up to the 
point where the expects that net utility cannot be increased 
by additional search. 
The search models discussed in Chapter 2 excluded psychic search 
costs. The inclusion psychic costs and the observation number rule 
in the generalised search model make necessary a second presentation 
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of the construction of the backward induction stopping rule, As 
in Chapter 2, it is initially assumed that only a finite number of search 
periods exist, This restriction is later shown to be redundant for 
all realistic search situations but it is temporarily useful in 
constructing p* and proving its optimality. 
Assumptionl There is only a finite number J of search periods. 6-2-1 
The presence of assumption (6-2-1) will be denoted by a superscript J, 
J For instance, a stopping rule ~ will be denoted by ~ and the present 
valued ex ante expected net utility from the use of a generalised 
J J J, _..1 J J 
search rule p = (~ ,v ,0) wlll be denoted by VO(~ ,v ,0). 
Definition: 
~bJ is the backward induction stopping rule when there are 
only J <: 00 search periods, 6-2-2 
Definition: 
J* ~ is an optimal stopping rule if and only if 
_~T J* J J J J 
Vo (~ ,v, 0 ) <: V 0 (~ ,v , 0 ) 6-2-3 
J for any observation number rule v and any terminal 
decision procedure 0, 
The construction of ~bJ is presented for any given vJ and O. 
Proposition 6-2-1 shows that, subject to assumption (6-2-1), ~bJ 
is an optimal stopping rule ie, the present valued ex ante expected 
net utility from search using ~bJ cannot be exceeded by using any other 
stopping rule, 
. . f h k ddt' st . Rule :bJ,. Der~vat~on 0 t e Bac war In uc ~on opp~nq ~ 
The backward induction stopping rule ~bJ is 
6-2-4 
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0, if search is to continue through period 1 
where (y. ) 
1 6-2-5 
1, if search is to stop at the end of 
for all i 0,1" •• ,J-l. Since it is assumed that only J search 
periods exist, search cannot persist past the end of period Tr 
Hence, 
6-2-6 
the searcher finds himself at the end period TJ , his 
11 In 
vector of observed prices is YJ = (PI , ... ,Pl J). For a given 
terminal decision procedure 0, the searcher1s attainable utility 
at the end of period TJ is I(o(yJ )). By definition, 
VJ
J ( 1:' bJ ,\)J . ~) I (1) ( ) ) 
'" ,IJ;::; IJ YJ 6-2-7 
Suppose the searcher finds himself at the end of period TJ _1. 
11 J-l,n The vector of his observed prices is YJ-l :::: (PI , ... ,PI J-1). 
If he chooses to stop searching at this point the attainable utility 
I(o(yJ _1)), If he chooses to continue his search through period 
TJ he must choose some number nJ of observations on PI to make in 
period TJ . The present value of the net utility the searcher expects 
to attain at the end of period TJ by taking nJ extra observations is 
:::: (1 6-2-8 
by (6-2-7), If the net utility exceeds I(o(YJ~I)) the searcher expects 
that the present value of the utility attainable by searching on 
through period TJ exceeds the utility ly attainable. 
i;bJ 
J-1 
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is defined so that the searcher continues his search through period 
T if and only J this action provides a higher valued 
expected net utility. 
SbJ = 
J-l 
By definition, 
( J bJ J I 10' if I(o(YJ_l)) < (hCi)(E[VJCt;; ,\) ,0) YJ - 1] 
K(J ,nJ )) 
6-2-9 
6- 2-10 
Hence, (6-2-9) is equivalent to 
6-2-11 
Now suppose the searcher finds himself at the end of period 
TJ _2, The utility attainable now is I(o(YJ_2))' The present value 
of the expected net utility of making nJ _1 observations in period 
TJ _1 and nJ observations in period TJ is 
6-2-12 
Note that, if nJ 0, then the searcher anticipates stopping his 
search at the end of period TJ _1 , The searcher's expectation at the 
end of period TJ _2 of the present value of the net utility attainable 
from search is 
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~J bJ J VJ_2 (1; ,\! ,8) == max{I(8(YJ_2)),(1~a) (E[IC6(YJ":"'l)) I>'J""<2J - K(J-l,nJ _1)), 
2 (I-a) CE[I(8(YJ))iYJ_2J ~ (1- a)K(J-l,nJ _1) 
6-2-13 
== max{I(o(YJ_2))' (1-a) (max{E[I(8(YJ~1)) lyJ - 2], 6-2-14 
(I-a) (E[I(8(yJ )) IYJ-2] - K(J,nJ ))} - K(J-1,nJ _1))} 
J bJ J 1 
== max{I(8(YJ_2)),(1-a) (E[VJ _1(1; ,v ,8) YJ-2 J 
- K(J-l,nJ _1))} 
1;~~2 is defined so that the searcher continues his search through 
period TJ _1 if and only if this action provides a higher present 
valued expected net utility. 
:: SbJ = 
J-2 
6-2-15 
6-2-16 
Continuing the backward induction in this manner for j = J-3, ... ,2,1,0 
shows that the present value, at the end of period T" of the expected 
J 
net utility from search is 
-~ T bJ J J bJ J 1 V~(I; ,\! ,8) = max {I (8 (y.)), (l-a)(E[V. 1(1; ,\! ,8) y,] - K(j+l,n)'+l))} J' J J+ J 
6-2-17 
and that the jth element of the backward induction stopping rule is 
0, if 1(0 (y , )) 
J 
# V~ (I; bJ , \! J , 8) 
J 
bJ S?J 6-2-18 1;, (y,) ::; ::; 
J J J 
1. if I ( 0 (y . ) ) 
. J 
::; V~(l;bJ,\!J,o) 
J 
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j = 0,1",.,J-1. Recall that the Jth element of sbJ is defined 
to be identically unity by (6-2-6), 
This completes the construction of the backward induction stopping 
rule the generalised search model restricted by assumption (6-2-1), 
The proof of the optimality of the backward induction stopping rule 
sbJ for the generalised search model is given by Proposition 6-2 1 and 
is similar to the proof of Proposition 2-5~3 which established the 
optimality of a backward induction stopping rule for the sequential 
search modeL Like Proposition 2-5~31 the proof of Proposition 6-2-1 
relies upon successive applications of Lemma 2~5~2. 
If there is only a finite number J of search periods, then the 
backward induction stopping rule sbJ is an optimal stopping rule. 
e.roof j 
sbJ is an optimal stopping rule if and only if 
J bJ J J J J Vo(s ,v ,0) ~ VO(s ,v ,0) 6-2-19 
for any stopping rule sJ, any observation number rule vJ and any terminal 
decision procedure o. From (6-2-17) and (6~2-18), 
K(1,n1))} 6-2-20 
6-2-21 
Again from (6,2-17) and (6-2",18), 
6-2-22 
6-2-23 
Substituting (6-2-23) into (6 .. 2,.,21) gives 
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Expanding (6-2-24) in this fashion up to the Jth term gives the present 
value of the searcher's ex ante expected net utility from search 
according to a generalised search rule pJ = (sJ. vJ,8) as 
J J (I"SJ_2)(I-a)(E[SJpl I (8(YJ_l)) + 
J J I (I-SJ~I)(I-a)(E[SJI(8(YJ)) YJ-l] 
Recall from (6-1-5) that the jth stopping rule component s~ is a 
J 
6-2-25 
6-2-26 
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2 
v 
- E (l-a) K(v,n )} + 
v=l v 
.J-l 
v 
- E (l-a) K(v,n )} + 
v=l v 
6-2-27 
The jth individual integral, j = 0 •...• J-1. of the nest of 
integrals (6-2-27) is 
J 
U J U P1 PI J j 
... [S.{(1-a) I(o(y.)) 
L L J J 
P1 PI 
j v 
- E (I-a) K(v,n )} + 
v 
v=1 
JP~ jP~ (I-S~)(1-a) ... [ ... ]f (y. 1 iy .)dy. 1]f (y.\y. 1)dy. 6-2-28 J L L· g J+ J J+ g J]- J PI P1 
which is an integral of the type considered in Lemma 2-5- 2. Applying 
Lemma 2-5-2 shows the function t;,~(y.) which maximises (6,..2-28) is 
J J 
J* t;,. (y.) where 
J J 
* J* (y.) S. 
J J 
ie. 
J* J* ~. (y.) S. 
J J J 
ie. 
J* J* ~. (y.) S. '" 
J J J 
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j j v 
0, (1-~)' I(6(y.)) - l: (1~~) K(v n ) 
J v~l v 
j 
max{(l-a)jI(o(y.)) - E ( 
J v=l 
v K(v.n ). 
v 
6-2-29 
(1 ) j+l(E[VJ (rJ* J ') I ] K(' 1 )) 
-Ci, j + 1'" > \) > 6 Y j J + > + 1 -
j v 
I: (1-a) K(V,n ) 
v=l v 
1, otherwise 
0, I(o(y.)) # max{I(o(y.)),(l-a)(E(~ 1(t;,J*,vJ ,o)ly.] 
J J J + J 
J J* J O. 1(0 (y . )) :f. V. (t;, ,v, 0) 
J J 
J J* J 1, I ( ° (y . )) = V. (~ ,v, 0) 
J J 
K(j+l.n· 1))} J+ 
6-2-30 
J J* J [V. 1(~ ,v ,0) ly·] J+ J 
- K(j+l,n. 1))} J+ 
6-2-31 
Comparison of (6-2-31) and (6-2-18) shows 
J* bJ j = O, .•• ,J. Hence t;, ~ t;, and 
c bJ d h' . 
..,. an t lS 1S true 
J 
, from (2-5-15), 
(6-2-2) and (6-2-3) 
2 
v 
- I: (I-a) K (v, n )" .. , 
v=l v 
6-2-32 
(YJ-l!YJ-Z) dYJ-l ",Jfg(Y2!Yl)dY2]fg(Yl)dYl] 
V~(~bJ)VJ.o) 
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6-2-33 
for any stopping rule ~J, any observation number rule vJ and any 
terminal decision procedure 0, 
Q.E.D. 
This completes the first steps in the specification of 
optimal generalised search rule and in the proof of optimality, 
Since ~bJ has been proved to be an optimal stopping rule. 
denoted from here on by ~J*. 
J* The construction and proof of the optimality of ~ have been 
presented for any observation number rule vJ and any terminal decision 
procedure 0, The utility attainable from search clearly depends upon 
the choice of vJ and o. The next section constructs the optimal 
J* 
observation number rule v and proves its optimality, 
One of the characteristics of sequential search 
from Stlgleresque search is that a sequent search rule has a 
stopping rule component not subject to the restriction 
Sl = 1, The reader will have noticed formal 
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similarities between the development of the optimal generalised 
search stopping rule and the optimal sequential search stopping rule 
developed in Chapter 2. The inclusion of an adaptive stopping rule 
in the generalised search rule is one of the two factors which causes 
generalised search to contain sequential search as a special case while 
also containing Stigleresque search as a special case. Conversely, 
one of the characteristics of Stigleresque search which distinguishes 
it from sequential search is that a Stigleresque search rule has an 
observation number rule not subject to the restriction that n1 = 1 
always. The inclusion of an adaptive observation number rule in the 
generalised search rule is the second factor which causes generalised 
search to contain both Stigleresque and sequential search as special 
cases, In the next section the reader will note several formal similarities 
between the development of the optimal generalised search observation 
number rule and the discussion in Chapter 5 of the determination of 
the optimal number of observations taken by a Stigleresque searcher. 
SECTION 6~3: THE OPTIMAL GENERALISED SEARCH OBSERVATION NUMBER RULE 
The optimal stopping rule ~J* has been shown to be a backward 
induction rule, subject to assumption (6-2-1). Subject to the same 
J* 
assumption, the optimal observation number rule \I is shown in this 
section to also be a backward induction rule. 
The discussion of this section considers observation number rules 
only in the context of their being used with the optimal stopping 
J* 
rule ~ . The objective of the generalised search problem is to 
maximise$ with respect to ~, \I and 0, the present valued ex ante 
283, 
attainable from search . 6-2-1 proved expected net 
.. ~T J* 
that VO(~ ,0) V~(~J VJ~6] for any observation number rule vJ 
and any terminal procedure O. 
optimal 
its use in unct 
Definition: 
J* 
rule v is 
\'dth any stopping rule 
J* 
v is an optimal observation number rule 
J J* J* J J* J 
VOCl; ,\) ~o) ~ VO(~ ,v ~o) 
for any observation number rule vJ and any 
constructing the 
consider 
and . " lL 
6-3-1 
decision procedure 0, 
It is convenient to introduce the following notation. 
Definition: 
J J J J For any observation number rule v = (\)0'\)1""'\)J-1) the 
vector the vector of the last (J-j) components of \) J 
ie. 6-3-2 
Definition: 
\)bJ is the backward induction observation number rule when 
there are only J < 00 search periods. 6-3-3 
bJ Rule \) 
The backward induction observation number rule vbJ is 
such that 
where n~J 
1 
bJ bJ 
\) ::: \) 
-0 
bJ \). (y.) '" 
J J 
bJ 
n. 1 
-J+ 
the number of observations on 
intends, at the end of period Tj • to take 
6-3-4 
0" .• 1 6-3-5 
that the searcher 
the searcher finds himself at the end of period TJ_l' 
11 J-1,n His vector of observed prices is YJ~.l :::: (PI"" ,PI J-l). If 
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he at this point, the attainable is 
If he continues on and takes n7 
J 
value of the net utility he 
Let nJ be such that 
for all nJ ~ 0, 
in 
to attain is 
6-3-6 
6-3-8 
then the action of highest present valued expected net utility is to 
continue search and take nJ observations on PI period T J' If 
6-3-9 
then the action of highest present valued expected net utility is to 
stop searching now> at the end of period TJ _I . v~J is defined as 
bJ ::: n ::: 
:.;r 
Comparing (6-2-8), (6-2-9) and (6-2-10) to 
may be written in the form of (6-2 11) as 
K(J,nJ)) 
6-3-10 
K(J,nJ)) 
10) shows (6-3-10) 
J~' bJ 
1(1; ,v ,6) 
J J* bJ VJ _1Ct; ,v ,6) 
6-3-11 
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Comparison of (6~3-11) and (6-2",11) shows that 
(i) bJ 0 if and only if J* 1 6,.3~12 nJ ;: SJ_l ;: 
(li) bJ > 0 if and only if J* 0 6- 3-13 nJ SJ_l '" 
(6-3-12) and (6-3-13) formally express the idea, advanced intuitively 
earlier, that if a search has persisted to the end of period TJ _1, 
then it is continued past the end of period TJ~1 if and only if at 
least one observation on PI is to be taken in period TJ , 
Now suppose the searcher finds himself at the end of period 
TJ~2' His vector of observed prices is YJ~2 ;: 11 J-2,n (PI ,." ,PI J~2), 
I(8(YJ~2)) is the attainable utility if the searcher stops his search 
at the end of period TJ~2' The searcher has the option of continuing 
his search past the end of period TJ~2' Suppose the searcher considers 
taking nJ ""l observations on PI in period TJ _1 and nJ observations on 
PI in period TJ' Note that nJ '" 0 implies, by (6-3-12), that the 
searcher intends to halt his search at the end of period TJ_1' Note 
also that it is possible for nJ~l '" 0 and nJ > 0, It will be shown 
1 (cf. the above comments on 
(6-3-12) and (6-3,..13)), The present value of the expected net 
utility attained by taking nJ ,.1 and nJ observations in periods TJ _1 
and TJ is 
(I-a) (E[max{I(8(YJ~I)) ,(1-a) (E[I(8(YJ)) IYJ",l,nJ _p IlJ ] -
K(J,nJ ))}I YJ_2,nJ _1] - K(J-l,nJ _1)) 
6-3-14 
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6-3-15 
6-3-16 
then the action of highest present valued expected net utility is to 
continue search and to take nJ_,l observations on PI in period TJ_l' 
If 
6-3-17 
then the action of highest present valued expected net utility is to 
stop search now, at the end of period TJ _2 , C 1 
bJ . 
onsequent y vJ _2 1S 
defined as 
[
cnJ_1.nj ), if I(6CYJ_2)) < (I-a) (E[max{I(6(yJ _1)), 
(1-a)(E[I(6(yJ))I YJ_l,nj_l,njl -
K(J,nj))}1 ,nj_l] - K(J-l,nj_l)) 6~3 
CO,O), if ICoCYJ _2)) 2; (l-aHE[max{I(o(YJ_l)). 
(1-a)(E[I(o(yJ ))I YJ_l 1nj_l,njJ -
K(J,nJ))}IYJ~2,nj~1] - K(J~l,nJ_l)) 
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By definition, 
max{I(o(YJ_2)),(1-a)(E[max{I(o(YJ_1)),(1-a)(E[I(o(YJ)) \YJ_l,nJ_1,nJ] -
K(J,nj))}\YJ_2,nJ_I J - K(J-l,nJ_1))} 
= max{r (o(YJ_2))' (l~a) (E[V~_l (I;J* ,vbJ ,6) IYJ"l,nJ_l,nJ] 
K(J-l,nJ_1))} 6-3-19 
J J* bJ 
= VJ _2 (1; ,v ,0) 6-3-20 
bJ By substituting (6-3~20) into (6-3~18), vJ~2(YJ-2) can be written as 
_~T J* bJ (nj_l,nj), if I(0(YJ_2)) 1- VJ_2 (1; ,v ,0) 
6-3-21 
(0,0), if I(0(YJ _2)) 
Continuing the backward induction in this manner for j = J-3, ... ,2,1,O 
shows that the present value, at the end of period Tj , of the expected 
net utility from search conducted according to the generalised search 
J J* bJ 
rule p = (s ,v ,0) is, for all j = 0,1, ... ,J-l, 
_~T J* bJ _~T J* bJ I bJ V~(I; ,v ,0) = max{I(o(y.)),(l-a)(E[V~ 1(1; ,v ,0) y.,n. 1] -) J ' J + J -) + 
bJ 
where n. 1 
-J+ 
K (j + 1 , n ~J 1) ) } 
J+ 
IJ 
= n. 1 = Cn! 1,·.·,nJ') such that -J+ J+ 
_~T J* bJ \ i J E[V~ 1(1; ,v ,0) y.,n. 1] - K(j+1,n! 1) J + J -) + J+ 
J J* J \ J . ~ E[V. l(S ,v ,0) y.,n. 1] - K(]+1,n. 1) J+ J -J+ J + 
J for all ~j+1 = (n j +1"",nJ ), and shows that 
6-3-22 
6-3-23 
( Ii) 'f I(Je( )) I VJ.(CJ*.VbJ,Je) n. 1"'" nJ • 1 IJ y. r s, IJ J+ J J . 
bJ bJ 
v. (y.) 
J J '" ~j+1 '" 
Comparison of (6-,3~24) and (6-2-18) shows that 
(i) 
Cii) 
J bJ J* ~ n. ~ ° if and only if I;J' (YJ') = 
.. 1 1 l~J+ 
J bJ J* ~ n. > ° if and only if 1;. (y.) = 
. . 1 1 J J l=J+ 
J* S. 
J 
J* S. 
J 
= 1 
= ° 
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6-3-24 
6-3-25 
6-3-26 
This completes the construction of the backward induction observation 
number rule vbJ for the generalised search model restricted by 
assumption (6~2-1), J* Some similarities and differences between I; 
bJ 
and v are worthwhile considering. The method of construction of 
each is similar. At the end of period T., where j = O, .. "J-1, the 
J 
J* J* 
searcher assesses the value S. of 1;. (y.) and the values of the 
J J J 
. bJ bJ bJ bJ 
observat1on number rule elements (n. 1, •.. ,nJ ) = n. 1 '" v. (y.). J + -J+ J J 
J* bJ If S. = 1 then, by (6~3~25), n. 1 = (0, •.. ,0) since search is 
J ~+ 
stopped now, at the 
bJ 
n. 1 r (0,.",0) and 
-J+ 
period T. l' At the J+ 
J* 
end of period T., If S. = ° then, by (6-3-26), 
J J 
n~:l ~ ° observations on PI are taken throughout 
end of period T. l' the searcher assesses the value J+ 
J* J* S. 1 of 1;. l(Y' 1) and the new values of the observation number rule 
J+ J+ J+ 
bJ bJ bJ bJ 
elements (n. 2,.,.,nJ ) = n. 2 = v. 1CY, 1)' TIlis process is repeated J+ -J+ J+ J+ 
until either the searcher chooses to halt his search or the end of 
the last period TJ is reached. 
The proof that the backward induction observation number rule 
is an optimal observation number rule is given in Proposition 6-3-1 
289, 
and is similar to the proof given in Proposition 6-2~1 for the 
optimality of the backward induction stopping rule, 
Proposition 6-3-1: 
If there is only a finite number J of search periods, then the 
bJ backward induction observation number rule v is an optimal 
observation number rule, 
Proof; 
v
bJ is an optimal observation number rule if and only if 
6-3-27 
for any observation number rule vJ and any terminal decision procedure 
8, 
... 
" . 
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{ J",1 m~x (I-a) I(8(YJ~I)) 
~-1 
6-3-28 
j U j U P PI 1 2 2 V bJ max[(I~a) I(o(Y2))~ E (I-a) K(v,nv ), •. ,~ L v=1 L 
PI Pi 
J-1 J-1 V bJ jP~ (1 a) I(o(yJ _1))- I: (1"'0:) K(v,nv L 
v=l L 
Pi 
J 
E (1-a)vK(V,n~J)]fg(YJIYJ~1)dYJ]fg(YJ~1IYJ_2)dYJ_l .,,] 
6-3-30 
by (6~3 22) and (6-3-23). 
Q,E.D, 
This completes the second step in the specification of the 
optimal generalised search rule p* and in the proof of s optimality. 
\)bJ has b db' 1 b . b 1 een prove to e an optlma 0 servatlon num er ru e 
J* is denoted from here on by \) ie. 
bJ J* 
\) - \) 
The third and last step in the specification of p* the 
specificatio~ of the optimal terminal decision procedure 0*. This 
the subject of Section 6-4. 
SECTION 6-4: THE OPTIMAL GENERALISED SEARCH TERMINAL DECISION PROCEDURE 
The present valued ex ante expected net utility from search 
conducted according to the optimal stopping rule and the optimal 
J* 
observation number rule \) is dependent upon the terminal decision 
procedure 0 used, The objective in constructing an optimal generalised 
search rule is to describe a search behaviour which the searcher 
expects ex ante to yield him the greatest present valued net utility 
from search. Consequently, an optimal terminal decision procedure 
8* need be discussed only in the context of a search 
J* 
rule which uses an optimal stopping rule s and an optimal observation 
J* 
number rule \) since Propos'itions 6",2-1 and 6-3,,1 that 
_~J J* J* _J J J 
Vo (t; , v 1 0 ) ~ V 0 ( S ,v , <5 ) 
any generalised search rule pJ = (l;J,\)J,o), An optimal terminal 
sion procedure 0* is therefore defined as having the property 
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of maximising the value of the ex ante expected net utility 
J* J* from search when used in conjunction with ~ and v , 
Definition: 
6* is an optimal terminal decision procedure if and only if 
for any terminal decision procedure 0, 
In Chapter 2, where the search model was to sequential 
search and zero-one demand for commodity I, 0* was shown to choose 
between two types of terminal action. The searcher either purchased 
zero units of commodity 1 or else he purchased one unit of commodity 
1 from the seller whose combined quoted selling price and transaction 
cost was the smallest observed, In simpler previous consumer search 
models (eg, [43)~ [50])~ the first terminal action is assumed to 
never be optimal so that demand for commodity 1 fixed at one unit. 
In this case the optimal terminal decision procedure was shown to be 
equivalent to a procedure with an objective of minimising the total 
expenditure on commodity 1, When demand is continuously variable 
with respect to prices and wealth 1 such an expenditure minimising 
terminal decision procedure is usually not optimal, Whether or not 
expenditure on commodity 1 rises or falls with changes in wealth and 
the price of commodity 1 depends on the consumer 1 s income and price 
elasticities of demand commodity I, 
Proposition 6-4~1 ishes what one would from 
applying Bellman's principle of optimality to the problem of 
choosing a terminal decision procedure. 0* is the terminal decision 
procedure which~ if search halts at the end of period Tj' selects the 
terminal action a* € A. which maximises the utility attainable at the 
J 
end of period T., The 
J 
of 6* depends upon the nature of the costs 
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faced by the searcher and, in general, there is no simple way of 
expressing 0* as a function of costs and observed prices, However, 
Proposition 6-4-2 shows that if transaction costs are the same for all 
sellers, then 0* has a simpler form - if 0* does not select action 
ao' to purchase zero units of commodity 1, then 0* selects the terminal 
action of purchasing the quantity of commodity 1 demanded from the 
seller who offered the lowest price. 
Proposition 6-4-1: 
The optimal terminal decision procedure 0* is such that, if 
search halts at the end of period T. for any j = O, ... ,J, then 
J 
o*(y.) = a* where l(a*) ~ lCa) for all terminal actions a EA .. 
J J 
Proof; 
0* is an optimal terminal decision procedure if and only if 
for any terminal decision procedure O. 8* is such that 
l(o*(Yj)) ~ lCa) for all a E Aj • for any j ; O, ••. ,J. 
Hence l(o*(Yj)) ~ l(oCYj)) for any j = O •••• ,J and for 6-4-4 
any terminal decision procedure O. From (6~3-28), for any 0, 
" . 
2 
l: (1 
v=1 f 
U 
PI 
,., max[max {e1 
L J 
P1 !.;)·",1 
f 
U P1 
••• max[max{(1-a)max l(a)~Cl-a)K(1,nl)' 
L J a8A1 P1 ~1 
~~ 2 
J 
2 v max[max{(l~a) max I(a)- E (1-a) K(v,nv)" .,' L J a8A2 v=1 P1 ~2 
rp~ . J-1 
J
' max[max {(1-a) max l(a) 
L J at:AJ _1 P1 !;J-1 
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6-4 .. 6 
295, 
6-4-7 
6-4-8 
Q.E.D, 
At the end of period T. the searcher has made a total of 
j J* J 
b n. observations on PI and his wealth. net of financial search 
i:::::l 1 
costs, M. = M - c Cj). J 0* selects the utility maximising terminal j J* 
action a* from the ( b n. + 1) terminal actions contained in the 
1 1 
terminal action space A .. 
J 
Suppose the optimal terminal action is aO' Then the searcher 
allocates wealth of M. to purchases of conwodities 2 to t. The 
J 
optimality action aO requires that the prices observed for 
commodity 1 are all such that the searcher willingly demands none 
of commodity 1 from any of the sellers contacted during search. 
The defined as the smallest price for commodity 1 
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for which a consumer with wealth M. will demand none of commodity 
J 
1. 
Definition: 
:> 0 if P1 < p*. 1J 
It should be noted that (6-4-9) tacitly assumes commodity 1 
is not a Giffen good, The utility attained by taking action aO 
at the end of period T. is 
J 
6-4-10 
Suppose the optimal terminal action is aik , Then the searcher 
allocates wealth of (M. ~ t'k) to purchases of comnodities 1 J 1 
to t. The optimality of action aik requires that the price for 
commodity 1 offered by the kth seller contacted in the ith period 
was such that the searcher willingly demands a positive quantity 
of commodity 1 from him. The utility attained by taking action 
aik at the end of period Tj is 
ik -
I(aik) = I(Pl ~P2.··,.Pt,Mj ~ t ik) 6-4-11 
The utility yielded by the optimal terminal decision procedure 
8* at the end of period T. is) therefore, 
J 
for all i,k} 6-4-12 
8* thus determines if any of commodity 1 is to be purchased and, 
if so) also determines the quantity purchased and the seller from 
whom the purchase is made, 
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If transaction costs vary between sellers, there seems to he 
no simpler \IIay of expressing 6* than as in C6~4~12), However, if 
transaction costs are the same for all sellers, a much simpler 
way of expressing 8* is available, This form is the result of 
Proposition 6-4-2, 
Assumption: All sellers of commodity 1 have the same transaction 
costs ie. 
6-4-13 
The result of Proposition 6~4~2 incorporates a variable 
Pij which is defined as the price for commodity 1 for which the 
consumer is indifferent between terminal action aO and any other 
terminal action a ik € Aj • 
Definition; 
6-4-14 
Since CMj .... t) < Mj' C5",2~7) ~ (5-2,,9) and (6-4-14) imply that 
6-4-15 
pij is the price for commodity 1 for which a consumer faced with 
a transaction cost of t is indifferent between demanding zero 
units of commodity 1 and Xl (pij.P2, ••• ,Pl,Mj - t) units of commodity 
1. Note that demand for commodity 1 is jump discontinuous with 
respect to PI when PI :::: p** Ij , the size and the position of the 
discontinuity depending upon the size of the transaction cost to 
ProEosition 6,,4_2; 
. f ik min < p** aik , 1 PI :::: Plj Ij 
0* (y.) :::: 
J 
if Pij min aO' < PIj 
all j 
(a) 
8* (y.) 
J 
for a1l 5 
Since 
by (6-4-14). 
Since 
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vector of observed prices) such that 
Then~ from (6",4~12), 
l~",~nr and all r '" 1,.,,~j. 
t), 
ik rs Pl < Pl ' by (5-2-7), for all r,s. Hence 
Combining (6-4-18) and (6-4~19) proves that 
min 
P < p** Ij Ij 
(b) Suppose the vector of observed y., is such that 
J 
t) 
-t)} 
6-4-16 
6-4-17 
6-4-18 
6-4-19 
6-4-20 
for all s = 1 •.•. , and all r = 1,.",j, In 
Comparing (6-4-14) (6-4",22) shows 
, 1> , (I 
(5-2-7) and (6-4-,23) together imply 
P** min Ij <: Plj 
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icular l 
t) 6-4-22 
- t) 6-4-23 
6-4-24 
Combining (6",4 ... 20) and (6-4-24) proves the desired result. 
Q,E,D. 
An examination of (6"4,,,,14) shows that Pij + pij as t -+ O. 
In the absence of transaction costs, therefore t the result of 
Proposition 6-4~2 becomes 
6-4-25 
If commodity 1 not a Giffen good, as implied by (6-4-9), 
(lx l then, since -3-- < 0 all PI €. L U [Pl'P1], the terminal decision PI 
procedure can be re sed in terms of the consumer I 5 
for commodity 1. This re-expression of 8* is presented 
6-4-3 which shows that, if the optimal terminal action 
then it is to patronise the seller from whom the 
demand the greatest 
Corollary 6-4-3: 
8* (y.) :::: 
J 
quant 
aik~ 
aO~ 
of commodity 1. 
max x* (pI's) 1 1 
1',5 
demand 
Corollary 
would 
aX1 
all s J* l,."nr and all r = 1,.",j. 
From Proposition 6~4~2, if 8*(y.) 
J 
< 0 impl *( ik) *'C min) *( rs) f 11 xI PI =xI P1j >x1 Pl ora r,s. 
By ion, xi(P1) '" 0 for PI ~ Pij 
> 0 for PI :> pH 
6*(Yj) = aik if max XiCP~s) := xiCpik) > O. 
r,s 
From Proposition 6-4~2, 
for all r,s. Hence, 
8* (y. ) 
J 
O * C min) 
'" := xi Plj = 
Q.E.D. 
Two of the of transaction costs on demand are worth 
noting. f . 1 b d . min * , or any glven owest 0 serve prlce PIj < Pij' 
demand for commodity 1 is lower if t :> 0 than if t = O. Transaction 
costs thus lower the demand for commodity 1. Second, x1(pij,Mj 
so no quantity commodity 1 smaller than xl CPij)Mj .. t) will 
ever be purchased, Transaction costs thus place a lower bound 
t) > 0 
on the number of commodity I exchanged in anyone transaction, 
The three components of the generalised search rule 
J* J* J* p '" (~ ,v >0*) have been constructed and their properties 
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described, J* The next section establishes that p is optimal in that 
a searcher s ex ante that its use will maximise his present 
valued net utility from search, 
SECTION 6-5: THE OPTIMAL GENERALISED SEARCH RULE 
Sections 6-2, 6~3 and 6-4 presented the components of the 
J* 
search rule p (~J*.vJ*.o*) and proved the individual optimalities 
of these components., subj ect to assumption (6~2~1) that there is only 
a finite number J of search periods. Proposition 6~5-1 combines the 
results of Propositions 6~2~2. 6_3-1 and 6~4~1 to show is an 
optimal generalised search rule. subject to assumption (6-2-1), As 
in Section 2-5, where assumption (2-4-1) was shown to be redundant. 
it is shown in this section that assumption (6~2~1) is very weak. 
In any realist search problem the conditions of search are such that 
(6-2-1) will be satisfied and, therefore, be redundant. Examples 
of search conditions sufficient to satisfy (6-2-1) are given after 
Proposition 6~5-1. 
ition 6-5-1: 
If search will not persist for more than J < 00 search periods, 
J* the generalised search rule p 
Proof: 
J* J* (~ ,v ,0*) is optimal. 
J* By (6-1-7), p (~J*,vJ*,o*) is an optimal search rule if and 
only if 
VJo(~J*."J*,~*) VJ(~J J~} <, ,v .!J ~ 0 <, ,v .u 6-5-1 
for any generalised J rule p J J C~ ,v ~o), Proposition 6-4-1 
shows that 
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for any terminal decision procedure o. Proposition 6-3-1 shows that 
J for any observation number rule v and any terminal decision procedure 
o. Proposition 6-2-1 shows that 
6-5-4 
for any stopping rule ~J, any observation number rule vJ and any 
terminal decision procedure O. Combining (6-5-2), (6-5-3) and 
Q,E.D. 
It should be realised that, in the context of generalised search, 
finiteness in the quantity of search undertaken implies not only that 
search persists over only a finite number of periods, but also that 
only a finite number of observations on PI are taken in any particular 
period. The term "search length", which is used freely in the search 
literature, is thus ambiguous in the context of generalised search. 
One must distinguish carefully between the number of observations taken 
and the number of periods over which observations are taken. 
Propositions 6-5-2 and 6-5-3 prove that conditions (6-5-5) and 
(6-5-6) are sufficient for search to persist over only a finite 
number of periods, 
limit c (j) ~ M 
j-+<x> 
6-5-5 
j > J**, J** < 00 6-5-6 
(6~5~5) requires that financial search costs accumulated over successive 
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periods eventually drive the searcher into bankruptcy, (6-5~6) 
requires that discounted psychic search costs accumulated past some 
period TJ ** exceed the greatest present valued utility that can 
possibly be gained from search. Clearly one or both of these conditions 
will always apply in reality so that, in reality, assumption 
(6-2-1) is redundant, 
Propositions 6-5-5 and 6-5-6 prove that conditions (6-5-7) and 
(6-5-8) are sufficient for only a finite number of observations on 
PI to be taken in anyone period T j ,j :;: 1. 
limit 
n .-+00 ) 
n. 
J 
~ c .. ~ M. 1 for all j > 1 i=l 1) J~ ~ 6-5-7 
6-5-8 
Condition (6-5-7) is similar to condition (6-5-5) in that it 
requires that financial search costs accumulated within anyone 
period eventually drive the searcher into bankruptcy. Condition 
(6-5-8) is similar to condition (6-5-6) in that it requires the 
psychic costs accumulated within anyone period eventually exceed 
the greatest utility that can possibly be gained from search. 
Conditions (6-5-7) and (6-5-8) are only necessary in the limiting 
case of a searcher being physically able to make an infinite number 
of observations on PI within a period. Clearly this is unrealistic 
and an assumption of a finite intensity of search achieves the same 
end of guaranteeing that only a finite number of observations are taken 
in anyone period. In reality, therefore~ the number of observations 
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taken in anyone period is restricted to being finite by whichever 
of these three constraints becomes binding first - (6-5-7), (6-5-8) 
or the physical constraint of a finite intensity of search. 
Proposition 6-5~2: 
If limit c(j) ~ M, then optimal search persists for only a finite 
j-+<:o 
number of periods, 
Proof: 
limit c (j) ~ M implies that 
j--+<x> 
limi t M. = limit (M",c(j)) < 0 J '"' j-+<:o j-+<:o 
6-5-9 
Let TJ * be the last period for which the searcher's wealth net 
of financial search costs exceeds the transaction cost ie. 
and 
M. - t < 0, for all j > J* 
J 
(6-5-10) and (6-5,..11) imply 
MJ * > Mj' for all j > J* 
6-5-10 
6-5-11 
6-5-12 
From (6-5-11), the utility attainable in period T., j > J*, is 
J 
6-5-13 
since the searcher no longer has the net wealth to take any terminal 
action other than aO' By (6-5-12) and (5-2-9) 
I(P1J*,P2, ... ,pl.,MJ *) > I(pij,p2,,,,,pl.,Mj ) for all j > J* 
6-5-14 
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The utility attainable at the end of period TJ * is 
6-5-15 
> max I(pi· ,P2"" ,Pl,M.) j >J* J J 
j-J* -
? max {(I-a) I (pi· .• P2'··· ,Pl,M.) j >J* J J 
j v-J* 
L (I-a) K(v,n*)} 
v=J*+1 v 
6-5-16 
= VJ *+1 (~*,v*,o*) 6-5-17 
(6-5-17) guarantees that ~j*(YJ*) = Sj* = 1 always. Hence J* is an 
upper bound on the number of periods over which optimal search can 
persist. 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 6-5-3: 
If 
all j > J**, then optimal search persists for only a finite number 
of periods. 
Proof: 
At the end of period TJ ** the searcher's present valued expected 
net utility from search is 
6-5-18 
~ 0 
. J** ~ max {(l-a)J- I(o*(y.)) 
j>J** J 
v-J** (I-a) K(v,n*)} 
v 
v=J**+l 
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6-5-20 
j v-J** ~ (I-a) K(v,n*)} < 0 
v 
v;:::J**+l 
6-5-22 
Comparing (6-5-22) and (6-5~20) shows 
VJ**(~*'v*,o*) = I(O*(YJ**)) 6-5-23 
(6-5-23) guarantees that ~j**(YJ**) ::: Sj** ::: 1 always. Hence J** 
is an upper bound on the number of periods over which search can 
persist. 
Q.E.D. 
Propositions 6-5-2 and 6-5-3 show that, in reality, search 
persists over only a finite number J of periods. Proposition 6-5-1 
shows that, if J is finite, then the generalised search rule derived 
J* J* J* 
subject to assumption (6-2-1), p ::: (~ ,v ,0*), is optimal. 
Consequently, pJ* is an optimal generalised search rule under 
realistic search conditions. This is the result of Proposition 6-5-4. 
Proposition 6-5-4: 
If (i) limit c(j) ~ M 
j-+<» 
j v-J** 
E (I-a) K(v,n~) > 
v=J**+l 
(ii) and/or j -J** L (I-a) I (PI ,P2' ... ,p {,M) 
for all j > J**, J** < 00, 
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then the generalised search rule pJ* = (~J*,vJ*J6*) is optimal even 
if the number of periods J is infinite. 
Proof: 
If either of (i) or (ii) apply, then Propositions 6-5 2 and 
6-5-3 show J ::::: min(J*,J**) ·ls an upper bound on the number of periods 
over which search will persist. J* Proposition 6-5-1 shows p is 
optimal if search will persist over no more than J periods. Hence, 
J* 
p is optimal if (i) and/or (ii) apply. 
Q.E.D. 
Assumption (6-2~1), that there is only a finite number J of 
search periods, is proved redundant in reality by Proposition 6-5-4. 
The superscript J is accordingly removed from the notation. The 
optimal search rule is denoted by p* :::: (~*,v*,o*) and the accompanying 
present valued ex ante expected net utility from search by 
VO(~*)v*,6*). 
Propositions 6~5-5 and 6-5-6 complete the proof that, in reality, 
only a finite quantity of search is undertaken by a searcher using an 
optimal ised search rule p*. They prove that, even if the 
intensity of search can be infinitely great, conditions (6-5-7) and 
(6-5 M 8) guarantee only a finite number of observations on PI are ever 
taken in anyone period. 
If limit z:: c .. G::. M. 1 for all j G:: 1, then optimal search permits 
i=1 1) )-
no more than a finite number of observations on PI to be taken in any 
period. 
Let M. (n.) ) J = M. 1 J'" c .. 1J 6-5-24 
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n. 
J 
limit L c .. 2: M. 1 implies that 
n.-}<lo i=l lJ J -
J 
n. 
J 
limit M. Cn.) = limit (M. 1 t.: coo) < 0 J J J ~ lj " n. -}<lo n. -}<lo i=l 
J J 
Let N~ be the greatest number of observations the searcher can take 
J 
in period Tj for which his wealth net of financial search costs exceeds 
the transaction cost tie, 
M. (N:<) - t > 0 6-5-26 
J J 
and 
M. (n.) - t ~ 0 for all n. > N ~ 
J J J J 
6-5-27 
Hence, from (6-5-26) and (6-5-27), 
M. (Nn > M. (n.) for all n. > N~ 
J J J J J J 
6-5-28 
The utility attainable if n. > N~ observations on PI are taken is 
J J 
1( "'*( jl jn.)) I() U Yj-I,P I """PI J :::; aO 
since, by (6-5-27), the searcher no longer has the net wealth to take 
any action other than aO if he takes nj > Nj observations on PI' 
for all nj > Nj by (6-5-28), Hence taking Nj observations on PI 
is always preferred to taking n. > N~ observations on PI' Therefore 
J J 
N~ is a finite upper bound on the number of observations taken in 
J 
period T., 
J 
Proposition 6-5-6: 
Q.E.D. 
If limit K(j,n.) > I(P~'P2" .• 'Pl,M) for all j ~ 1, then optimal 
n • -}<lo J 
J 
search permits no more than a finite number of observations on PI to 
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be taken in any period, 
L limit KU,n j ) > I(P1,P2"",p,t,M) implies that there exists a 
n.-+<.o 
J 
finite number N~* such that 
J 
6-5 31 
L ICp!, ,,,. ,p,t,M) is an upper bound on the utility attainable from 
search. Hence the searcher will prefer to take no observations on PI 
to taking n. > N~* observations on PI' N~* is therefore a finite upper 
J J J 
bound on the number of observations on PI that will be taken in period 
T .• j ;;:. L 
J 
Q,E.D. 
If either or both of (6-5?5) and (6-5-6) are satisfied and if 
either or both of (6-5-7) and (6-5-8) are satisfied, then a searcher 
using an optimal generalised search rule p* will take only a finite 
number of observations on P1 throughout the whole of his search. 
If either or both of (6-5-5) and (6-5 6) are satisfied then, 
by Propositions 6-5-2 and 6-5-3. optimal generalised search persists 
over only a finite number of periods. If or both of (6-5-7) 
and (6-5-8) are satisfied then, by Propositions 6-5-5 and 6-5-6, only 
a finite number of observations on PI are anyone period. 
Hence, in total, only a finite number of observations on PI are 
taken throughout the entire search, 
Q,E,D. 
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This concludes the proofs of the optimality of p* and the 
finiteness of the quantity of search undertaken us p*. 
So far the thesis has explained the construction p* and proved 
its opt ity. The next section considers the forms which p* may 
take under various conditions of search. The search conditions examined 
in particular are those under which the optimal search behaviour 
specified by p* coincides with the behavioural extremes Stigleresque 
and sequent search. This thesis has claimed that the conflict between 
the optimal of the Stigleresque and sequential search rules is 
a consequence only of different authors analysing different search 
models, Both types of models have been examined and extended by this 
thesis. It ing that the last substantive section of this thesis 
should use the framework of generalised search to demonstrate the 
differences between these models> and to show hm'>J they blend into their 
common middle ground of generalised search as the different constraints 
which give to them are relaxed. 
SECTION 6-6; THE RELATIONSHIP OF GENERALISED SEARCH TO STIGLERESQUE 
SEARCH AND SEQUENTIAL SEARCH 
In Section 1-4 Stigleresque and sequential search rules are 
described as being optimal in search problems where the conditions 
of search are such that the generalised search rule gives 
S* o 
for Stigleresque 
S* :::: 0 and 
o ' 
and 
:::: 1 all i ~ 1 such that Si = 
6-6-1 
:::: S~ = 0 
1 
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for sequential search. 
If one of these search behaviours is optimal then it must maximise 
the searcher's present valued ex ante expectations of the net utility 
attainable from search, VO(~*,v*,o*). An examination of VO(~*,v*,6*) 
will, therefore, reveal the circumstances in which the optimal 
generalised search behaviour coincides with either of the behaviours 
specified by (6~6~1) or (6-6-2). For this examination it is convenient 
to express VO(~* ,v* ,6*) in the form given in Lemma 6-6-1, \vhich is 
comparable to Lemma 2-5-1. Both Lemmas express the ex ante expected 
net utility from search as the expectation of the sum of net utilities 
expected ex ante at the ends of periods T1 ,T2,." weighted by their 
ex ante probabilities of being the payoff from search. 
Recall, from (1-4-21), the vector 1 = (1j) where 1 j (Yj) = ~j = 1 
. if and only if search is halted at the end of period T. and where 
J 
1. (y.) = W· = ° otherwise. The values WI"" depend upon the search 
J J J 
rule p = (~,v,6) chosen since lji. may be expressed as 
J 
lji. = (1-S0)(hS1)·" (1-S. l)S, J J - J 6-6-3 
for all j ~ 0, The intuitive argument given in Section 2-5 for the 
use of the vector 1 in the result of Lemma 2-5-1 is directly applicable 
to the use of 1 in Lemma 6~6-1. 
, , , V{ (1-a)jI(6*(y.)) -
J J 
+ fP~ 
L 
P1 
j 
E 
v=l 
31 • 
By analogy to 
2 
E (l_a)VK(V,n;)} + ..• + (l-S~ 
v=l J 
j 
I(o*(y.)) E (l-a)vK(v,n*)} + ..• Jf (y·iy· l)dy .... J 
J v=1 v g J J - J 
6-6-4 
J 
U 
PI 
(l-S*)S*{(l-a)I(o*(y )) -
L 0 1 1 
Pi 
(I-a) vK(v ,n*)}f (y. )dr. 
v g J J 
= W*OI(8*(yO)) + L 
j 1 
j v 
E (l-a)K(v,n*)} (y.)dy. 
v=l v J J 
The result of Lemma 6~6~l is that 
00 
Q.E.D, 
VO(~*,v*,o*) = w8I(o*(yO)) + E E[W~{(l~a)jI(o*(y.)) -
j=1 J J 
j v 
L (l-a) K(v,n*)}] 
v 
v=1 
6-6-7 
Suppose St search is optimal, By (6-6-1), So 0 
and Si = 1 so, by (6-6-3), W8 :: 0 and Wi = 1, Therefore, from (6-6-7), 
VoCs*,v*,o*) = E[(1-a)I(o*(Y1)) - (l-a)K(l,ni)] 6-6-8 
ie. I(6*(yO)) < (1-a)E[I(6*(Y1))] - (l-a)K(l,ni) 6-6-9 
00 j 1 j v-I ~ E E[w~{(l-a) - I(6*(y.)) - E (I-a) K(v,n~)}IY1] 
j=2 J J v::: 2 
for any vector Yl of 
(6-6-9) and (6-6-10) 
to extend a search 
(i) psychic 
ively large and/or 
6-6-10 
Under what conditions will 
true? (6-6~10) means that it is never 
end of period Tl' This could be 
costs for periods T2 onwards being 
imal 
by 
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(ii) financial search costs in these periods being prohibit-
ively large. 
( ' , , , 111) the discount rate a being sufficiently large, 
(6-6-9) will be true only if the transaction cost t and the discount 
rate a are both within some bounds which will depend upon the intensity 
of the searcher's preference for commodity L There will be many 
costs and discounting situations where (6-6-9) and (6-6-10) will be 
true and, for each of them, the optimal search behaviour specified 
by p* will be Stigleresque, 
Now suppose that sequential search is optimal, Then So ::: 0, 
which implies lj!0 ::: 0, and nt ::: 1 for all i :;; j where l~j ::: 1, 
Hence, from (6-6-7), 
00 
l: 
j=l 
E[ljJ~{(1-a)jI(8*(y.)) 
J J 
(6-6-11) implies that 
00 
I (8 * (y 0)) < l: 
j=l 
j 
l: (l-a)vK(v,l)}] 
v=l 
j 
l: (l-a)vK(v,l)}] 
v=l 
6-6-11 
6-6-12 
n~ ::: 1 for all i $ j where IV'!' ::: 1 implies that, for all vectors of 
1 J 
observed prices y., the searcher expects it to be optimal to make 
1 
only one observation on PI in period Ti+1' assuming he wishes to 
carry his search on through period T. 1 ie. 
1+ 
max{(1-a)E[I(8*(y. I))iy·] - (1-a)K(i+1,n:< 1), 1+ 1 1+ 
(1-a)2E[V. 2(~*,v*,8*)iy.] - (l-a)2K(i+2,n~ 2) - (1-a)K(i+1,n:< I)} 1+ 1 1+ 1+ 
::: max{(1-a)E[I(8*(y. l))iy.] '"' (1-a)K(i+1,1), 1+ 1 6-6-13 
(1-a)2E[V, 2(~*,v*,6*)iy.] - (1-a)2 K(i+2,1) - (l-a)K(i+l,l)} 1+ 1 
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Conditions under which is never optimal to take more than one 
observation per period could be (i) in any period T., the 
1 
psychic search costs of observations subsequent to the first 
b . it 'b dl o servatlon PI are prahl itively large an or 
(ii) in any period T .• the marginal 
1 
search costs of observations subsequent to the 
b . il o servatlon PI are prohibitively large. 
(iii) costs are never such as to 
induce the searcher to take no observations in a period and then take 
observations in a later period. Such a situation could arise if all 
the marginal costs in a period were large while the marginal costs 
of observations in later periods were small. 
In similar fashion to (6~6-9) 1 (6~6-12) implies, for a given intensity 
of searcher preference for commodity I, some bounds on the values of 
t and IX for which sequential search will be optimal. There will be 
many costs and discounting situations satisfying (6-6-12) and (6-6-13) 
and, for each of these 1 the optimal search behaviour prescribed by 
p* will be sequential, 
In the light of the debate of the respective optimalities of 
Stigleresque and sequential search behaviours, it is interesting to 
note that if the conditions of search are such that So = 0, Si = 1 
and ni :: I, then the two search behaviours are indistinguishable. 
For either of the Stigleresque or ial extremes discussed, 
a relaxation of the restrictions giving to them causes search 
behaviours to emerge which cannot be by either of them. 
For ance, if search costs in period are reduced, a searcher 
who previously halted his search at the of period Tl may be 
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induced to extend his search through period T2' A St leresque search 
rule no describes the searcher's generalised search behaviour. 
Similarly, the marginal costs of second observations in some periods 
are , a searcher may be induced to take at least two observations 
in some periods. A sequential search rule no longer describes the 
searcher's 
that as 
ised search behaviour. One can expect, therefore, 
technology of search rises, with an accompanying relaxation 
of the constraints binding a searcher, the extremes of Sti 
and sequential search will merge into their common ground of generalised 
search, 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
The initial controversy which appeared in the search literature 
was the controversy concerning sequential search rules' "superiority" 
over fixed~sample~size search rules such as those discussed by Stigler 
in his seminal papers [50], [51]. The controversy continues today, 
and is accompanied by assorted empirical efforts to estimate the 
margin by which sequential search rules are "superior" when compared 
to fixed~sample~size search rules, These empirical efforts, however, 
all compare the properties of these two types of rules in models where 
the assumed conditions of search are such that sequential search is 
optimal, Inevitably, therefore, the empirical results show sequential 
search rules to be superior to fixed-sample-size search rules. These 
"results" are, of course, of no use at all in answering questions about 
the relative merits of these two types of search rules in any other 
type of search problem, In any event, the entire controversy is 
something of a non-question. Chapter 6 of this thesis demonstrated 
that sequential search rules were optimal for some search problems, 
that fixed-sample-size search rules were optimal for other search 
problems, and that neither type of rule is generally optimal. It 
is clear that search theorists have largely overlooked that there 
is no one "search problem" and that the search rule which is optimal 
for a particular search problem is dependent on the nature of that 
problem. Insufficient attention has been paid to differences in search 
problems before the results of analyses based on different problems 
have been compared. Differences in search problems will also complicate 
efforts to estimate the opportunity costs of using whichever types 
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of search rules are optimal for these problems, since the opportunity 
costs will depend upon which particular search problems are being 
compared. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 consider different aspects of search problems 
for \vhich sequential search rules are optimal. Chapter 2 examined 
some previous authors t analyses of such problems. It was found that 
their models' use of a restriction of fixed demand for the searched-
for commodity and their use of an expenditure minimisation proxy for 
utility maximisation was valid only under conditions so restrictive that 
these analyses were devoid of useful economic content. The sequential 
search model constructed in Chapter 2 offers a much more fruitful 
description of these problems by using the indirect utility function 
to quite naturally incorporate financial search costs, 
and to make fixed demand restrictions unnecessary. This approach 
also has the valuable merit of making explicit the hitherto ignored 
important fact that the consumer's allocation problem is an integral 
part of his decision making during search. Recognition of this allows 
a much greater harvest of comparative statics results than is possible 
in expenditure minimising models, 
The rational choice of a set of preferred sellers by the searcher 
has, like his allocation problem, been largely ignored by the search 
literature, Excluding the notion of the direction of search has denied 
the search literature the opportunity to contribute to a variety of 
topics ego studies of advertising strategies and location theory. 
To ignore the direction of search is equivalent to imposing particular 
severe restrictions on the types of search problems considered. 
Presumably previous authors chose to ignore the question of selecting 
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a search path in an effort to prevent their analyses from becoming 
unmanageably complex, It is ironical, therefore, that including the 
rational choice of the direction of search in the analysis of search 
problems not only widens the set of search problems to which the 
analysis is applicable but, in some instances, also simplifies the 
analysis. For instance, in Section 3-7, consideration of optimal 
search paths showed that, under some assumptions on prices and search 
costs, which are much weaker than those made by the previous authors 
considered, the form of the sequential search rule reduces to 
much simpler myopic form. Chapter 3 and Section 5-4 show some 
differences in the determination of preferred search paths by 
sequential and Stigleresque searchers. 
Search problems were originally formulated in an effort to 
explain persistent price dispersion. Various results have been 
inferred, from both theoretical and empirical studies, about the 
maintenance of price dispersion over time and about changes brought 
about in measures of price dispersion by changes in parameters 
affecting individuals I search decisions. Chapter 4 provides the 
first derivation of a F.d.f. of transaction prices resulting from 
sequential search, albeit a derivation subject to strong simplifying 
assumptions. Comparison of the inferred results to comparative statics 
results derived from this p.d.f. shows that, while the inferred results 
are true in some circumstances, they are not true in general. For 
instance, a commonly inferred result is that a decrease in search costs 
causes an increase in the quantity of sequential search undertaken 
and a decrease in price dispersion. The comparative statics results 
show that, while a decrease in search costs cannot cause a decrease 
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in the quantity of sequential search undertaken, it may cause an 
increase in price dispersion. In addition, Chapter 4 shows that 
the measures of price dispersion commonly used cannot adequately 
describe price dispersion in any but one unusual market situation. 
A major objective of analysing search problems is the formulation 
of a dynamic non~tatonnement price adjustment model which provides 
an explanation of the persistence of, and changes in, price dispersion. 
At present, the major stumbling block to this formulation is that no 
general description of searcher behaviour is available. This thesis 
has made a step in this direction by rationalising three different 
search models, Furthering this rationalisation to provide a 
general description of searcher behaviour would seem to be an essential 
initial step in understanding the processes by which markets make 
disequilibrium adjustments, the rates at which these adjustments occur, 
and in understanding how to influence both of these. 
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APPENDIX I 
A LIST OF NOTATION 
This appendix is an alphabetical listing of the notation used 
in the thesis. ish alphabet and script symbols are listed first. 
Greek alphabet symbols are listed last, 
A. = {aO,a11 ' •••• a. } the searcher's terminal J Jnj space at 
the end of period T., 
J 
the terminal action which is to choose to purchase no units 
of commodity 1. 
aik the terminal action which is to choose to purchase a quantity 
xi > 0 of commodity 1 from the kth seller contacted in 
period 
cik the marginal financial cost to the searcher of contacting the 
kth seller in period T .. 
1 
C. 
1 
c (j) -
c (j) -
C. 
1-
J 
c.* 1-
J 
the marginal financial cost to a sequential searcher of 
his ith observation. Note that ci ::; cil ' 
the cumulative financial cost to the searcher of taking 
j 
i:lni observations on PI through periods TI,.,.;r j , 
the jth smallest marginal financial search cost. 
the marginal financial cost to the searcher of contacting 
the jth seller on the search path i 1 , ...• i j , ... 
the marginal cost to the searcher of contact 
the jth seller on the optimal search path ii, ..• ,ij, ... ,ij*' 
the first and second derivatives, W,r,t. j, of a 
Stigleresque searcher's financial cost function, under the 
assumptions that j continuous and c (j) is twice 
differentiable w,rtt. j. 
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1 . 
Cj(Cj+I,PI, ... ,pi) - the searcher's jth reservation price function. 
1 . 
Cj = Cj (cj+I,PI, .•• ,pi) - the value of the searcher's jth reservation 
price. 
C. V, - the coefficient of variation for the p. d. f. of the minimum 
price observed by a sequential searcher. 
Ef[Pllwl - the mean selling price for commodity 1. 
mini Eh[PI w] - the mean of the p.d.f. of the minimum price observed by 
a sequential searcher. 
E [j I w., ... , w. ,t. "".' t. ,c. "", c. 1 - the ex ante expected 
11 1. 11 1j 11 1. J • J 
sequential search length of a searcher following a search 
path iI,.",i j . 
EI(j) ~ the ex ante expected utility, exclusive of psychic search 
costs, for a Stigleresque search of j observations. 
ETE(iI,.",i j ) - the ex ante expected total expenditure on the purchase 
of a unit of commodity I~ for a sequential searcher following 
the search path iI" .. ,i j , 
the p.d.f. of selling prices of commodity 1. 
the c.d.f. of selling prices of commodity 1. 
f(P1Iwi .) - the p.d.f. of the searcher's beliefs about the probabilities 
J 
of the possible values of the selling price offered by the 
jth seller on his search path. 
F(Pllwi .) r the c.d.f, of the searcher's beliefs about the probabilities 
J 
of the possible values of the selling price offered by the 
jth seller on his search path. 
fg(piI ... ,.,pinj ) - the pod.f. of the searcherts ex ante beliefs about 
the probabilities of the possible values of the observations 
he intends to take in periods TI, ...• Tj (see Appendix II). 
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f ( j+l,l j+l,n. 11 ) th d f of the searcher's bell'efs gPl ,··.,Pl J+ Yj - ep ... 
g(w) -
about the probabilities of the possible values of the n. 1 J+ 
observations he intends to take in period T. 1 given the J+ 
values of the observations taken in periods Tl, ... ,T j 
(see Appendix II). 
the searcher's prior p.d.f. on w, 
g(wly.) - the searcher's posterior p.d.f, on w, given the values of 
J 
the observations taken in periods Tl, ... ,T j (see Appendix 
II) . 
h(P7in lw) the p.d.L of the minimum price observed by a searcher. 
H(p~inlw) the c.d.f. of the minimum price observed by a searcher. 
1+ the set of non~negative integers. 
I(PI IP2",.,Pl,M) - the searcher's indirect utility function. 
Ia(Mj) ~ the indirect utility attainable with prices P2,.,.,Pl and 
wealth M., when demand for commodity 1 is constrained to be 
J 
zero. 
- - min II (Mj-(Pl+t)j ) - the indirect utility attainable with prices 
P2, ... ,Pl' wealth Mj , and a lowest combined observed selling 
min price and transaction cost for commodity 1 of (Pl+t)j , 
when demand for commodity 1. is constrained to be one unit. 
I(o(y.)) ~ the indirect utility attainable with a terminal decision 
J 
procedure 0 and a vector of observed prices y .. 
J 
il, ... ,i j - a search path over sellers with indices i 1,i2 to i j . 
ii," .,ij* - an ex ante optimal search path. 
Kik the marginal psychic cost to the searcher of contacting the 
kth seller in period T .. 
1 
the total psychic cost of search incurred by a Stigleresque 
searcher's taking j observations. 
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K(j,n j ) - the total psychic cost of search in period T. J 
KI · -1-
J 
Kl'* .,.. 1. 
M 
M, 
J 
n. 
1 
J 
J 
n. I ::: 
-J+ 
by taking n. observations in period 
J 
the psychic cost to the of contacting the 
jth seller on the search path i 1,.". , ... 
the marginal psychic cost to the searcher of contacting the 
jth seller on the optimal search path ii,.,.,ij,.,.,ij*' 
the searcher's initial wealth. 
the searcher's wealth? net of financial search costs, at 
the end of period T., 
J 
the number of observations on PI taken in period Ti' 
J 
v·Cy.) - the vector of numbers of observations J J 
on PI a searcher using an observation number rule vJ intends, 
at the end period T., to take 
J 
when he has observed prices y. and when there are J search 
J 
periods. 
v~(Y·) - the vector of numbers of observations 
J J 
on PI a searcher using an optimal observation number rule 
v* intends, at the end of period T., to take in periods 
J 
T. 1,T. 2"'" when he has observed prices YJ·. J+ J+ 
P2" .. ,Pl - the prices of commodities 2 to t. 
L PI a lower bound on PI' 
U PI an upper bound on PI' 
ik PI the value of a searcher's kth observation on PI in period Ti' 
the value of a 
i Note that P1 
sequential 
i1 
PI . 
searcher's ith observation on PI' 
the minimum of the prices observed in periods T1"."T j , 
~ the minimum the combined observed selling prices and 
transaction costs observed in periods T1,.",T j , 
p~ 
1 
the point solution to the 
C.(c. 1,P1*""JP~ l'P·). 1 1+ 1- 1 
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price equation 
pij the smallest price for commodity 1 for which a searcher with 
wealth M. will demand none of commodity 1. 
J 
P** 1j the for commodity 1 for which a searcher with wealth 
M. indifferent between buying none of commodity I and 
J 
demanding a quantity of xl (Pij'Pz, ... ,Pl,Mj-t) from a seller 
with transaction cost t. 
Pr(1/!k*=l\W. ,.,.,w. ,c. , ... ,e. ,to , ... ,t. ) - the ex ante probability 
11 1j 11 1j 11 lj 
that a sequential searcher takes exactly k observations with 
an ex ante search path of il, ... ,i j , 
Q(j) - the ex ante expected net utility from a Stigleresque search 
of j observations, 
s. = ~.(y.) ~ the value of the jth element of a stopping rule ~ when 
J J J 
prices y. have been observed. 
J 
s~J = ~~J(y.) _ the value of the jth element of the backward induction 
J J J 
stopping rule ~bJ when at most J observations will be taken 
on PI and when prices Yj have been observed. 
S~ = ~~(y.) - the value of the jth element of an optimal stopping 
J J J 
rule ~* when prices y. have been observed. 
J 
TI" .. ,Tj , ... - a sequence of time periods. 
t (j) -
t. 
1-
J 
the transaction cost for the kth seller contacted in period T .. 
1 
the transaction cost for the ith seller contacted by a 
sequent searcher. Note that ti 
the jth smallest transaction cost. 
the transaction cost for the jth seller on the search path 
iI' ..• ,ij ) . , . 
t.* the transaction cost for the jth seller on the optimal search 
1. 
J 
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TE. (8) ~ the sequential searcher's total expenditure on commodity 1 
J 
if search stops at the end of period T. and the searcher's 
J 
terminal decision procedure is o. 
U(x l , .. . ,xt ) - the searcher's direct utility function. 
U~(O) -
J 
the direct utility a sequential searcher can attain by taking 
terminal action aO at the end of period Tj . 
U~. (1) - the direct utility a sequential searcher can attain by taking 1J 
U~(l) ~ 
J 
terminal action ail at the end of period Tj . 
the greatest direct utility a sequential searcher can attain 
by taking any terminal action other than aO at the end of 
period T .. 
J 
U(8(y.)) ~ the direct utility attained at the end of period T. if a 
J J 
searcher uses a terminal decision procedure 8 to choose a 
terminal action from his terminal action space Aj . 
mini varh(Pl w) - the variance of the p.d.f. of the minimum price observed 
by a sequential searcher. 
V.(s,8) - the utility expected, at the end of period T., from sequential 
J J 
search conducted according to a sequential search rule 
p ::: (s,8). 
s 
VO(s,8) - the utility expected ex ante from sequential search conducted 
according to a sequential search rule p = (s,8). 
s 
~(s,8) - the utility expected, at the end of period T., from 
J J 
sequential search conducted according to a sequential 
search rule p = (s,8), when there are at most J periods 
s 
in which search can occur. 
V.(s.v,8) - the present valued net utility expected, at the end of 
J 
period T., from generalised search conducted according to a 
J 
generalised search rule p = (s,v,8). 
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, 
VO(~,v,8) - the present valued ex ante expected net utility from 
generalised search conducted according to a generalised 
search rule p = (~,v,o). 
~(~,v,8) - the present valued net utility expected, at the end of 
J 
period T., from generalised search conducted according to 
J 
a generalised search rule p = (~,v,8), when there are at 
most J periods in which search can occur. 
W. (s,8) - the total expenditure on the purchase of one unit of 
J 
commodity 1 expected, at the end of period T., from sequential 
J 
search conducted according to a sequential search rule 
WO(~,8) - the ex ante expected total expenditure on the purchase of 
one unit of commodity 1 from sequential search conducted 
according to a sequential search rule p = (s,8). 
. s 
w a vector of parameters conditioning the p.d.f. of selling 
prices of commodity 1, f(P1iw). 
w. the value of w ascribed by the searcher to the. jth seller on 
l. 
J 
the searcher's search path i 1, ... ,i j , ... 
w.* the value of w ascribed by the searcher to the jth seller 
l. 
J 
w (j) -
w (j) -
x~ 
1 
y. 
J 
a 
h h ' 'I h h '* .* '* on t e searc er s optlma searc pat 1 1 , ... ,l j , ... ,1 j *. 
the jth smallest of the values of w ascribed to sellers by 
the searcher. 
the jth largest of the values of w ascribed to sellers by 
the searcher. 
the searcher's demand for commodity i, i = 1, ... ,l 
the vector of the prices observed by the searcher in periods 
T1 , .. ·,Tj . 
the discount rate. 
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y an exogenous parameter conditioning psychic costs. 
8 a terminal decision procedure. 
8* an optimal tel~inal decision procedure. 
v = (vO,v I , ... ) - an observation number rule. 
an optimal observation number rule. v* = (vo,vi, ... ) 
"J J J. 
v = (vO'''''vJ _1) - an observation number rule when there are at most 
J periods in which search can occur. 
J* 
v an optimal observation number rule when there are at most J 
periods in which search can occur. 
bJ 
v the backward induction observation number rule when there 
are at most J periods in which search can occur. 
J J J ~j :::: (vj , ... ,VJ _1) - a truncation of the observation number rule 
J 
v . 
I; - a stopping rule. 
a stopping rule when there are only J search periods. 
- a backward induction stopping rule when there 
are only J search periods. 
J* J* J* J* I; (1;0 ';1 , ... ,1=;J ) - an optimal stopping rule when there are only 
1;* :::: 
P 
J p 
J* p 
p* 
J search periods. 
(t;"v,o) - a generalised search rule. 
(t;J,vJ,o) - a generalised search rule when there are at most J 
periods in which search can occur. 
(t;,J*,vJ*,o*) - an optimal generalised search rule when there 
are at most J periods in which can occur. 
(;*,v*,8*) - an optimal generalised rule. 
ps (1;,8) - a sequential search rule. 
p* (1;*,8*) - an optimal sequential search rule. 
s 
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Ps ::: (~,O) - a sequential search rule which minimises the ex ante 
expectation of the total expenditure on the purchase of a 
unit of commodity I, 
the empty set, 
~L (c2" ,., ,c. 1) ::: p~ ~ the function expressing the ith fixed point 1 . 1+ 1 
solution p~ in terms of marginal financial costs of search, 
1 
'l' = ('l' 0' 'l'I' .. , , 'l' j , , .. ) - a vector with components 'l' j which have the 
1 if and only if search halts in property that 'l'j(Yj) ::: ~j ::: 
period Tj' 'l'j(Yj)::: ~j = o otherwise, 
~. ::: 'l'. (y.) - the value of 'l'. for a given vector y. of price observations. 
J J J J J 
W ::: (wI"" ,wi) ~. the vector of the searcher's initial endowments of 
commodities 1 to t. 
the set of utility functions for which it is always optimal 
to search and always optimal to purchase one unit of commodity 
1. 
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APPENDIX II 
AN OUTLINE OF BAYESIAN INFERENCE 
This appendix gives a short outline of the fundamentals of the 
statistical tools of Bay~sian inference. The reader is referred to 
De Groot [9, chapters 8 and 12] for a far more complete explanation. 
The description given here uses the notation of the thesis to assist 
the reader in understanding how the technique is applied in the thesis. 
The source of uncertainty in a Bayesian problem is an unknown 
parameter w which affects a probability function f over an observation 
space PI' The usual way of denoting this is to write the probability 
function as f(Pllw). The Bayesian assumptions, which are informationally 
demanding, are (i) the Bayesian decision maker has complete knowledge 
of f except for w. 
(ii) the decision maker has a prior probability function 
g over W, the space of w. 
The decision maker is interested to refine his knowledge of w's 
true value because of the higher rewards available to him from making 
decisions with more accurate information about the true value. Since 
observations drawn from PI are all distributed with probability 
1 j function f(Pliw), a sample PI, ... ,Pl contains information which the 
decision maker can use to refine his prior probability function g(w), 
I j 
values PI'" ·,PI are observed. Bayes theorem gives the probabilities 
of values of w as 
I . 
1 . f(Pl.····piiw)g(w) 
g(WiPI· .. · ,pi) = A-2-1 
wff Iw)g(w)dw 
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for all w € W. This probability function is called the "posterior" 
probability function of w. The "unconditional" probability function 
f l j. hd . o Pl"" ,PI IS t e enomlnator of (A-2-1) and is denoted by 
A-2-2 
1 . 
As j + 00, g(wIPl",,~pi) approaches a limiting distribution which is 
degenerate at the true value of w. The probabilities of values of a 
(j+l)th observation p{+l as assessed by the decision maker after 
1 j 
observing Pl, ... ,Pl are, therefore, 
A-2-3 
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APPENDIX I II 
SUPERMARTINGALES AND STOPPING RULES 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide the reader with an 
explanation of how the consumer search problem can take on the structure 
of a supermartingale, De Groot [9, p. 353-369] gives an excellent and 
well referenced presentation of the properties of supermartingales and 
the relationships between supermartingales and optimal sequential 
stopping rules. 
I . 
Let 2j ::: zep1 •... ,pi) be a random variable whose value depends 
1 j 
on the first j observations P1 •... 'P1. 
Definition: 
The sequence Zl,22 •... is a supermartinga1e w.r.t. the sequence 
j ::: 1,2, .. , E[Zj] exists and, with probability 1, 
2 .. A-3-1 
J 
Definition: 
If the sequence 21 .22 •... is a supermartingale w.r.t. the sequence 
1 2 P1'P1 •... and if the expected value of 2 from search E[2 j *] ~ E[21] 
for every ~topping rule for which E[Z,*] exists, then the supermartingale 
~ . J 
Zl,22, ... is regular. 
In the context of a consumer's sequential search problem. the 
utility attainable after j observations P~, ... ,pi is 
~ - ~ - min max{U~(O),U~(l)} ::: max{IoeM,).I1eM,~eP1+t), )} 
J J J J J 
A-3-2 
1 j The utility attainable is thus dependent on the observations P1, ... ,P1 
and the variable max{UjeO),Uje1)} is of the form of 2j . Suppose that, 
after j observations have been taken~ the sequence of the expected 
utilities from search has the property that 
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A-3-3 
for all k 1,2, ... Comparing CA-3-3) to CA-3-1) shows that such a 
sequence of expected utilities is a supermartingale w.r.t. 
observations j+1 j+2 PI ,PI , ... 
De Groot [9, p. 359]) 
Let the sequence Z1,Z2"" be a supermartingale and suppose that 
the random variables Z1.Z2"" are uniformly integrable. 
exists for any stopping rule for which the probability of only a 
finite number of observations being taken is unity, and E[Zj*] ~ E[Z1]' 
The regularity property of the supermartingale sequence of 
expected utilities CA-3-3) is thus established if, for all j ::: 1.2, ...• 
the terms in (A-3-2) are shown to be uniformly integrable ie. for all 
j :::: 1,2, ... 
prClmax{!o(Mj ),I1 (Mj -(Pl+ t )~in)}1 ::; UB) ::: 1 A-3-4 
where UB < (X) an upper bound on the utility attainable from search. 
- - L Such an upper bound is max{I O(M),I1(M-Pl)} < 00 Set 
UB 
~ ~ L 
max {I 0 eM), I1 (M-PI)} A-3-5 
and (A,..3-.4) is established. The sequence of variables (A-3-2) with 
the property (A-3-3) therefore a regular supermartingale. 
The economic meaning of this is as follows. After j observations 
1 j Pl' ...• Pl. the searcher expects 
(i) E(max{U~ l(O),U! 1(1)}\Pl1, ... ,pJ1·] < max{U~(O).U!(l)} A-3-6 J+ J+ - J J 
(ii) E[max{Ul*(O)JU;*(l)}\p~"",p{] ~ E[max{UJ+l(O),UJ+l(l)}1 
1 . 
P1 p • , ,pi] A-3-7 
where j* ~ j+1. (i) says that the searcher expects to do no better 
j+l by taking a (j+l)th observation PI (ii) says that the searcher does 
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not expect the utility attainable from a search of (j+l) or more 
observations to exceed the utility expected to be attainable if only 
the (j+l)th observation p{+1 is taken. Overall, therefore, the searcher 
expects to do no better at any point in his search that is subsequent 
1 j to his present position of having taken observations Pl"'.,Pl' It 
is rational for him to stop search. This is the basis of the following 
theorem. 
Theorem: (see De Groot [9, p. 367]) 
Consider a problem of optimal sequential stopping in which an 
optimal stopping rule exists. Suppose that for any set of observed 
1 j l' 
values Pl, ... ,Pl for which E[Zj+l lp l, ... ,Pll ~ Zj' the sequence of 
future values Z. I'Z, 2"" is a regular supermartingale w.r.t. the J+ J + 
j+l j+2 
sequence of future observations PI ,PI ,.0. Then an optimal procedure 
1 j 
after any set of values Pl, ... ,Pl has been observed is to continue 
sampling if E[Zj+l lpi, ... ,pi] > Zj and to terminate the sampling 
process if E[Zj+l lp i, ... ,pi1 ~ Zj' 
Note that the only expectation considered by the searcher is the 
expectation after one additional observation. The theorem states that 
a myopic sequential search rule is optimal. When the theorem is 
placed in the context of the consumer search problem, the condition 
for taking the (j+l)th observation on PI is that 
E [max{Uj +1 (0) ~ Uj +1 (I)) Ipi, .. qp{] > max{Uj (0) ,Uj (1)} 
which~ by (2-5-19), implies that 
A-3-8 
E[V. l(s*,6*)ly.] ~ E[max{U~ I(O),U~ 1(1)} lp1l •... ,pJ1·] A-3-9 J+ J J+. J+ 
(A-3-9) is identical to the condition (2-7-40) which was claimed in 
Chapter 2 to be sufficient for myopic search to be optimal. 
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APPENDIX IV 
THE PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION OF SAMPLE MINIMA 
Sample minima are considered throughout a large portion of this 
thesis. This appendix gives a derivation of the p.d.f. of the 
minimum of a sample of j independent observations on P1 drawn from a 
population 'with p.d.f. f(P1Iw). 
A-4-1 
Therefore i min l' P1 ~ P1j for all :::: 1, .. " j , A-4-2 
with equality for at least one of i :::: l, ... ,j. Consider the 
b b 'l' h min pro a 1 1ty t at Plj > P1' Then, by (A-4-2), 
A-4-3 
The observations are independently and identically distributed so 
min j, 
pr(p1j > P1Iw):::: IT pr(p~ > Pl lw) 
i=1 
j 
::: IT ( 1 - F (p 1\ w) ) 
i=1 
min The c.d.f. of Plj is therefore 
pr(p~}n $ P1 iw) :::: 1 - (1 - F(P1Iw))j 
The p.d. f. min P1j is the differential w.r.t. P1 of (A-4-7), 
A-4-4 
A-4-S 
A-4-6 
A-4-7 
A-4-8 
